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Abstract
This dissertation is concerned with how the social capital of corporate insiders is
associated with the governance and performance of publicly listed small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) in Canada. The premise of social capital theory is that
relationships matter and that network structures have implications for outcomes.
Encouraging SME growth and performance is an important part of economic policy.
In Canada, going public is one way innovative SMEs can access capital for growth.
This research considers the network of relationships between directors, owners and
senior officers in a public corporation – i.e. the social capital of corporate insiders
– to better understand corporate governance. Family-run firms, large corporate
ownership and professional relationships between directors have been the subject of
numerous corporate governance studies. They can also be considered networks. In
this research, I assume that these various networks act to unite corporate insiders into
coalitions with similar interests. I consider the implications of social capital on firm
performance in terms of effective control, director independence, CEO ownership, and
family control of the firm. The hypotheses, generated from the theory of internal
social capital of the firm, are tested using fixed and random effects regression models
on a panel of Canadian industrial SMEs that had an initial public offering between
2000 and 2010. SME performance is measured by Tobin’s Q.
I find support for the idea that the structure of social capital within the firm
is related to corporate governance and associated with performance. My results
indicate that having multiple coalitions in the firm, as well as more independent
directors, are both positively associated with performance. There are also indirect
effects related to the social capital of the firm. After controlling for the structure
of social capital in the firm, CEO ownership is found to have no association with
firm performance, except in a few cases where the CEO owns in excess of 40 percent
of the firm. Once these cases are omitted from the sample there does not appear
to be a significant relationship between CEO ownership and performance. These
few cases suggest the role of CEO may be important to performance outcomes in
iii
highly controlled firms. Further case-study research into this finding may be merited.
Finally, I find no evidence that family-run firms have valuations that differ from other
firms.
The theory of internal social capital of a firm contributes to the corporate gov-
ernance literature by considering how the network of relationships within the firm
affects outcomes. There are also useful methodological contributions from this re-
search. Theoretically grounded network measures determine: (i) a scale of effective
control of a firm when there are multiple coalitions of owners, and (ii) a way to iden-
tify truly independent directors. Entrepreneurs, directors and managers will find this
research useful because it outlines how the structure of relationships within an SME
is associated with firm valuation.
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In this research, I argue that the network of relationships between directors, own-
ers and senior officers in a public corporation – i.e., the social capital of corporate
insiders – can be used to better understand corporate governance. The core idea of
social capital theory, which is a kind of network theory, is that individuals can gain
advantages through the structure of their relationships (Burt 1992). Following this
idea, I consider three different kinds of linkages between corporate insiders: (i) those
based on ownership, (ii) family relationships and (iii) professional relationships. Us-
ing social capital theory, I interpret the network of connections to better understand
the corporate governance of each firm. In my analysis, I find strong support for the
idea that the corporate governance of the firm has a significant association with firm
performance. This finding builds on a long history of corporate governance research.
This research makes use of a sample of Canadian industrial small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) that went public between the years 2000 and 2010. In
developed countries – most of which are dealing with the aftermath of the financial
1
crisis – encouraging SME growth and performance is an important part of economic
policy (BBC 2012, The Economist 2012, OECD 2012). In Canada, going public is
one way innovative SMEs can access the capital they need for growth. Understanding
factors that affect firm performance is important for researchers and policymakers
concerned with the SMEs on the public market.
1.1.1 Analyzing the Social Capital of Corporate Insiders
In this research, I assume that corporate insiders are part of coalitions within the
firm because of shared financial interests. I argue that researchers can trace these
interests back to the common networks insiders share. Collectively, each of the
coalitions within a firm controls some proportion of the outstanding voting shares
in the firm. The degree to which a single coalition controls more voting shares
than other coalitions within the firm is an indication of their effective control of the
organization. Similarly, if there are multiple coalitions controlling similar amounts of
voting shares, there is a degree of oversight over decisions within the firm. In the case
of multiple groups with similar voting rights, no single group can unilaterally control
the firm. In general, I argue that considering the relationships between insiders
through various networks can yield insight into firm governance and performance.
In what follows, I briefly outline some of the theories underlying the three main
networks used in this research. Economic sociologists have mainly been concerned
with the meaning of insiders’ professional interlocks across multiple firms. The im-
portance of ownership and family-run firms has largely, although not exclusively,
fallen in the domain of researchers interested in agency theory.
1.1.2 The Meaning of Corporate Interlocks
Network theory has benefited tremendously from the work done by economic sociol-
ogists interested in the underlying meanings behind corporate interlocks – directors
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that serve on the boards of multiple firms. This stream of research sees directors
that work together often as having more than just professional relationships. Cor-
porate interlocks have been investigated as conduits through which resources can
be exchanged between firms for mutual advantage (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978), ways
in which firms are linked to their creditors (Mintz & Schwartz 1985), and also as
indications of a distinct social class (Useem 1979).
1.1.3 Agency Theory and the Importance of Ownership and
Family
One of the most important obligations of directors is to oversee managers to ensure
that shareholders’ interests are protected. Berle & Means (1932) argue that in firms
where the stock is widely held, there is a separation between the dispersed owners
and the managers who actually control the firm. Agency theory formalizes this
relationship between the principals of a company (the shareholders) and their agents
(the managers) (Jensen & Meckling 1976). In this scheme, directors oversee managers
to protect the interests of dispersed shareholders.
Morck, Shleifer & Vishny (1988b) find a non-linear relationship between the
shareholdings of top managers and firm performance. Researchers continue to
try to unravel this relationship between ownership and performance (for a brief
review, see Benson & Davidson III 2009). In addition to this line of research,
the importance of concentrated ownership – i.e., a single owner with a large pro-
portion of voting shares – on firm performance is an important area of research
(Morck 2000, Maury & Pajuste 2005). Another active area of research considers how
family-run firms perform relative to other firms (Villalonga & Amit 2006, Villalonga
& Amit 2010, Morck 2005a).
All of these governance problems can exist simultaneously in public SMEs that
have recently undergone an initial public offering (IPO). Firms are often started by
an entrepreneur and the firm can grow, in part, through the efforts of her family.
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Over time, family, friends, business partners and early investors may also work for
the company. When the firm goes public, these insiders may retain a significant pro-
portion of the outstanding voting shares. By my calculations, slightly more than 40
percent of public SMEs that have recently undergone an IPO have families involved




This research asks: how is the social capital of corporate insiders related to the val-
uation of public SMEs in Canada? In this dissertation, I submit that the internal
social capital of a firm – or the structure of relationships that exist between directors,
owners and managers – operates both directly and indirectly to affect firm valuation.
The structure of the relationships between insiders directly affects how the firm is
operated. Essentially, the structure of relations results in a degree of informal over-
sight within the firm. The structure of relationships can also be useful to governance
research when it is used indirectly to inform other measures. The the direct and
indirect uses of social capital are discussed below.
Utilizing social capital theory, it is possible to infer which corporate insiders are
related by considering common ownership or family links. In this research, a group
of related insiders is assumed to be more likely to have similar concerns, and thus
to vote as a group on issues of common interest. Analyzing the total percentage
of the outstanding voting shares that are controlled by each insider coalition yields
information about the relative power of each coalition in the firm. Using social capital
theory to relate and compare these different coalitions in a firm, I create a measure
of effective control of the firm. At one extreme, the measure indicates that there is a
single coalition within the firm that can exercise total control. At the other extreme,
there are multiple coalitions of insiders that have similar voting rights. In this case,
no single group can unilaterally act to extract benefits from the firm without the
other coalitions overruling them. This is the informal oversight that can exist based
on the structure of relationships between insiders.
The second way in which the structure of relationships between insiders has im-
plications for firm governance is through an analysis of relationships that do not
exist. In this case, the network of relationships within a firm is used to determine
which insiders are not connected to anyone else in the firm network. Isolated direc-
tors can be considered to be independent – they do not share any common family,
ownership or professional links with any other insider in the corporation. In many
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governance studies, the determining who is an outside directors is largely an ad hoc
process that differs across studies. Most researchers agree that outside directors
must be independent but few have any theoretically grounded way of determining
independence.
The internal social capital of firms can also act on firms indirectly. It can be used
to help isolate an aspect of governance or act as a moderating effect on a relevant
concept of governance. This approach is important because firms have mainly been
treated as homogeneous in corporate governance studies. I argue that the structure
of the relationships between the corporate insiders can mean that there could be
different outcomes depending on the structure within the firm. I propose a new
agenda for corporate governance research that takes the internal social capital of
firms into account in the analysis of firm outcomes. This research follows along these
lines with an analysis of family-operated firms and CEO ownership. In both cases,




This research addresses the following questions:
1. How are the relationships that exist between different groups of insiders related
to corporate governance and, in turn, to firm performance?
2. How is the presence of independent directors in the firm associated with per-
formance?
3. Are family-run firms different from other firms? How is the corporate gover-
nance of these firms related to performance?
4. How is CEO ownership related to firm performance?
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1.4 Methodology
This research examines a panel of industrial SMEs in Canada that underwent an
IPO between 2000 and 2010. Fixed and random effects regressions are used to
model the corporate governance characteristics of the firm as they relate to firm
performance. Consistent with the existing literature, this research uses Tobin’s Q
as a measure of performance or firm valuation. Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of
book value of liabilities plus market value of common equity divided by the book
value of assets (Khanna & Palepu 2000, Klein, Shapiro & Young 2005, Martinez,
Stohr & Quiroga 2007, Elkinawy & Stater 2011). Research has shown that book
value of assets is highly correlated with replacement cost of capital (Hillman 2005).
Tobin’s Q accounts for the market’s perception of potential of the corporation to
grow. Thus, Tobin’s Q captures how much investors are willing to pay for the shares
of the company. Increases in market valuation could be due to improvements in
actual conditions the firm is experiencing, but may also be due to forward-looking
investors predicting future gains.
The usual difficulty in trying to explain firm performance is that firms are very
different. The solution for cases where there is variation among individual firms is
generally to use a fixed effects model. Unlike fixed effects models, which account for
variation within repeated observations of an individual firm, a random effects model
also accounts for variation between individual firms. For example, in the context of
the present study, a random effects model adds a term that will vary to account for
differences between firms. The random effect accounts for the observed deviations of
individual firms away from the average of the population. At its simplest, a random
effects model allows for individuals to have intercepts that differ (see Rabe-Hesketh
& Skrondal 2008).
1.4.1 Sample
I focus my research on Canadian SMEs that have recently gone public for a number
of reasons. The first is that the population of Canadian SMEs is important in its
8
own right. Like the AIM exchange in the UK, Canada encourages SMEs to access
funds through the public market. Per capita, Canada has the largest public exchange
for SMEs in the world (Nicholls 2006, pg.163). The second reason is that recently
public SMEs provide an opportunity to study firms in the beginning phases of their
existence as public firms. This is a particularly important time for SMEs and it
would be useful to better understand the implications that corporate governance has
for these firms. This is also advantageous because I can try to mitigate concerns
of endogeneity between managerial ownership and firm performance by constructing
a longitudinal panel of firms from their beginnings and measure the association of
ownership with performance.
Restricting the sample to recently public firms focuses the study on firms starting
out, and not the entire population of SMEs on the public market. I argue that this
approach is necessary because there are many SMEs that exist on the market but
may be in decline – perhaps due to events that are outside the observation window
of this study. Davis, Haltiwanger & Schuh (1996) outline the problem of dealing
with criteria for collecting a sample of SMEs over time. The authors note that one
major problem is that firms change over time, so setting arbitrary inclusion criteria
to be considered an SME is problematic. For example, if the criteria to enter the
panel is that the firm must employ 250 people or less to be considered an SME,
then large firms that are shrinking will enter the panel. Similarly, smaller firms that
grow will eventually leave the panel. Since there are a number of firms listed on
the public exchanges that are doing relatively poorly, we risk creating a downward
biased panel by selecting all SMEs that exist within a window of time. I argue that
a better solution is to follow firms from their IPO date onwards. This not only
mitigates concerns of public ownership levels being caused by performance, because
we capture the firm at the initial stages of ownership. It also focuses this research
on SMEs at an important period of their development.
Focusing on SMEs also has a further advantage. Smaller firms are much less
complex compared to larger firms. The relationships between corporate insiders are
often more straightforward. In larger firms, for example, there tends to be more
ownership that is held through complex arrangements through multiple corporations
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and shell companies. Family-run firms may also have multiple generations repre-
sented in the organization. For the SMEs in this study, the holdings by insiders are
relatively straightforward. Although Statistics Canada’s Inter-Corporate Ownership
database was consulted to examine the companies and ownership by insiders in this
study, most firms were not listed.
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1.5 Findings
The results of this research indicate that the presence of a larger proportion of
independent directors is positively associated with firm performance. Concentrated
ownership in the hands of a single coalition within the firm is negatively associated
with the performance of the firm over time.
More than 40 percent of firms in the population I consider in this research have
multiple family members acting as corporate insiders. A firm is considered to be
family-run only if family members are part of the largest shareholding group in the
study. I find no statistically significant differences between family-run firms and other
SMEs in the sample. In an examination of all firms, I find a relationship between
CEO ownership and firm performance. However, this finding is only statistically
different from zero in cases where the CEO owns in excess of 40 percent of the firm’s
outstanding voting shares. There are very few cases where the CEO owns such a
large percentage of the firm. For the majority of firms in the sample, there does not
appear to be any direct relationship between CEO ownership and performance.
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1.6 Approach and Limitations
The proposition that the social capital of boards of directors is associated with firm
performance is tested using a series of fixed and random effects regression mod-
els. Every attempt has also been made to introduce appropriate controls into these
models to account for firm size, regional differences, and industry differences.
However, this research also faces limitations. First, this analysis is concerned with
the internal social capital of firms (Harris & Helfat 2007) – i.e., the relationships be-
tween directors, managers and owners within a given firm. Thus, the present research
does not consider the importance of inter-organizational relationships. Second, this
analysis does not take into account director experience or other measurements of
human capital. Third, this research is specifically concerned with public SMEs that
have recently undergone an IPO on the Toronto Venture Exchange and the TSX.
The results may not be applicable to firms that are not part of this population.
Finally, the study relies heavily upon information from the System for Electronic
Disclosure of Insiders (SEDI). In Canada, insiders are required by law to report their
shareholdings and trades in SEDI. However, the system may contain errors when the
insiders make mistakes (McNally & Smith 2010).
1.6.1 Extensions
While the results of this study are not directly applicable to large firms, they do offer a
potential way forward in the study of corporate governance of larger firms. Likely the
most important changes necessary to the methodology described in this dissertation
would be to extend the criteria for relationships between corporate insiders to take
into account for more complex inter-corporate ownership structures that are common
in Canada (Morck, Strangland & Yeung 1998, Attiga & Morck 2006). For studies of




To date, the corporate governance literature has neglected to study the importance
of internal social capital to firm performance. This research contributes to the cor-
porate governance literature through its consideration of how the social capital of
corporate insiders can be used to understand corporate governance and, in turn, firm
performance. There are also methodological contributions from this research. The-
oretically grounded network measures determine both a scale of effective control of
a firm when there are multiple coalitions of owners, and also a way to identify truly
independent directors.
The increased interest by policy makers in new ways of allowing SMEs to access
capital make studies of these firms relevant and timely. The results of this research
offer a better understanding of corporate governance of SMEs and their performance
though an analysis of the relationships of corporate insiders. The main finding of
this research is that corporate governance is associated with SME performance.
This study builds on research drawn from the corporate governance and socio-
logical literature. The academic literature in these fields tends to focus on large,
established firms. Very little work examines the importance of corporate governance
to the performance of relatively small- and medium-sized firms. The contributions
of this research are in creating complementary models of SME performance which
include testable hypotheses about the social capital of corporate insiders. This re-
search will assess the importance of corporate governance to the performance of
SMEs. The outcomes of this research will potentially be of interest to three con-
stituencies: academics, policy makers and practitioners – entrepreneurs, managers
and directors.
Academics will be interested in this research because it offers a novel way to
approach firm corporate governance – through the use of social capital theory applied
to networks within the firm. The relationships between corporate insiders are used to
create measures of corporate governance based on insights from agency theory. Policy
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makers will find this work useful because it offers practical, quantitative methods
for measuring the relationships between corporate insiders. Entrepreneurs, directors
and managers will find this research useful because it will outline how different forms
of governance are generally associated with firm performance and valuation. This
knowledge can be used as the boards of SMEs are assembled or new members added
to existing boards.
In SMEs, many of the corporate insiders maintain relationships with the found-
ing entrepreneur. Family members, friends or early investors may all be corporate
insiders because of their personal relationships with the founder rather than merit.
Directors working with these firms need to be aware of the possible dynamics of
groups of insiders within the firm. The relationships highlighted in this study – fam-
ily, ownership and professional relationships – may affect how directors can do their






The purpose of this study is to better understand how the social capital of corporate
insiders affects firm performance and growth. Social capital is the idea that the
relationships a person has can be advantageous. In this study, I am concerned with
three types of relationships of corporate insiders. In this paper these are referred
to as relationships through mutual ownership, professional relationships and family
ties.
Some may find the rhetorical choice of phrases such as “ownership network” or
“family network” awkward. Indeed, the extant corporate governance literature rarely
refers to ownership or family control overtly as a network, especially when considering
the corporate governance structure within the firm. I argue that the relationships be-
tween individuals involved in these different networks should be explicitly accounted
for.
Currently, corporate governance considers the roles of executives and directors in
running a public firm. In the simplest version, directors are charged with overseeing
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executives on behalf of shareholders. However, the more closely we look at firms
in different circumstances – such as firms with large shareholders, or firms with
the majority of executives also serving as directors, etc. – the more this simple
explanation of corporate governance begins to break down. Indeed, much of the
corporate governance literature is concerned with discerning the implications that
real-world situations have for existing corporate governance theory. One of the main
difficulties that exists for researchers is determining what the conditions are that
actually exist in any particular firm.
For example, if theory tells us that concentrated ownership is negatively related to
performance, how can we verify this? Should we examine each individual’s holdings
in a corporation? Do we overlook the fact that multiple large shareholders are related
when we consider whether a corporation should be considered as being effectively
controlled? Moreover, how can we hope to consider the implications of multiple large
shareholders in a firm? I argue that examining the social capital of corporate insiders
– i.e., the structure of the network of ownership, professional and family relationships
that exists among corporate insiders – provides a useful and theoretically robust way
in which to better understand the conditions that actually exist in a firm.
The structure of relationships – the social capital of corporate insiders – allows
us a relatively simple way to determine if corporate insiders should be thought of
as a group. A group of related insiders – linked by shared ownership, professional
or family interests – can be thought of as having aligned interests and being more
likely to vote in concert. The approach also has another advantage. Those directors
that are not obviously part of any such insider group are more likely to act as truly
independent directors.
This network approach provides the frame in which the extant literature pre-
sented in this section is reviewed. Two areas of corporate governance research have
generated particular interest. The first has mainly focused on ownership in various
forms. The second, is family involvement in firms. The third section in this liter-
ature review is dominated by the approaches taken by economic sociologists. This
research often considers professional networks – the relationships between corporate
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insiders that exist when they work together through corporate interlocks. Social
capital theory is discussed in depth in this section.
As mentioned, the first type of relationship in this research is concerned with
ownership. In this research, I say that corporate insiders have a relationship if they
share common ownership in the firm – perhaps through an intermediate company.
Ownership and its relationship to control of the firm has been the central concern of
the corporate governance literature.
An important and growing area of research concerns the role of family involvement
in firms. This study is no exception to this trend and finds that family relations are
found to be an important type of corporate insider relationship that needs to be
accounted for. Family relations comprise the second aspect of relationships between
corporate insiders that are considered in this study.
Professional relationships comprise the third aspect of social capital considered in
this study. The economic sociology literature concerned with boards of director inter-
locks has been the focal point for advancements in our understanding of professional
relationships and in network theory more generally. This portion of the literature
review serves the dual purpose of showing the relevance of network approaches to
our understanding of organizations, as well as making explicit the importance of
relationships in business.
Before the review of the literature, I present a brief section giving some back-
ground to the economic landscape in Canada and the context in which SMEs must
operate within Canada.
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2.2 Understanding Canadian Markets
This section summarizes the unique characteristics of the Canadian stock market for
public corporations. In particular, it compares other national stock markets to the
Canadian system. The broader Canadian market also stands in stark contrast to
the UK and USA because of the prevalence of inter-corporate ownership in Canada
(Morck et al. 1998). These business groups, or corporate pyramids, allow for the con-
trol, if not majority ownership, of multiple corporations by a single owner (ownership
pyramids are tracked by Statistics Canada, see Statistics Canada 2010b). Business
groups in Canada are often family owned.
The Canadian economy and political system is similar in many respects to the
USA and the UK. All of these countries have common law legal systems, and can
be described as market-based economies (Porta, Lopez-de Silanes & Shleifer 1999).
However, despite these superficial similarities, there are important differences be-
tween the Canadian, American and British markets. Canadian IPOs tend to be
smaller than their British or American counterparts. By American standards, over
85 percent of Canadian IPOs are penny stocks – earning median proceeds from sales
of shares of $800,000 (Carpentier & Suret 2009, pg.102). Two aspects of the Canadian
stock market differentiate it from other exchanges. First, the listing requirements are
not as stringent as other countries. Second, firms do not have to be profitable, and
post-IPO proceeds need to be in excess of only half a million dollars, which should
sustain the firm for at least a year (Carpentier & Suret 2009, pg.102).
It should be noted that similar public exchanges for SMEs exist in other countries
– most notably the AIM exchange in the UK (London Stock Exchange 2012). Sim-
ilarly, there is the NYSE Alternext in Europe which exists to facilitate SME access
to institutional investors – although this is not a regulated market but a multilat-
eral trading facility under EU directives (see NYSE Euronext 2012). These types
of exchanges, which allow promising SMEs access to capital, may become increas-
ingly important over time. In the current climate of fiscal austerity, ways to increase
financing for SMEs is already an issue of international concern (OECD 2012).
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In Canada, a large portion of publicly traded corporations are involved in
resource-based industries and finance. There is a large number of small and micro-
sized public corporations, and a relatively small number of large public companies.
The two main exchanges in Canada are called the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX)
and the Toronto Venture Exchange (TSX-Venture, or simply the Venture Exchange).
However, there are also smaller exchanges such as the Canadian National Stock Ex-
change (CNSX) and the NEX. The CNSX currently lists just 143 stocks, and the NEX
is an exchange solely for companies that have fallen below the listing requirements
of the TSX Venture exchange. The Canadian stock exchanges are sometimes seen as
training grounds where successful corporations can graduate to a larger exchange to
access deeper capital pools (Carpentier & Suret 2009). Successful companies listed on
the venture exchange are encouraged to graduate to the TSX main exchange. Large
corporations on the TSX often, in turn, graduate to large international exchanges
such as the NYSE in the USA, or the NASDAQ. Smaller successful companies some-
times also choose to cross-list on international exchanges such as Britain’s AIM or
the London Stock Exchange (Carpentier & Suret 2009, Nicholls 2006, pg.158).
The composition of the TSX and the Toronto Venture Exchange are also worth
noting. The 200 largest firms account for approximately 88 percent of the total mar-
ket capitalization of both exchanges. The largest 100 firms on the TSX alone account
for over 70 percent of the capitalization of that exchange. In contrast, the smallest
2,000 listed firms account for less than nine percent of the market capitalization of
both exchanges. On the TSX alone, the smallest 1,000 listed firms account for just
5 percent of the total market capitalization (Nicholls 2006). While the venture ex-
change technically encourages larger firms to graduate to the TSX, the largest firms
in the venture exchange have a greater market capitalization than the smallest on
the TSX. Nicholls (2006) reports that the largest 63 corporations on the venture
exchange have greater market capitalization than over 600 TSX-listed companies.
Researchers have noted that Canadian firms tend to go public sooner than their
American or UK counterparts (Carpentier & Suret 2009, Nicholls 2006). The number
of public companies in Canada relative to the population is the highest in the world.
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Figure 2.1: TSX -Percentage of market capitalization and listed companies by in-
dustry (from Nicholls, 2006, pg.165)
In 1999, Canada had 130 listed companies per million people compared to approx-
imately 65 for Australia, nearly 29 for the USA and 31 for the UK (Nicholls 2006,
pg.153). The fact that Canada has a relatively underdeveloped venture capital (VC)
system has been offered as an explanation for the large number of small public com-
panies. The fact that Canadian venture capital is less capable than American ven-
ture capital explains why corporations need to access public capital markets sooner
(Cumming 2006, pg.221). Additionally, while Canada has a large number of public
companies, they tend to be thinly traded compared to other common law market-
based economies. Morck & Yeung (2006, pg.318) suggest that this is due to systemic
corporate governance problems in Canada.
The composition of Canadian firms on both exchanges is shown in Figure 2.1 and
2.2. By market capitalization, the TSX is dominated by oil and gas, financial services,
and industrial companies, followed by mining, communications and technology. The
TSX Venture exchange by market capitalization is dominated by mining, oil and gas,
followed by technology, manufacturing, and biotech.
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Figure 2.2: TSX Venture Percentage of market capitalization and listed companies
(adapted from Nichols, 2006, pg.166)
Large shareholders are a feature of the Canadian economy. Large shareholders
are of interest because they are in a position to control a company even if a large pro-
portion of its shares is widely held among many small investors. From a governance
perspective, this situation is a concern because of the potential for large shareholders
to use their controlling shares to influence corporate decision-makers for their private
benefit, to the detriment of smaller shareholders.
The natural questions that follow from this discussion are at what point a share-
holder should be considered large and at what point there should be concerns that
large shareholders exhibit effective control of the public company. In the most clear-
cut case, controlling shareholders own a simple majority (greater than 50 percent)
of the shares outstanding. In this case, the shareholders can appoint the board and
CEO. However, effective control can be exercised over a public company when a
much smaller fraction of the company is owned. The level of voting rights implying
effective control of a public corporation differs across jurisdictions. Usually, those
with ownership rights in excess of 5 percent are considered to be of interest, although
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blocks of 10 percent to 20 percent of shares has also been used as a threshold for
effective control (Porta et al. 1999). Large shareholders can effectively control a
corporation with less than a majority of the votes because small shareholders rarely
vote, and when they do they tend to vote for the recommended course of action in the
proxy circular. Large shareholders can recommend directors, managers and set the
corporate agenda largely uncontested (for an in-depth discussion, see Morck 2005b).
The discussion so far assumes the simplest case that each share of stock cor-
responds to a single vote. In reality, Canadian public companies often issue mul-
tiple classes of shares that allocate different voting rights to different shareholders
(Morck et al. 1998, Amoako-Adu & Smith 2001). For example, this was the case
for Magna International, a Canadian corporation that was effectively controlled by
Frank Stronach through so-called “dual-class” shares. Stronach had relatively little
in the way of direct dividend rights from shares, but the class of shares he owned
gave him a majority of the voting rights. In 2010 Magna paid what some sharehold-
ers argue was an excessive amount to sell his super-voting shares and restructure
Magna as a widely held firm with a single class of shares (Keenan 2010, Miller &
Keith 2010).
In Canada, legal voting control exists if more than 50 percent of the outstanding
shares are held. In cases where an individual holds more than 20 percent of a firm’s
outstanding shares, they are considered to have effective control of the company,
unless otherwise proven (Nicholls 2006, pg.168). Those with control of 10 percent or
more are deemed to be “insiders” by provincial securities regulators (Nicholls 2006,
pg.168). Since 2003, insiders of public corporations must report their holdings in the
company online (see www.sedi.ca, CDS Inc. 2010). Other methods of control include
the use of dual-class shares (Nicholls 2006).
The prevalence of controlling shareholders in the Canadian economy effectively
changes the focus of Canadian regulatory concerns compared to the USA and the
UK. The USA and the UK have mainly widely held public corporations. In their
seminal work, Berle & Means (1932) argued that in widely held corporations, that
there exists a separation between the interests of owners (i.e., shareholders) and
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managers. The authors argued that managers have little incentive to operate the
company in the interests of shareholders because individual shareholders are too
small and unorganized to effectively monitor those that manage their investments.
In the governance literature, the central concern is often focused on shareholders and
management (Berle & Means 1932, Cheffins & Bank 2009). With the presence of con-
trolling shareholders, the problem becomes dealing with conflicts between majority
owners and minority owners (Daniels & Morck 1995, Nicholls 2006).
Of the 300 largest firms on the TSX, more than 25 percent have a controlling
shareholder (Gray 2005b, Gray 2005a). Using the inter-corporate ownership database
from Statistics Canada (Statistics Canada 2010a), Nicholls (2006) breaks down the
control structure of the 100 largest TSX listed firms as follows:
Table 2.1: Ownership of the 100 largest firms listed on the TSX (Nicholls, 2006)
Number Ownership
41 of 100 largest firms on the TSX Single shareholder with 10 percent or more
of outstanding shares
30 of the 41 Have a single owner with at least 20
percent equity ownership stake
20 of the 30 Have a single controlling shareholder
Corporate insiders include those such as management, directors or others who
own in excess of 10 percent of voting shares. Between the USA and Canada, there
appear to be significant differences in the level of insider ownership (Rao & Lee-
Sing 1995). In this comparison of different-sized corporations (see Figure 2.3, below),
Canadian smaller firm insiders on average have higher ownership levels compared to
their American counterparts. However, as progressively larger firms are examined,
there appears to be a decline in Canadian insider ownership and then an increase as
sales levels increase. In American firms, ownership levels appear to steadily decline
as the level of sales of a firm increases.
Comparing the number of directors in samples of US and Canadian firms, there
appears to be very little difference. The number of inside directors, or directors who
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Figure 2.3: Percentage of voting shares held by insiders, by size class (adapted from
Rao & Lee-Sing, 1995, pg.50)
also serve as firm management, is lower in Canada than the USA despite the fact
that the basic structure – the ratio of inside directors to the total number directors
– is similar across size classes (Rao & Lee-Sing 1995).
Corporations with dual-class voting shares are also common on the TSX. It is
estimated that 20 percent to 25 percent of stocks listed on the TSX have some type
of dual-class voting share (Gray 2005b, Nicholls 2006). When groups of firms have
hierarchical inter-corporate ownership interests, they are often referred to as corpo-
rate pyramids. Such interrelations between corporations are considered problematic
because of the risk of the tunnelling of wealth, or transferring goods at below or
above market prices, between a public corporation to a privately held corporation
(Morck & Yeung 2006, pg.306).
While Canada, USA and the UK all have legal systems based on the British
common law, critics charge that the legal environment in Canada regarding corpo-
rate ownership remains rooted in the past. Over time, the USA and the UK have
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developed different legal regimes to encourage mainly freestanding public corpora-
tions. Governance experts have noted that Canada is more accurately comparable to
Latin America, East Asia and parts of Europe because of the nation’s preponderance
of corporate pyramids and dual-class voting shares (Morck & Yeung 2006). While
at one point similar, modernizations in American and British corporate governance
have made it so that suggesting to import governance solutions from these coun-
tries into the Canadian environment are “embarrassingly like debates about the best
global positioning system to install in a horse-drawn buggy.” (Morck & Yeung 2006,
pg.286).
In America, pyramids disappeared because of New Deal reforms to the tax code
that penalize inter-corporate dividends. These regulations tax earnings as they are
passed up through the levels of a corporate pyramid (Morck, Wolfenzon & Yeung
2005, Morck & Yeung 2006, pg.308). In the UK, regulatory changes enacted after
WWII force shareholders to acquire complete ownership if they acquire more than 30
percent of outstanding shares. This legislative change allows large block-holders in
public firms to be challenged by other large investors; if one individual takes a large
position in a public company, another large shareholder can challenge their control.
Vying for control though stock purchasing can only increase until the 30 percent
threshold is reached, which will force one of the investors to take the corporation
private. Morck & Yeung (2006) argue that these differences mean that governance
in the USA and the UK is implicitly concerned with widely held corporations. In
Canada, however, the unit of analysis should more accurately be the business group
rather than the individual firm, which is assumed to be freestanding (Morck & Yeung
2006, pg.300).
Morck (2005) notes that inter-corporate dividends account for 20 to 40 percent of
income in corporate Canada, compared to just eight percent in the USA. The main
problem with pyramidal business groups is that they can exert tremendous control
over capital without a corresponding equity stake. At an extreme is Sweden’s Wal-
lenberg family, which controls a pyramidal business group that accounts for over half
of the Swedish stock exchange by market capitalization (Morck 2005, p.144). More
subtly, powerful family businesses have a tendency to become entrenched over time.
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Powerful family-owned business groups have a tendency to maintain contacts within
governments and to become adept at encouraging beneficial legislation. Anecdotal
accounts in the Canadian context abound (Morck 2000). For example, in 1991, the
Bronfman family was allowed to move $2 billion from Canada, exempt from capi-
tal gains taxes, presumably with the blessing of the Liberal government of the day
(Morck 2000, Morck & Yeung 2006, pg.307).
The ultimate impact of pyramidal ownership on small firm IPOs in Canada is un-
known. Some firms IPO with ownership stakes from pyramids, while other firms even-
tually become acquired by pyramidal groups. While venture capital investors have
been found to have a beneficial effect on firm performance (Carpentier & Suret 2009),
it is unlikely that large block-holders would consistently have the same outcome. In
Canada, research shows that for larger firms, stocks that are controlled by others
are priced lower than comparable stocks not so controlled (Smith, Amoako-Adu &
Kalimipalli 2009).
This brief review is intended to explain the structural characteristics of the Cana-
dian public market. Despite the large number of public firms, there is often very lit-
tle trading of stock relative to other market-based economies. In general, Canadian
firms appear to go to the equity market for financing well before other firms in other
common-law countries such as the USA, the UK and Australia. This is potentially
due, at least in part, to a systemic failure of venture capital in Canada to successfully
bring firms to an initial public offering. As a result, Canadian stock markets have a
large number of small firms and these firms are often thinly traded. The American
and British corporate governance literature often implicitly assumes that firms are
freestanding organizations, and hence that the most pressing governance problems
will be between the interests of management and dispersed shareholders. In the
Canadian context, studies clearly show the influence of corporate control exercised
through pyramidal business group structures or stocks with differing voting rights.
Given these facts, what are the implications for firms that have recently undergone
an IPO? At the very least, one thing is certain: to be accurate, studies must take
into account the unique Canadian market conditions.
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2.3 Ownership Networks
In their influential book The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle &
Means (1932) argue that there exists a separation of ownership and control in the
modern corporation. Firms with widely held shares are not accountable to share-
holders because individual shareholders are too small to effectively challenge man-
agement. Instead, a professional class of managers effectively controls the assets of
shareholders (Cheffins & Bank 2009).
Principal-agent theory in the corporate governance literature formalizes the
potential for divergence of interests between management and small shareholders
(Jensen & Meckling 1976). Within this framework, shareholders are considered the
principals, and the firm’s managers their agents. Holding little equity interest them-
selves, managers (the agents) have an incentive to misallocate the profits that belong
to the principals (shareholders) for their own ends. While boards of directors are put
in place to monitor management, they too are subject to a principal-agent problem.
Directors can become entrenched in their positions, choosing to exercise no effective
oversight over management.
The solution proposed by agency theorists is to realign the interests of agents
with the principals, by ensuring that agents own equity in the firm. By becoming
shareholders, agents are thought to have less incentive to engage in behaviours that
do not benefit shareholders.
Early research suggests that there is a not a simple linear relationship between
the size of executive ownership and firm performance (Morck et al. 1988b). However,
theory does not predict what the relationship between ownership and performance
should be. In their exploratory empirical study, Morck et al. (1988b) use Tobin’s
Q as a measure of the firm’s performance. Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of
the market value of the firm, consisting of intangibles as well as existing physical
stock of capital, divided by the replacement cost of physical assets (Morck et al.
1988, p.296). This definition implies that when the firm is highly valued because it
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possesses intangible goods, Tobin’s Q will be high. Intangibles include things such as
good management, strong patent portfolios or the market power of the firm. Hence
the measure accounts for the market’s perception of potential of the corporation to
grow. A Tobin’s Q greater than one is thought to mean that the firm is performing
well, less than one indicates that the firm is under-performing.
In a cross-sectional sample of Fortune 500 companies, Morck et al. (1988b) find
firm performance is highest in cases where cumulative executive ownership is about
5 percent. Higher rates of ownership are associated with declining performance un-
til executives own more than 25 percent of the firm. After this point, performance
is observed to increase again (see Figure 2.4, on page 29). All of the findings are
individually and jointly statistically significant. Based on this exploratory empirical
evidence, moderate executive ownership should be associated with increased firm
performance because executive interests will be aligned with shareholders. The au-
thors speculate that the decrease in performance that is associated with ownership
greater than 5 percent is due to the entrenchment of executives. Entrenchment im-
plies that management of corporate assets is less effective when executives have few
constraints acting on them (Morck et al. 1988b, pg.294). In other words, there is
little incentive for executives to work effectively when they are confident that they
cannot be removed based on their performance.
The effects of entrenchment and convergence of interests are predicted to affect
performance in opposite ways. Performance of firms where executives are entrenched
is expected to be lower. The performance of firms where there is significant man-
agement ownership is predicted to be higher. However, given that both of these
effects are related to firm ownership by executives, it is unclear which effect should
be expected to dominate in empirical observations. There is no ownership thresh-
old established by theory indicating at which points effects should, on average, be
stronger than the other.
The relationship between firm performance and executive ownership is also in-
vestigated by Loderer & Martin (1997). Contrary to Morck et al. (1988b) findings,
they find no clear indication that firm performance is necessarily related to executive
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Figure 2.4: The relationship between board ownership and Tobin’s Q implied by
the piecewise linear OLS regression of Tobin’s Q on board ownership and other firm
characteristics for 371 Fortune 500 firms (from Morck et al 1988)
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ownership. Instead, they argue, the opposite could be the case: executive ownership
could increase because of firm performance. In other words, the authors suggest
that managers could be rewarded for good firm performance. The authors examine
executive ownership in cases where firms acquire another company. They estimate
two regression equations simultaneously, which are designed to show whether exec-
utive stock ownership affects performance or vice versa. One equation models the
returns from the acquisition, and the other equation models executive shareholdings.
The sample is composed of 867 companies that acquired other firms between 1978
and 1988 in the USA Loderer & Martin (1997, pg.227). The results of estimating
these two equations indicates to the authors that executive stock holding does not
appear to influence performance, but firm performance does appear to influence the
amount of stock executives hold. While it is possible that the sample of acquiring
firms is not broadly representative of firms, their method and results indicate that
endogeneity could be a problem in simple regression models. As a result, they argue
that researchers need to carefully consider the direction of causal relationships in
models.
Demsetz & Villalonga (2001) explore the relationship between firm performance
and ownership structure through the analysis of multiple variables measuring exec-
utive ownership as well as the ownership of major shareholders. The authors argue
that Berle & Means’s (1932) research implies that the more dispersed the ownership
of a firm is, the better the performance should be. Demsetz & Villalonga (2001)
counter that corporate ownership is better considered as being a result of firm per-
formance over time. This means statistical studies that do not take into account the
inter-relatedness of ownership and firm performance will be biased.
Some aspects of the study are worth noting. The authors consider ownership in
terms of major shareholders and with respect to executive shareholdings. They use
a panel of firms with the performance measure of Tobin’s Q and independent vari-
ables as the average of the years 1976 and 1980. In order to model the simultaneity
problem, the problem where performance and ownership could be simultaneously
determined through a circular relationship, the authors also examine regressions
with ownership as both the dependent and an independent variable. Besides control
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variables, both equations make use of ownership variables as explanatory variables.
Using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, the authors find a relationship be-
tween executive ownership and firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. However,
treating executive ownership as an endogenous variable, and using two-staged least
squares regression, the authors find that this relationship disappears. The authors
argue that the study provides unequivocal evidence that ownership is endogenously
determined.
There are some potential problems with the study. First, the study does not
differentiate between management and board of director ownership. Instead, these
two groups are treated as a homogeneous unit. There is not a measure of institutional
representation on the board. Additionally, the sample is based on data from an earlier
paper (Demsetz & Lehn 1985). However, the authors note that only a portion of
the data from the earlier study is still available. These concerns aside, the authors
raise a number of important points. Researchers need to be concerned with the
endogeneity of ownership structures (i.e., the ultimate direction of the relationship
of ownership with performance), as well as the statistical approaches used to measure
this relationship.
Inevitably, the conflicting evidence from various researchers has led to a careful
examination of empirical approaches used in order to understand the discrepancies
between theory and the seemingly diverse results. Benson and Davidson III (2009)
note that the different results may be explained as an artifact of measurement prob-
lems combined with modelling choices. The studies that find no relationship between
managers’ ownership of equity and performance measures use fixed effects estimation
procedures. Fixed effects estimation methods analyze variation within firm observa-
tions over time by subtracting the group average to control for other manager- and
firm-specific variables (Benson & Davidson III 2009, Zhou 2001). The problem, first
noted by (Zhou 2001), is that because managerial ownership levels change so slowly,
there is likely to be very little within-firm change over time. Instead, the changes
will be more noticeable examining between-firm variations. The size of the firm,
often used as a denominator in models, will also have an important impact. A multi-
million-dollar increase in the wealth of an executive may be lost when considered
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relative to the market value of a Fortune 500 company (Hall & Liebman 1998, Ben-
son & Davidson III 2009).
Following Hall & Liebman (1998), Benson & Davidson III (2009) suggest that
a better measurement of management’s ownership stake in the company needs to
be used. They suggest a measure of pay-performance semi-elasticity (ppse), which
measures the dollar value of executive wealth to be gained for each percentage change
in firm value (Benson & Davidson III 2009). They argue that this measure exhibits
more variability that also accurately represents the stake management has in the
corporation. Using this measure, the authors find a consistent U-shaped relationship
between ownership and performance under a variety of specifications and validity
checks. This result is similar to that of (Morck et al. 1988b).
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2.3.1 Inside and Outside Directors
While executive ownership of the corporation is an important part of agency theory,
the composition of the board is also a focus of interest for many scholars. The sole
duty of boards of directors is technically to oversee the work of CEOs and senior
management. In practice, however, some boards of directors are often composed
of members of the top management team itself. In cases where senior managers
effectively control the board, there remains the potential for agency problems. There
are other cases where the directors are somehow connected to those that operate the
company. Directors that are somehow associated with management are often termed
insider directors. Directors that are deemed to be independent are often called
outside directors. These outside directors are not employed by the corporation in
other capacities and are independent of management for that reason.
Outside directors are generally considered to be more effective overseers of man-
agement. As a result, agency researchers are often interested in the number of outside
directors on the board. Theoretically, outside directors are thought to be more likely
to challenge CEOs and managers on questionable expenditures on behalf of residual
claimants – the shareholders. In practice, the composition of boards is often de-
termined by the CEO, which casts doubt on the ultimate independence of directors
(Weisbach 1988). However, Fama & Jensen (1983) counter that board members have
not only a legal obligation, but also their own professional reputations to consider,
which will give them added incentive to ensure shareholder interests are protected
(Fama & Jensen 1983).
While there is broad consensus in what generally constitutes an outside director
there appears to be no consensus in the details of actually determining an outside
director. For Borokhovich, Parrino & Trapani (1996, pg.344) the situation is straight
forward – outside directors are those directors that are not officers of the firm. Cyert,
Kang & Kumar (2002, pg.461) extend the definition of an outside director to ensure
that a director is not related to the CEO, nor are they direct employees of the
firm. Srinivasan (2005, pg.305) is more general, stating that outside directors “are
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defined as board members who have no relationship with the company other than
their role as directors”. Peng’s (2004, pg.454) definition of an outside director is
that directors have no family relations with the firm’s management, or professional
dealings directly with the firm or the management. All of these different definitions
of outside directors overlap to some degree. However, there are clearly significant
differences in the ways some authors define outside directors.
Perhaps not surprisingly given the diversity of definitions, the empirical evidence
concerning outside directors has been mixed. Hermalin & Weisbach (1991) find lit-
tle evidence indicating that board composition has an effect on performance once
ownership, CEO tenure, and board experience and firm control variables are taken
into account. The authors note that this result is inconsistent with the governance
literature up to that point. It could also be that firms benefit from having mainly
internal board members because of their familiarity with the firm and its challenges
(Hermalin & Weisbach 1991, pg.111). Another possible explanation is that the vari-
able did not accurately capture true outsiders to the firm. Hwang & Kim (2009) use
the social ties of directors, in addition to traditional measures of financial or familial
ties, to determine director independence. Using their social measures, the authors
find that social ties matter for various measures related to governance. A major
result of their findings is that many boards that are considered independent actually
are not.
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2.3.2 Concentrated Corporate Ownership
The precise implications of the existence of large shareholders is a complex topic.
Berle and Means have become widely influential because of their observation that
the interests of managers can become uncoupled from those of small shareholders
(Berle & Means 1932, Cheffins & Bank 2009). From this perspective, increasing
ownership should reduce this separation of interests. In this thesis, this is termed as
a Type I agency problem (this is derived from Villalonga & Amit (2006), who use a
slightly different terminology). There also exists a second agency problem. Type II
agency problems refer to large shareholders that use their position to extract private
benefits from the firm at the expense of other shareholders. This Type II agency
problem is common in countries where there are many business groups (for a review
of international corporate ownership see Morck, Percy, Tian & Yeung 2005). In the
Canadian context, Type II agency problems are more likely to arise because of the
large number of business groups (Bozec & Laurin 2008, Morck & Yeung 2006). It is
worth noting that the USA and UK have the fewest business groups relative to the
rest of the world.
There is growing interest in international studies of countries with Type II agency
problems, such as Canada, where family-controlled business groups are common
(Morck 2005). These studies tend to emphasize four problems with large sharehold-
ers (Bozec & Laurin 2008, Morck & Yeung 2006, pg.27). The first problem is that
controlling shareholders can force the firm to make decisions that are sub-optimal
for smaller shareholders. For example, controlling shareholders may resist takeovers,
even if shareholders would benefit. Similarly, controlling shareholders may decide to
engage in acquisition activity for reasons unrelated to future profits – as a matter of
family pride, for example. Third, controlling shareholders may appoint family mem-
bers or less-than-capable associates to the board – a point echoed by the fieldwork
of Leblanc & Gillies (2005). Fourth, large shareholders can engage in tunnelling
of wealth out of the firm and into other investments that benefit the controlling
shareholder at the expense of small shareholders (Bozec & Laurin 2008, Morck &
Yeung 2006).
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In one of the few Canadian governance studies examining multiple sizes of firms,
Rao and Lee-Sing observe that the majority of Canadian firms have a controlling
shareholder (Rao & Lee-Sing 1995, pg.47). They also find that, in general, legal
ownership (more than 50 percent of voting rights) is associated with relatively lower
growth compared to widely held firms (less than 20 percent of voting rights), and
effectively controlled (20–49 percent of voting rights) firms (Rao & Lee-Sing 1995,
pg.61, 101). However, it should also be noted that the levels of ownership differ
across industry categories. Technology-intensive manufacturing appears to have the
lowest rate of controlling ownership, with over 88 percent of firms being widely held
(Rao & Lee-Sing 1995, pg.48).
High levels of inter-corporate ownership are common throughout the world.
Canada is no exception (see Figure 2.5). Governance researchers generally point
out that the presence of large shareholders in a company may indicate a Type II
agency problem.
Figure 2.5: Listed companies under majority control (from Allaire, 2010, p18)
Most of the empirical research concerned with the performance of firms with large
shareholders assumes that the large shareholder completely controls the firm (Laeven
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& Levine 2007). Researchers generally only take into account the characteristics of
the largest shareholder and exclude other large shareholders and managers. However,
not all researchers make this assumption. Maury & Pajuste (2005) find evidence that
more equal distribution of voting shares among large shareholders has a positive effect
on firm valuation in Finland. This is consistent with the idea that large shareholders
can be monitored by other large investors in order to ensure that smaller shareholders’
interests are protected (Tjaden 2010, Maury & Pajuste 2005, Connelly, Hoskisson,
Tihanyi & Certo 2010).
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2.4 Family Networks
Throughout the world, family firms have been found to be large shareholders in
corporations. Often these wealthy families are the descendants of successful en-
trepreneurs (Morck 2005a). This fact has encouraged many scholars to investigate
the link between family ownership and corporate performance.
Researchers have found that investors appear willing to pay a premium to
own shares in a company where the original entrepreneur manages the company
(Villalonga & Amit 2006, pg.394). However, firms where descendants are appointed
to lead the firm generally suffer a decrease in firm value (Smith & Amoako-Adu 1999).
Working with a sample of large American firms from 1994 to 2000, Villalonga & Amit
(2006) find that family ownership creates value only in cases where the original owner
is the CEO. In cases where a relative is appointed, value of the firm is lessened. Using
both fixed effects and random effects models, the authors find that control-enhancing
mechanisms such as dual-class shares also destroy market value.
In Canada, major shareholders – often the founding family (Allaire 2010) – may
choose to maintain control over their enterprise using dual-class shares. Structures
such as dual-class shares or corporate pyramids are often used to maintain control
in firms with minimal costs. Governance researchers are concerned about situations
such as these because individuals can control corporations despite having minimal
amounts of equity invested in them.
King & Santor (2008) use a random effects model to examine how family own-
ership in Canada affects performance and capital from 1998 to 2005. The authors
distinguish family ownership from control-enhancing mechanisms such as dual-class
shares. They find that family controlled firms with a single class of shares have
similar performance to widely held firms. However, family owned firms with dual-
class shares have a market valuation about 17 percent lower. This finding leads the
researchers to conclude that it is not family controlled firms per se but the pres-
ence of dual-class shares or pyramidal ownership structures that are problematic for
valuations.
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2.5 Professional Networks and Social Capital
For the most part, research concerned with corporate governance overlooks the fact
that corporate insiders tend to know one another. Directors in particular often
serve on the boards of multiple companies simultaneously. Historically, much has
been made of these corporate interlocks especially by those concerned with unfair
business practices (Brandeis 1914) . However, it has been left to the field of economic
sociology to explore the implications of these connections between insiders.
Economic sociology has explored these connections through the development of
many different theories. At the core of all of these theories has been a concern with
the underlying network that links individuals into identifiable clusters. This concern
with the relations between individuals has led sociologists and social psychologists
to develop a more general theory of social networks. The concept of social capital is
one way in which social network structures are theoretically understood.
This section on professional networks serves a dual purpose. The first is to intro-
duce the concept of relationships between corporate insiders – especially directors.
Most of this research and related theory has been done by economic sociologists.
The other purpose is to introduce the idea of social capital and to explain how this
concept is used to theorize about the importance of networks in social and economic
contexts.
This section will begin with an overview of social capital and network theory,
followed by a discussion of three influential theories concerned with the importance
of the social network of directors. Finally, attention will be drawn to more recent
research that considers how the relationships between directors in a firm can be
treated as a network. The authors draw a distinction between what they call social
capital that is internal to the firm, compared to social capital that involves linkages
that extend outside the firm.
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2.5.1 Social Capital Theory
The idea that knowing people can bring benefits is well known. Social capital is
the idea that relationships can be valuable and advantageous. While this basic idea
is appealing, there is dispute among academics regarding what precisely should be
considered social capital and what should not (Lin 1999). In order to define and
better understand the concept of social capital, the following section will briefly
discuss the origins of the idea and some of the meanings that the phrase has taken
on over time.
Social capital can be traced from its intellectual roots in context with other
forms of capital. In the classical theory of capital, Marx saw capital as the tool
by which the bourgeoisie exploits the proletariat by extracting the surplus value
from the production process (Lin 1999, pg.28-31). Over time, researchers extended
the concept of capital beyond physical goods and money. Human capital explained
how individuals capture more of the surplus value as they develop skills or talents
that allow them to demand a higher wage (Lin 1999, pg.31). Social capital is “the
contextual complement to human capital” (Burt 2002, pg.202). Those individuals
who are better connected tend to gain more advantages.
Lin (1999, pg.33) argues that the benefits of social capital are derived from three
sources. First, social capital allows for the flow of information between individuals,
which can reduce transaction costs. For example, members of the same graduating
class may share job opportunities. Second, social capital can exert influence on
others. For example, people are more likely to be positively disposed toward people
about whom their friends speak highly than toward complete strangers. Third,
social credentials are derived through belonging to groups. For example, having a
professional designation may entail a degree of standing in one’s community.
The precise methods by which individuals gain advantages through their connec-
tions is debated. The main controversy stems from whether social capital is an asset
of the individual or a collective. Lin argues that social capital is something that is
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embedded in social relationships between individuals (Lin 1999, pg.35). More pre-
cisely, Lin defines social capital as “resources embedded in a social structure which
are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions.” (Lin 1999, pg.35). Lin argues
that something of value must be “embedded” in the relationship, that individuals
need to be able to access this value, and also be able to use it.
In his social resource theory, Lin argues that resources are embedded in one’s
network of relationships with others. These resources are captured as characteristics
of one’s contacts. These resources are intuitive and often readily observable as wealth,
power or status (Lin 1999, pg.36).
Coleman envisioned social capital as having to do with the closeness of relation-
ships between people (Coleman 1988, pg.105). Coleman sees social capital deriving
from communal forces – people working together to achieve some goal, or a general
norm that confers benefits to the group. Structurally, Coleman describes this soli-
darity as “closure”. In essence, more tightly knit groups (groups that exhibit greater
closure) likely have more social capital. For example, a close family in a community
where people know one another will have fewer children that drop out of school com-
pared to other communities. Here, the emphasis on social capital comes from the
fact that people are part of tightly knit communities. The density of links between
people make it easier for them to find out about problems with children and deal
with them when they arise.
The idea that social capital is derived mainly from the closure of a group has
been questioned. Other theorists note that certain individuals can act as “bridges”
between groups. Structurally, individuals who act as bridges can become sources of
valuable information. Granovetter’s (1973) work exploring how people find a job has
become a classic example of the importance of “weak links” between people bringing
benefits. Granovetter found that distant acquaintances, not close friends, were often
sources of information about job opportunities. Burt’s (2000) idea of structural holes
formalizes this kind of “bridging” relationship. Burt (2005) also refers to individuals
in a position to act as a bridge between groups as “brokers” because these individuals
gain advantage from brokering information between groups. In contrast, closure does
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not explain what happens when individuals benefit from extended networks of friends
and acquaintances.
Burt (2000) argues that there are too many general metaphors for social capital.
Rather than broad metaphors, Burt argues that social capital research would benefit
by considering only specific examples of structures of relationships in a network.
Burt argues that for clarity, specific cases need to be considered and the network
mechanisms need to be clearly described. Otherwise, the sheer diversity of metaphors
that exist to explain social capital by reference to different examples will impede
productive discussion (Burt 2000).
Burt defines social capital as “the advantage created by a person’s location in
a structure of relationships” (Burt 2005, pg.4). Burt’s insistence on the struc-
ture of relationships forces a degree of concreteness on this complex theoretical
discussion. Coleman’s emphasis on the importance of closure in groups is taken
by Burt to be an important part, but only a part, of explaining social capital in
network terms (Burt 2000, Coleman 1988). Rather than just closure, social capi-
tal must also include the idea of information passing between close groups. Gra-
novetter’s weak ties argument famously highlights the important effects individuals
can have when they act to broker information between otherwise distinct groups
(Granovetter 1973, Granovetter 1983).
Burt argues that brokerage and closure are both key elements of social capital
(Burt 2000, Burt 2005). In closure, there can be more trust because groups enforce
norms. Lin (1999, pg.34) highlights these dense networks as important for main-
taining resources within the group. However, bridging different dense groups is a
preferable model to understand the processes of searching for and acquiring infor-
mation (Burt 2000, pg.355). In Burt’s parlance, structural holes exist between dense
groups and the individuals that act to bridge groups are in a position to gain ad-
vantage. It is important to note, however, that even if individuals occupy a network
position that appears to provide advantage, they are not expected necessarily to take
advantage of it. In short, a social structure may influence an individual, but it will
not necessarily influence an individual. Individuals make decisions and cause things
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to happen – social structure is not the cause of any event – see Burt (1992). For a
discussion of structuralism in general, see Flew (1995, pg.109).
2.5.2 The Underpinnings of Network Theory
Much of modern network theory developed from the work of social psychologists.
Perhaps the earliest formal paper concerned networks was written by Bavelas (1950).
Bavelas’s (1950) paper was concerned with how small groups can be affected by
the structure of the communication network they are within – even if they are not
aware of the network topology. Bavelas found that different network configurations
actually appeared to influence the efficiency with which the task was performed and
the morale of those involved. To distinguish the networks and the positions that
people occupied within them, Bavelas developed a measure of how central a given
actor was within the network. This key idea of centrality has been adopted by the
networking literature. Perhaps more importantly, Bavelas’s (1950) insight that the
structure of relationships in a network can influence outcomes has deeply influenced
the networking research that has followed.
Initially, much of the networking literature was concerned with the strong links
between individuals. More contemporary theories such as structural holes (Burt
1992) or the strength of weak ties (Granovetter 1973) focus on the links between
these dense clusters. Yet, even these theories of weak ties are also indebted to
social psychology for providing theoretical grounding. Granovetter’s (1973) strength
of weak ties theory, for example, posits that there exists some sort of transitivity
between actors – if actor A and B share a strong link, and B and C also share a strong
link, then it is more likely that A and C will have some some sort of relationship,
even if just a weak link (Borgatti & Halgin 2011, pg.3). This kind of transitivity in
relationships is underpinned by Heider’s (1958) balance theory or Festinger’s (1957)
theory of cognitive dissonance (Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell 2011).
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2.5.3 Network Theory: Flows and Bonds
Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell (2011) argue that there are essentially two main theoretical
types of network models. They call the first network flow theories. This class of
theory is mainly concerned with how information flows through a network. Based
on the structural characteristics of the network and an individual’s position in said
network, one can infer certain outcomes. The authors term the second general class of
network models as network architecture or bonding models (Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell
2011, Borgatti & Halgin 2011). This class of model cannot be adequately captured
by considering the flow of information in the network. Instead of communication
between nodes, it is the alignment between nodes that leads to an outcome. In this
case, the relationships between nodes are indications of coordination of some sort.
Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell summarize the difference between these two general classes
succinctly. In the network flow model, relations can be likened to pipes, whereas in
the architectural model the relations are bonds – girders that, “bind the network
together” (Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell 2011, pg.12).
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2.5.4 Social Embeddedness
Social capital captures the idea that resources can be acquired from an individual’s
network of social relationships. An important supporting idea of social capital is
that of social embeddedness. Social embeddedness theory highlights the fact that
economic transactions are not isolated events, but are always embedded within some
social context (Granovetter 1985). The insight of social embeddedness theory is that
the outcome of economic transactions often differs from what would be expected
of purely rational actors. Instead, economic relationships can take other forms for
social reasons.
Davis (1996) utilizes the theory of social embeddedness to explain the dynamics of
board networks. He argues that directors are constrained in their actions by the social
bonds that develop over time with others. For example, directors are technically in an
oversight role with respect to the major decisions of a firm’s management. However,
it is not uncommon for directors to know senior managers socially or to have mutual
acquaintances. This situation is a well-known case of social embeddedness – directors
may be hesitant to disagree with management because of social relationships that
have nothing to do with the achieving the best possible performance of the firm.
This particular observation has relevance in the Canadian context where there are a
number of business groups controlled by rich families (Morck & Yeung 2006). Leblanc
& Gillies (2005) argue that directors need to exercise more discretion when dealing
with these families than they would dealing with the board at a widely held firm.
Proponents of the social embeddedness perspective are critical of approaches
that treat people as completely independent and isolated rational actors devoid of
any social context. Social embeddedness also questions theories that place excessive
emphasis on environmental causes at the expense of an individual’s own decision-
making abilities (Granovetter 1985).
Social relationships often supersede so-called pure economic transactions. For
example, in a detailed study of small fashion firms, Uzzi (1997) finds that firms
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that often work together tend to compromise and make allowances for one another.
This flexibility benefits all organizations in the long term because it encourages
future collaborations. The ultimate decision to make allowances for others is based
mainly upon social considerations (Uzzi 1997). Developing social relationships often
increases trust. This increased trust will be useful when economic transactions do
not go as planned. These insights have led some researchers to consider the role that
networks have in a firm’s development and performance.
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2.5.5 Professional Networks
The sections that follow highlight major theories concerned with board interlocks
and the implications that these interlocks have for understanding relationships be-
tween organizations. In particular, bank-based theory, resource dependence theory,
theories of elites, and social capital theory are each discussed. Bank-based theory
sees financial firms as particularly important organizations that have the power to
influence industrial firms that rely on them for funds. Resource dependence theory
(Pfeffer & Salancik 1978) is concerned with how organizations gain access to the
resources external to the firm that they need to stay in business in an uncertain
business environment. Theories of elites see executives as a separate social class.
Useem (1986) argues that these corporate elites see serving on the boards of other
companies as a way to increase their knowledge of the business environment. Useem’s
in-depth interviews with directors also provide reasons to believe that directors are
trusted sources of information for managers.
Organizational Resource Dependence
The resource dependence perspective has proven to be one of the most influential and
adaptable theoretical frameworks for understanding organizational relationships in
general and the role of boards of directors in particular. Influenced by organizational
ecology (Hannan & Freeman 1977), the resource dependence approach of Pfeffer &
Salancik (1978) considers firms as embedded within their environment. This is in
contrast to other organizational theories, which focus on using resources within the
firm without much reference to the external environment and the processes involved
with attaining resources. In contrast, Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) stress the importance
of considering the external environment, and the relationship to other organizations,
as key factors influencing events within the firm. The primary goal of the firm, they
argue, is to extract resources from the environment in order to survive. In order
to accomplish this goal, the environment needs to be understood and uncertainty
reduced.
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Because the external environment is always changing, firms are expected to act
in ways to reduce risk. Change is a source of risk for the long-term survival of the
firm – especially for young firms. Pfeffer and Salancik argue that firms attempt
to reduce uncertainty by coordinating with other organizations. Coordination may
take many different forms: boards of directorships, trade agreements between firms,
industry associations, etc. These relationships need not be permanent. They simply
need to provide the organization with a degree of environmental stability, as well as
information (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978, pg.144). Not only may these linkages provide
information in the present, they also serve as conduits for gaining more information
in future. These links to other organizations can also be used to extract commitments
from others when needed to reduce uncertainty. Finally, the mere existence of these
linkages provides the firm with a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of others (Pfeffer
& Salancik 1978, pg.145). For example, a firm that is an active member of the
local chamber of commerce may be seen as more stable or reliable by customers and
suppliers.
Within resource dependence theory, using the connections that corporate direc-
tors have to other organizations is seen as an important way that a firm can link
itself to its environment (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). The authors highlight three ways
boards are important. First, boards are seen as advisers to inexperienced managers.
Second, boards of directors are overseers of the processes of the firm. Technically,
this is the oversight role of boards of directors. Third, directors are seen as people
that have been co-opted to help the organization. Co-opted people are expected to
adhere to the established norms of the firm.
The idea of co-optation was drawn from a study of the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) power project (Selznick 1949). The TVA was able to silence vocal critics to
the project by bringing them into the process of decision making. Selznick’s (1949)
point was that critics themselves gradually accommodate the organization because
they are part of the planning process. Pfeffer and Salancik extend the idea of co-
optation. They argue that co-optation through director interlocks implies that a
subtle relationship is established between the organizations through their directors
(Pfeffer & Salancik 1978, pg.163-5).
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Co-optive theory posits that when a firm faces problems that are beyond its
power, corporate interlocks are used as a way to reduce uncertainty. Burt (1983a,
pg.76) notes that interlock ties would be valuable to the firm even if they were just
sources for information because they would act to reduce uncertainty. Generally,
however, researchers interested in co-optation presuppose that the board positions
are deliberately chosen not so much to utilize an individual director’s talents as to
establish contact with the particular organizations they represent.
The North American evidence of a relationship between interlocking and firm
performance is mixed. In Canada, Carrington (1981) found a positive relationship
between industry concentration, profits and board interlocks. In the USA, Burt
(1983a) found small statistically significant results on profits, once concentration was
controlled for, while Pennings (1980) found no statistically significant relationship
(Mizruchi 1996, pg.274-5).
Co-optation theory has been broadly criticized on the grounds that director in-
terlocks are not consistently re-established after the death of a director. In Canada,
Ornstein found that 30 percent of broken ties due to death of a director between
1946 and 1977 were reestablished within two years (Ornstein 1982). Ornstein argues
that this finding indicates that neither theories of elites (discussed in the following
section) nor co-optation are alone sufficient to explain the small proportion of ties
replaced. This is evidence, critics note, that not all interlocks can be described as
co-optative (Mizruchi 1996).
Overall, the data requirements of co-optation theory present daunting challenges
for those wishing to provide direct empirical support to the co-optation hypothesis.
Co-optation assumes that interlocks are established with the intention of seeking
knowledge from a particular firm, and to reduce uncertainty as a result of acting on
that knowledge of the external environment. However, establishing the cause of any
director appointments is a difficult task and likely not feasible for most researchers.
As made clear by Selznik in his study of the TVA, some directors surely are co-
opted (Selznick 1949). It is also likely that some firms use director interlocks as
conduits for exchanging information between particular firms in order to reduce
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uncertainty. However, there appears to be little evidence to support the notion
that most interlocks linking organizations are co-optative in nature (Mizruchi 1996,
Ornstein 1982).
Executives As Elites
Many academic studies of the 1970s and 1980s frame relationships between directors
as a study of elites. Useem (1986) found that executives act in such a way as
to promote policies that best serve their interests. Useem (1986) conducted over
100 in-depth interviews with directors of large firms in the USA and the UK. He
found that resource exchange did not sufficiently answer why people chose to sit as
a director on the board of a firm. Instead, he found that directors serve on the
boards of corporations partially because they feel obligated to do so, but also in
order to increase their general understanding of business events. He uses the term
“business scan” to capture the idea that directors use their positions as a way to
collect information, gain insight into current strategies, current events, techniques,
and any other relevant topics. He refers to the elite community of executives and
directors as “the inner circle” because of the tendency for directors to be chosen
through old friendships or acquaintances Useem (1986).
Bank Based Theory
The role of corporate boards of directors in firms and the wider economy has been an
area of study for nearly a century. How boards operate, and who sits on these boards,
especially of powerful corporations, has long fascinated people. Near the turn of the
last century, corporations were considered to be joined to ‘money trusts’ through
multiple inter-corporate board appointments, which inevitably included powerful in-
vestment bankers (Brandeis 1914, Davis & Mizruchi 1999). Brandeis chose to focus
on the board appointments – with a number of leading industrial companies and
railroads – held by the powerful investment banker JP Morgan and his associates.
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Brandeis traced the collusive agreements between the firms that were linked through
inter-corporate board appointments. The industrial companies would take loans from
JP Morgan, and some would then sell goods as inputs to other manufacturers. All
of these companies would then ship their goods on the same railway service. Par-
tially thanks to Brandeis’ work, the 1914 Clayton Act effectively put an end to such
overt collusion in the USA. Section eight of the act specifically prohibits interlocks
between competing companies because of the risks to competition (Mizruchi 1996,
pg.273). Brandeis’ work was widely read and was both publicly popular and po-
litically influential. A few years after Brandeis published his popular book Other
People’s Money: And How The Bankers Use It, Lenin wrote about similar collusive
behaviour in Europe (Davis, Yoo & Baker 2003). Despite these changes, the relation-
ships between companies developed through board interlocks continue to be viewed
with great interest and often suspicion.
Echoing the concerns of Brandeis seventy years before, Mintz & Schwartz (1985)
argue that the centrality of financial institutions gives banks effective power over their
client firms. According to this theory, banks and other financial institutions benefit
from the information gained through multiple directors from outside industrial firms.
These board appointments provide the banks with current market information so that
the bank can more effectively conduct their business. To investigators of the inter-
corporate network of board appointments in the 1970s and 1980s, financial firms
appeared as central points in the network, as indicated by many outside directors
serving on their boards.
While the idea that financial institutions may be important actors or intermedi-
aries remains influential, theories that posit the hegemony of banks over their clients
has come under scrutiny – for modern versions, see Santos & Rumble (2006) and
for corresponding criticism, see Cheffins & Bank (2009). Empirical studies of the
importance of banks are sometimes at odds with theory. Critics also argue that
the thesis of bank hegemony is poorly defined and not consistently supported by
the existing inter-corporate board network patterns described by Mintz and Swartz
(Marsden 1988). More recently, the decline in the importance of financial firms in US
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corporate interlocks has raised serious questions regarding the central assumptions
of financial hegemony theory (Davis 1996).
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2.5.6 Boards of Directors as a Network
Recently, there has been renewed interest in considering boards of directors as a
social network. Harris & Helfat (2007) note that most studies consider only the
external networks that boards of directors are a part of. The authors argue that in
addition to external social capital researchers need to consider internal social capital
of boards. The authors distinguish these concepts as follows:
“Internal social capital refers to linkages among actors within a col-
lective of people (a network) and external social capital refers to linkages
between an actor within the network and actors outside of it.” (Harris
& Helfat 2007, pg.230).
Internal social capital represents the relationships that exist between directors
who serve on the board. External social capital consists of the relationships with
people who are outside of the firm. The authors note that very little research has
considered the internal relationships between directors.
Harris & Helfat (2007) envision board networks as relationships between individu-
als. In particular, the authors adopt a network flow-type theoretical model regarding
directors (Borgatti & Halgin 2011). Harris & Helfat are concerned with how infor-
mation flows through the network and the centrality of different directors and the
strength of the ties between them. Although the authors make an intuitively appeal-
ing case for networks that exist between directors, their paper lacks some important
specifics. For example, the authors note that managers or directors may occupy more
or less connected positions in the network. However, the authors never specify which
network(s) they are considering. With respect to communication, it is unclear what
types of communication count or what potential criteria are used to determine the
strength of ties between individuals.
This lack of specificity becomes more problematic as the authors draw on exam-
ples from actual firms. The authors note that coalitions form on boards and that
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CEOs may be more central in the network especially if they are also chairs of the
board. However, it is unclear what meaning a flow-type model of information access
has in the author’s discussion. For example, the authors note that certain members of
the board or managers may have access to information sooner than others. Access to
information about the firm is considered to be important to allow directors to make
“informed decisions” (Harris & Helfat 2007, pg.233) but the authors never explain
why this information confers anything useful to those who have it and how this is
systematically related to the operation of the firm. In the standard flow-model used
in network theory, information is often a general term to infer that some advantage
is gained. However, researchers must be clear about what advantage is gained and
why. Harris & Helfat do not explain why information flowing through the internal
board network is important enough for some nodes to gain advantage from others
by controlling the information over a long period. The authors attempt to illustrate
their points using cases regarding boards of directors gained from the media. How-
ever, the authors end up using network terminology to describe actual events rather
than explaining how the structure of relationships on the board affect outcomes (see
Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell 2011, pg.10).
The core idea the authors offer is important – boards of directors in a firm can be
treated as a network. Currently, the flow-type model is the most common network
model (Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell 2011). However, in this instance, the choice of
theoretical approach does not appear to be directly applicable to the problem area the
authors wish to contribute to. By forgoing specific examples of networks the authors
are actually concerned with, it is difficult to understand how the theory would predict
outcomes. In the concrete examples the authors give, network terminology is used
to describe current situations rather than to illustrate how the network structure of
the board influenced an outcome.
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2.6 Summary
This chapter considers the relationship between ownership and firm performance.
Performance is usually quantified as Tobin’s Q total market value of the firm di-
vided by total asset value. The focus of this research is the agency problem between
shareholders and managers in the widely held firm. Other research characterizes an
agency problem as being between small shareholders and large shareholders. How-
ever, when considering large shareholders, empirical studies often tend to focus on
only the largest single shareholder and ignore multiple large shareholders and man-
agers’ ownership stakes in the firm. This simplifying assumption is thought to be
problematic for studies of young firms where top managers potentially have an impor-
tant role in the firm’s performance. The corporate governance research that concerns
family-operated firms was also discussed in this chapter. This literature informs the
what I call ownership and family networks that act to link some corporate insiders.
Bank based theory, resource dependence theory and Useem’s theory of elites
were also discussed especially with reference to information transfer through board
interlocks. These theories inform questions about the professional networks directors
maintain.






This chapter introduces the theoretical model that motivates this study. This chapter
is roughly divided into two parts. The first half of the chapter is dedicated to
theoretical development. The second half of the chapter is dedicated to developing
the hypotheses of this research.
In the next few sections, the theoretical model will be made explicit. This portion
of the chapter builds on the literature review to lay the groundwork for the approach
taken in this research. It begins with a general overview of the theory and its
placement within the broader literature. Following this general overview are slightly
more in-depth discussions of both network theory and corporate governance theory.
Finally, the model used in this research is discussed. As noted, the second half of
the chapter develops the hypotheses to be used in this research.
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3.2 Theoretical Overview
The corporate governance literature concerned with executive ownership and per-
formance mainly builds upon agency theory. The underlying assumption of this
literature has been that corporate insiders are largely unrelated to other insiders in
the firm. Instead, this literature places emphasis on the amount of the firm owned
by key executives – particularly the CEO. It is hypothesized that an executive’s
ownership of the firm acts as an incentive for him to influence firm performance (see
Literature Review, Section 2.3). In contrast, this research approaches the public cor-
poration from the perspective that economic transactions are largely situated within
a social context, and that the pattern of social relations can have an important ef-
fects on outcomes (Granovetter 1985). In short, decisions that may be rational for
an autonomous actor may call for a significantly different approach when taken in a
wider context of group relations.
The key idea behind this research is that the directors, managers and large owners
of a corporation may somehow be socially related, and that these social relationships
are important for understanding corporate governance. This research starts from the
position that social relationships can be important to understanding how the organi-
zation governs itself. By understanding how different corporate insiders are related,
I argue that it is possible to determine whether different coalitions, representing dif-
ferent interests, exist in the firm. I use the term coalition here to denote groups of
corporate insiders that share some common network ties. These groups of variously
related corporate insiders are assumed to share common interests. These common
interests may or may not coincide with the interests of other coalitions within the
corporation.
The existence of multiple groups with different interests operating a public cor-
poration has some immediate implications for corporate governance. Clearly, a sin-
gle unified group composed of all corporate insiders – the directors, managers and
any large owners – entails effective control of the organization, assuming the group
controls a reasonable amount of the voting shares. Similarly, if corporations are
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composed of multiple different groups, the implication is that the firm’s operations
are determined with a degree of collaboration and compromise between groups. In
other words, having a firm with multiple different coalitions will provide oversight
over one another. At the other extreme, if there is a single group that has effective
control of the organization, there may not be any oversight.
The idea that a network of relationships can bring benefits has broadly been
termed social capital (see Literature Review, Section 2.5.1). In this research, an
explicitly structuralist approach is taken – the patterns of connection between indi-
viduals are considered to be indicative of likely outcomes (Borgatti & Foster 2003) –
although, to be clear, these patterns of relations can only imply likely influences on
outcomes based on the network structure. Ultimately, any social outcome is deter-
mined by individuals and not network structure (Flew 1995). In contrast to other
network theories of social capital, the content of the ties is largely neglected. In
particular, this work draws on Burt’s (1992, 2005) structuralist version of social cap-
ital. In contrast, other important social capital theorists focus on the content that
flows through social ties (Borgatti & Foster 2003, p.1002). Lin (1999), for example,
envisions social capital as being embedded resources within social relations.
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3.3 Networks and Corporate Governance
Much of the academic literature concerned with corporate governance and networks
has focused on the role that directors play as links between firms. By and large, this
research treats the firm as a black box with directors as conduits for resources to flow
between organizations. From this vantage point, firms create interlocks strategically
to gain information and resources from directors that serve with other organizations
(Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). From another network perspective, the corporate interlock
network is treated as a medium for information to flow between firms. In this case,
the existing corporate interlock network is analyzed in terms of the importance it
has for the spread of ideas or corporate governance strategy through the network
(Davis 1991).
These theories differ in a number of important ways from the current research.
First, in this research I am concerned with the network of relationships between
corporate insiders within a firm, not across firms. Relatively little research has
addressed the implications of examining corporate boards in terms of social capital
(Harris & Helfat 2007). On a deeper theoretical level, this research also differs from
the examples given because the focus is on the relative position of individuals in the
network, and not the flow of information through the network. The difference here
can be explained in terms of the difference between flow-type networks and bonding
network models (Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell 2011).
Currently, the most theoretically advanced network models are flow-type models
where information or some other resource flows through the network. Individuals in
different network positions are hypothesized to be more or less likely to have access
to the resources flowing in the network (see Literature Review, Section 2.5). This line
of argument is central to many research studies concerned with networks. Depending
on the circumstances, there may be advantages to being in dense network clusters
or bridging those clusters (Burt 1992, Burt 2004, Burt 2005).
In contrast, bonding models are concerned with how the existing ties between
agents act to help coordinate action (Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell 2011, p.7). In this
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type of theoretical model, collections of related nodes act in concert as a single node.
The relationships between these nodes can then be considered. These coordination
networks are sometimes also called girder models or architectural models in addition
to bonding models. The current research is situated within the tradition of bonding
models. I am concerned with how the structure of relationships between corporate
insiders influences outcomes – in this case, firm performance and valuation. I will
expand on this point in future sections. But first, it is necessary to discuss agency
theory and how the current theory fits into this perspective on corporate governance.
In the sections that follow, the theories that influence and guide this research
are discussed. In the next section, a more in-depth discussion of agency theory is
given. Agency theory is the dominant approach used by policy makers and corpo-
rate governance researchers. It is, however, not without its detractors. The theory
has been criticized on a number of grounds and alternatives have been presented.
Adherents of agency theory have broadened the theory in order to deal with large
and more complex ownership structures. In what follows, the method used by this
research, the results, and attempts to explain how agency models can benefit from
social capital theory are discussed.
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3.4 Agency Theory
Agency theory has largely been adopted by the corporate governance literature and
policy makers as the de facto standard by which to judge corporate governance.
However, as noted in the literature review, there is widespread dissatisfaction with
agency theory. In the broader management literature, agency theory is often criti-
cized as being too narrow (for review, see Pugliese et al. 2009), or not accounting for
the diversity of social relationships (Granovetter 1985).
In widely held firms, agency theory is concerned with the general situation in
public firms where directors oversee managers. Technically, directors are supposed
to ensure that the firm is efficiently operated and that investors receive fair com-
pensation for their investment in the firm. Agency theory has since been extended
in ways to account for more diverse ownership structures (see Figure 3.1). In par-
ticular, researchers have argued that in cases where there are multiple large owners,
oversight will be exercised over the largest owner by the remaining large owners
(Maury & Pajuste 2005, Villalonga & Amit 2006). Other researchers have also
questioned whether increasing ownership by key executives always acts to align in-
centives of managers with the interests of small shareholders (see Benson & David-
son III 2009, Morck et al. 1988b).
The aforementioned governance research brings important insights about partic-
ular groups governing the firm. However, many of the agency approaches fail to
account for other aspects of governance. Often the possible importance of other
corporate insiders is ignored in favour of a single aspect of governance (for relevant
discussion see Hermalin & Weisbach 1991). For example, Morck et al.’s (1988b)
work examining the relationship between managerial ownership and performance
does so at the expense of considering the importance of other large shareholders. At
the other extreme, Villalonga & Amit (2006) examine the largest shareholders but
omit other large shareholders from their analysis. Maury & Pajuste (2005) examine
relations between large corporate owners of the firm, but assume that independent
directors have no role in governance. I argue that the problem with these approaches
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Figure 3.1: Summary of agency theories of corporate governance. Lines represent
relationships. Oversight is provided by directors or possibly large shareholders.
is that corporate insiders – directors, managers and owners – have complex relation-
ships that vary across firms. In this dissertation, I argue that the structure of these
relationships can be used to inform agency theoretical approaches.
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3.5 This Research
In this research I use social capital theory to better understand how corporate insiders
are related. I argue that the structure of the relationships between corporate insiders
can help to inform us about the firm’s corporate governance and how the firm is likely
to perform.
The structure of insider relationships is important to firm governance in many
ways. Previously in this chapter, I touched on the importance of accounting for
different insider groups or coalitions within the firm. Having multiple groups within
the corporation that have a similar degree of power means that no single group can
exercise effective control over the corporation in ways that benefit themselves at the
expense of other the shareholders. At the very least, the necessity of collaborating
with other stakeholders ensures that potential strategies receive proper vetting. At
the other extreme, a single group with unchallenged effective control over the corpo-
ration may direct the organization in ways that benefits the group at the expense of
small shareholders.
Another important aspect of corporate governance is the role of directors. Direc-
tors are supposed to provide oversight over the management of the firm. In practice,
however, it is well known that some directors may be closer to top managers than
others. Determining which directors are truly independent can often be difficult. A
useful aspect of applying social capital theory to determine the structure relation-
ships between insiders within the firm is that there are often individuals who are not
connected to any insider group. A director is independent if the individual does not
have significant amounts of ownership in the firm or familial ties to others in the firm.
To help ensure that there are no significant ties to others in the firm, I also ensure
that directors do not share professional relationships with other corporate insiders.
This check of network relationships helps ensure that there are no friendships or quid
pro quo relationships acting between corporate boards.
The network of relationships within a public corporation can yield a number of
insights into structural characteristics of the firm. However, before these issues can
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be discussed, it is important to discuss in depth which networks are made use of in
this study to determine relationships between corporate insiders.
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3.5.1 Types of Linkages
In this research, I consider three kinds of relationships between corporate insiders:
ownership, family relationships and professional relationships. These different rela-
tionships are used to determine if corporate insiders are linked and whether they
belong to the same group. The underlying assumption is that insiders who are some-
how linked share the same interests in the firm. Once all the groups of corporate
insiders have been identified, their total voting power in the firm is considered. The
actual voting power that a group has is then used to determine how much power they
wield over corporate decision making. I call this amount of power effective control
over the corporation1. I will return to the precise calculation of effective control later
in the dissertation. Each of the three types of ownership are discussed below.
3.5.2 Ownership
Relationships that are defined by ownership capture cases in which multiple corporate
insiders have shares held in the firm through another common fund or company. In
practice, the other company may simply be a numbered company to hold common
investments – perhaps used in the case of business partners or a married couple.
Alternatively, common ownership may indicate that corporate insiders are employed
by another organization that holds shares in the company. In this case, great care
is taken to ensure that the voting shares held by this other corporation are included
in any calculation to accurately reflect the voting rights of the insider group they
belong to.
1In this sample of SMEs there are very few firms with dual class shares. In the very few cases
where there were dual class shares with different voting rights I was careful to ensure that these
rights were accurately reflected in the calculated amount of voting power an insider group has.
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3.5.3 Family
In this research, I assume a family relationship when multiple corporate insiders share
the same last name. Ultimately, this is a heuristic that may undercount the actual
number of related people in the firm, especially in cases where the same last name
is not used by spouses. In practice, however, the ownership networks and family
networks tend to have some overlap. For example, it is not unusual for children to
have their share ownership held in a family trust or for spouses to hold their shares
jointly. In finding groups that are related in the firm, both ownership and family
relations are used together to trace out linkages.
3.5.4 Professional Relationships
Professional relationships are indicated when corporate insiders share an appoint-
ment at another company – i.e., a corporate interlock – in addition to the company
under study. These corporate interlock-based relationships are not used in the cal-
culation of groups of insiders, because this type of relationship is not sufficient to
infer aligned interests. In other words, corporate insiders may just coincidentally sit
on another corporate board together and that this employment may not constitute
any significant relationship. However, professional relationships are considered when
determining if a director is truly independent. In this case, a shared appointment
on the board of another company, if it is shared with a member of an owning group
within the firm of interest, could reasonably be interpreted as a possible outside link
that could affect the director’s independence.
The following sections will continue to discuss how insider groups are determined
and the implications that this social capital approach has on interpretations of own-
ership and control within the firm.
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3.6 Social Capital of Insiders
In this research, corporate insiders are assigned to the same group if they are related
by common ownership through another company or shared account, or family rela-
tions. If corporate insiders belong to the same group, then they are assumed to have
similar interests and will hence vote as a block. The degree to which a firm can be
controlled by a single group of insiders is determined by examining the total number
of voting shares the group controls. For example, if a number of family members
are corporate insiders, their shareholdings are summed together; this reflects the
assumption that the family members are more likely to vote as a block.
An examination of the networks of corporate insiders also reveals which directors
are independent. Those directors who are not obviously related to other insiders are
considered to be independent. The proportion of independent directors over the total
number of directors is used as a measure of how much oversight they can reasonably
exercise over executives or large owners. This fraction is used as a measure of whether
independent directors are in the majority or the minority within the firm. In this
research, I argue that firms lacking a majority of independent directors will have
little effective oversight. Firms with a majority of independent directors will have
more oversight.
In this research, if a group of insiders has multiple family members as part of the
group, then the firm is assumed to be family-operated. Family-operated firms are
often mentioned in the literature (see Literature Review Section 2.4). Small firms
often start off as family-run because families can be a source of inexpensive and
reliable labour. However, from a governance perspective, it could be the case that
firms where families are part of the largest shareholding group are a concern in case
the family puts its interests ahead of those of common shareholders.
The network of relationships and their relative ownership stakes in the firm are
analyzed using a slightly adjusted version of Burt’s (1992) network measure of con-
straint. This measure is intended to capture the degree to which one insider group,
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or coalition, has effective control over the firm. One extreme indicates that the firm
is effectively controlled by a single group. At the other extreme, the measure of
effective control indicates that no single group controls the firm – i.e., that there are
multiple groups within the firm and each has a similar proportion of voting shares in
the firm. The latter situation implies that these groups are exercising some degree
of oversight over one another.
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3.6.1 Implications: Oversight and Control
In tension with the previously mentioned measure of control is oversight over a firm.
In this research, the proportion of independent directors is used to capture whether
there is any independent oversight. There are cases, for example, where there is
effective control by one insider group over the firm, but there is a countervailing power
exerted by truly independent directors. These two situations can overlap and may
be desirable by both the largest shareholding group as well as smaller shareholders.
For example, a single group may own a significant portion of the company but may
want to attain the highest market valuation possible. In order to assure would-be
investors, a board of truly independent directors is obtained. Thus, the potential
risks posed by having a single group effectively controlling the firm are offset by the
countervailing power of an independent board of directors.
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3.6.2 Positions Within the Firm
Certain positions within the organization also merit particular attention. This re-
search highlights how directors can be independent or related to the firm. Similarly,
this research examines how family-run firms may be viewed by the marketplace dif-
ferently than other firms. Finally, this research considers the position of the CEO
and asks whether, given the importance of this position within the organization, this
position shows any relationship to firm performance.
This research makes use of CEO ownership as a test of the social capital approach
and to tie back to the extant literature. A number of important questions arise from
the issue of CEO ownership. First, is CEO ownership a significant factor in firm
performance, even when the social capital measure of effective control is accounted
for? In short, is there evidence that the social capital perspective and executive
ownership measures are competing measures or are they complementary measures?
If the former, then it would appear that, in the case of SMEs at least, that total firm
social capital network structure should be considered rather than executive ownership
as a driver of performance. The social capital network structure is then perhaps more
fruitfully interpreted as an additional contextual factor within the firm enabling
either additional oversight or more control. In this case, the additional questions
of CEO ownership concern whether it supports the entrenchment or convergence-of-
interests hypotheses noted in the literature (Morck et al. 1988b).
Taken together, I argue that the structure of insider relationships – or the network
architecture or bonds of these relations (Borgatti & Halgin 2011) – yield important
information about likely firm performance. Ultimately, the structural measures used
in this study are meant to reveal the potential tensions within public companies,
tensions that centre on ownership and control of the firm. In this research, social
capital theory is used to make more sense of ownership and oversight issues by
examining these issues through the structure of relationships that exist between




In the second part of the chapter, the key hypotheses derived from the theory of
social capital of corporate insiders will be discussed. These hypotheses deal with:
1. Effective control by insider groups.
2. Oversight by independent directors.
3. Family operated firms and their implications for valuation.
4. CEO ownership and the implications for the social capital perspective presented
in this research.
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3.7.1 Effective Control by Insider Groups
One of the key concerns of corporate governance research is the degree to which a
public firm may have its resources improperly used by its managers or large share-
holders. Agency theory highlights the necessity of maintaining independent directors
who can oversee the work of managers to ensure that resources are not misused. Sim-
ilarly, large owners are considered to be potentially problematic for the firm unless
some oversight is provided. Research indicates that if other large organizations invest
in a firm, they may be able to provide a degree of oversight to ensure that resources
are not misallocated (Maury & Pajuste 2005, Villalonga & Amit 2006). In other
words, any choices by the largest shareholder are contestable by other large investors
who have an incentive to ensure that the resources are not improperly allocated.
The implicit assumption of studies of corporate governance is often that the
ownership of the firm is held by a single individual or entity. In the case of SMEs, it
could be the case that ownership stakes are held jointly – for example, by multiple
members of a single family – and control is exerted by the group as a whole. This
reflects the early history of the firm where skills and resources necessary for the firm
are gathered from the entrepreneur’s family and social circle. If this is correct, in
order to better understand the structure of relationships among corporate insiders,
it is reasonable to try to infer relationships from available network information. In
this study, I make use of information concerning ownership, family and professional
relations. I argue that social capital theory is useful in this context in order to gain
a better understanding how the structure of these relationships may be associated
with firm valuation. By understanding the structure of the relationships between
corporate insiders, it is possible to determine which insiders can be considered as a
group with similar interests.
This portion of the research begins from the perspective of trying to summarize
the structure of the potentially complex relationships between corporate insiders.
The first step in this process is to determine how the corporate insiders in a firm are
related to one another. This is done by considering their ownership records in the
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firm2. An analysis of these records will determine if, for example, multiple insiders
own shares in a public company through a common holding company, trust or the
like. The second step in this process is to relate corporate insiders through their
family ties. In this study, individuals are considered to be related if they share the
same last name. The goal of this process is to create a scaled measure that yields
some indication if the firm is effectively controlled by one of its owners.
2A detailed discussion of data sources and the methods used to determine linkages is provided
in the next chapter.
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A Simple Example
The ownership and family relations of directors are used to create a network of
relationships between the different corporate insiders. The following example shows
the major groups of corporate insiders that collectively owned in excess of one percent
of the Biosign Technologies between the years 2008 and 2009. Figure 3.2 shows
Biosign as the leftmost node. On the right are the major insider groups. In the
diagram, the first number is the number of individuals in the group. The words that
follow the hyphen are the last names of the individuals in the group, and any names
of accounts they may have that hold shares indirectly in Biosign Technologies. The
percentage that follows in parentheses is the calculated share of the corporation the
insider group owns.
Figure 3.2: Network of corporate insiders for Biosign Technologies (2009-2010).
In the illustration above, the topmost insider group has only one person in it
– Radu Leca, the CEO, who owned approximately 29 percent of the shares in the
corporation. Many of those shares were held through a holding company 2048703
Ontario Ltd. The vice-president of research, Eva Kettle, owned almost two percent of
the outstanding shares. The final listing is for Angela and Richard Potts. Collectively
they owned approximately 15 percent of the firm. Richard Potts also held shares
through a company called KBI Capital. The information is drawn from the SEDI
online database (CDS Inc. 2010, at www.sedi.ca), discussed in the next chapter.
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Constraint Measured with Ownership
The illustration above is a graph relating groups of corporate insiders to the firm.
Insiders are determined to be related through ownership linkages and family relations.
These insider groups are considered to vote as a block because they have similar
interests. If one insider group owns over 50 percent of outstanding voting shares
then, consistent with the economic literature, it is clear this insider group de facto
controls the company. Recall that the an owner with a clear majority of outstanding
voting shares can appoint the directors who in turn appoint top executives. However,
it is rare that a single owner has a clear voting majority.
As the illustration above makes clear, ownership structures in firms can be quite
complex. Many studies dealing with complex ownership simply take the largest
owner and make the assumption that this corporation controls the company (see
for example Porta et al. 1999, Morck, Wolfenzon & Yeung 2005). This assumption
makes complex ownership structures more tractable. However, this assumption does
not seem well suited to the present study. If there is are multiple owners with similar
amounts of shares, then it would seem reasonable that one group couldn’t unilaterally
impose its will upon others.
The social capital networking literature offers a partial measure to quantitatively
capture the degree to which one group may have control of the firm. In this case, it
is perhaps easiest to consider the firm under study as the “ego” node under study.
All of the insider groups can also be considered as the “alters”. The alters we are
concerned about in this section are each of the insider groups that are composed of
a related subset of corporate insiders.
A useful measure of effective control over the firm is the so-called measure of
constraint developed by Burt (1992). In the present example, the central node is the
firm under study. Each edge connected to the firm leads to a node representing a
group of corporate insiders. Each edge is weighted by the shares outstanding that are
controlled by each insider group. Thus, the more voting shares any group controls
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relative to other groups of insiders, the more the firm under study will be constrained.
Intuitively, one might argue that the operations of a firm with a clearly dominant
shareholding group is constrained by the will of that dominant owner.
The constraint measure captures an aspect of the network topology — it summa-
rizes how much choice the firm under study has with respect to others. In this case,
“choice” is considered to be how many alternative paths the central node has. If there
is a single insider group then there are effectively no alternative viewpoints within a
firm. Using Burt’s (1992) terminology, the firm is constrained because there are no
options besides the single insider group. The extension of this to multiple owners is
intuitively straightforward – although somewhat involved in terms of the actual cal-
culation of the network statistic (see Chapter 4, Section 4.9 for details). In the case
of multiple insider groups, the firm has multiple links with different insider groups.
In the case of a single insider group, the insider group may have incentive to treat
the company as a privately held firm and use it to maintain themselves comfortably
rather than trying to increase returns for investors. However, if there are multiple
insider groups, there are multiple paths or options leading from the firm. Thus,
these different insider groups linked to the firm have incentive to provide a degree
of oversight over one another. Thus, the constraint measure intuitively captures the
amount of control a single insider group can exert in a scale comparable across firms.
In conclusion, in firms where there are multiple insider groups, it is more difficult
for one group to make decisions unilaterally. Decisions cannot be forced through
without other insider groups in the firm resisting. Thus, the more voting shares
controlled by some insider groups relative to others, the greater the effective control
(constraint) the group can exert on the firm. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The measure of effective control (constraint) in the firm is nega-
tively associated with firm performance.
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3.7.2 Oversight by Independent Directors
Independent directors are generally considered to be an important aspect of corporate
governance. In the agency model, independent directors oversee managers and ensure
that the interests of ordinary shareholders are protected.
In this study, independent directors are those directors who are retained by the
firm but do not have significant ownership in the firm (Fama & Jensen 1983, Yermack
2004). This research uses a number of criteria in order to classify a director as in-
dependent. The first criteria is that independent directors cannot own more than
one percent of the outstanding shares in the corporation. Additionally, independent
directors cannot share a family or ownership relationship with any other directors.
Finally, independent directors must be professionally independent as well; they can-
not sit on a different corporate board with another director involved with the firm.
In other words, there are no obvious social relations between the independent
director and any other currently serving directors. Directors that are classified as
independent in this study are essentially those directors that are not part of any
insider group described earlier. Thus, these directors have no links to other insiders
and little incentive not to challenge management if their plans seem unreasonable. As
pointed out in the literature, not challenging management if the situation warranted
it could damage an independent director’s future job prospects (Fama & Jensen 1983,
Srinivasan 2005).
In this study, I create a variable capturing the number of independent directors
divided by the total number of directors. The proportion of independent direc-
tors serving with the firm is a measure of how committed the firm is to corporate
governance. Independent directors are thought to be more likely to challenge man-
agement, whereas inside directors have too much to potentially lose if they challenge
other managers in the firm (Weisbach 1988).
Hypothesis 2: The proportion of independent directors in the firm is positively
associated with firm performance.
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3.7.3 Family Control of the Firm
Family ownership is often an important aspect of the development of small and
medium-sized firms. In public firms, the situation is somewhat different. While some
families may be successful entrepreneurs, it is less certain that all family members will
be equally good managers or directors as people chosen on merit alone. Additionally,
the interests of the family within the public firm may not align with those of smaller
shareholders. I argue that family-run firms will be associated negatively with firm
valuation. To test this assertion, a dummy variable is set to one if a family belongs
to the largest shareholding insider group in the organization and has a majority
independent board. This leads to the following hypothesis:




To date, most studies concerned with the importance of corporate governance to
firm performance have followed Morck et al. (1988b) in examining the ownership of
top executives. The CEO is most often singled out because of her decision-making
power within the organization. This research is no different – the position of CEO
within public companies is unique and needs to be accounted for.
There are two main theories relating CEO ownership to firm performance (Morck
et al. 1988b). The first theory is called the convergence of interests hypothesis. The
intuition here is that the more of a company a CEO owns, the more her interests be-
come aligned with those of small shareholders because everyone has similar interests
in having the company succeed.
The other theoretical perspective is termed the entrenchment hypothesis. The
argument behind entrenchment theory is that CEOs are likely to become entrenched
if they own too much of the firm; the greater an executive’s ownership, the more
able he is to collect a large salary and shirk his duties because there are few people
who can challenge him. In this case, it is expected that firm performance will suffer
because the CEO has little incentive to improve firm performance beyond the minimal
amount to keep his income consistent.
Assuming that CEO ownership remains significantly related to firm performance,
an important question arises: Does CEO ownership follow a similar pattern to that
found by other studies? In other words, is increasing CEO ownership associated
with positive firm performance, and is there a point at which “excessive” executive
ownership is associated with decreased firm performance that is consistent with the
entrenchment hypothesis? In other words, if there is a non-linear relationship be-
tween ownership and performance, does it appear reasonably close to that found
by Morck et al. (1988b)? This leads to the following hypotheses concerning CEO
ownership:
Hypothesis 4: CEO ownership is non-linearly associated with firm performance.
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3.8 Summary
The first half of this chapter has developed the theory used in this research based on
the literature review. This section discussed the structural interpretation of social
capital used in this research. The types of networks that are used to determine
relationships between corporate insiders are also discussed. On a theoretical level, the
social capital perspective of corporate insiders is considered as a potential mechanism
of oversight and control. Additionally, positions within the organization, such as
directors and the CEO, are given special attention because of the emphasis in the
extant literature but also because of their important relationship to the social capital
of the organization. In the final half of this chapter explicit hypotheses were outlined.
In the next chapter, the approach and methodology will be discussed, along with





This research is concerned with how the social capital of corporate insiders affects
firm performance and valuation. Little is known about the importance of corporate
insiders to the performance of relatively small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
Both the economic sociology literature concerned with boards of directors, and the
corporate governance literature concerned with firm performance, tend to focus ex-
clusively on large firms. Much of this work also focuses on American firms – partially
perhaps because of data availability. To date, there has been little work relating di-
rectors to small and medium-sized firm performance in the Canadian context.
The Canadian corporate governance literature makes it clear that, despite the
many similarities between Canada and the USA, there are significant differences.
Foremost among them is that Canada lacks a national securities regulator. Instead,
different securities regulators exist at the provincial level. In terms of the wider
economy, Canada has a relatively larger number of family-controlled business groups
as compared to the USA or the UK. There also appears to be a greater tolerance
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by investors for large shareholders in public companies who exercise control of the
firm. Mechanisms of control include corporate pyramids and dual-class shares. In
the Canadian context, firms that have recently undergone an IPO often have a wide
variety of large shareholders, which may influence how they perform and grow over
time. Another important difference between Canada and the United States is the
relative lack of venture capital in Canada. While there are many public firms, they
tend to be much smaller than in other countries (for discussion, see Section 2.2).
In order to answer the research questions of this study, I created a database of
firms that have underwent an IPO in Canada between the years 2000 and 2010. Part
of the necessity of creating my own database of firm histories is due to the fact that
there is not a single integrated source available for this information.
While many countries have some source of information about public companies,
there appears to be no ideal single source of information about SME public firms
in Canada. For example, American researchers can access Compustat, which tracks
all public firms over time. While some Canadian firms that are cross-listed on an
American exchange are captured in Compustat, there is not complete coverage of all
Canadian firms. Another problem is that firms that go out of business in Canada
are often removed from databases that private companies maintain. Similarly, when
Canadian firms change their names, they may or may not be tracked consistently in
private data sources, such as FPInfoMart.ca. Thus, firms that go through mergers
or acquisitions, or that are taken private, can also be difficult to follow. A consistent
history of a firm can be constructed over time, but this entails cross-checking through
multiple sources and verifying major changes through the original corporate filings.
In order to make inferences regarding the role of social capital in firm performance,
this research makes extensive use of secondary data sources, such as the Financial
Post Survey of Industrials (Financial Post 2010b) and the System for Electronic
Disclosure by Insiders (SEDI) (CDS Inc. 2010). These sources respectively provide
firm financial statistics over time and director appointments with firms.
Tobin’s Q, the dependent variable in this research, is constructed using financial
information from the FP Survey of Industrials based on the annual reports of the
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firms in the sample. The price of the security is extracted from the FP Survey,
which captures the recent closing price. For firms on the Venture Exchange, I take the
average value of the daily price of the shares over the two weeks after the firm’s annual
report period ended. This information is extracted from the publicly accessible daily
stock prices from the Venture exchange, available at ftp://ftp.cdnx.com.
The analysis of firm performance is be conducted using various longitudinal re-
gression models ranging from fixed effects to random effects models. These models
will be discussed in subsequent sections. The hypotheses described broadly as the
social capital of corporate insiders will be implemented as explanatory variables, in
addition to relevant control variables.
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4.1.1 Outline
This chapter will cover the general approach and methodology to be used in this
research. First, the population under study will be discussed in-depth. The reasons
why public SMEs merit individual study are reviewed. The definition of an SME in
this paper is discussed as well as some of the shortcomings of the data sources used
in this research.
The section that follows discusses the data sources, data collection process and
methods of analysis used in this research. In this section, I outline the process I
developed to construct the sample of firms. The analytical approach of this research
is also considered. Network theory is discussed and related to how it is used in this
study as an interpretation of the social capital of corporate insiders. Other important
subjects that are discussed include potential concerns with endogeneity and their
possible solutions. Finally, the section ends with a general discussion outlining the
panel data methods used in this research.
The remaining sections in the chapter are concerned with the variables to be used
in the analysis. The dependent variables and the control variables are discussed.
Finally, an in-depth discussion covers the main variables of interest in this study and
how they are operationalized based on the theory outlined in the previous chapter.
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4.2 Population Under Study
This study focuses on a collection of Canadian industrial firms that have undergone
an IPO between the years 2000 and 2010, inclusive. Every attempt has been made
to collect as many of the firms that meet the criteria of this study as possible. In
one sense, the firms collected in this study represent the entire population of firms
of interest. However, within the broader scope of time, the firms collected in this
study represent only a sample of public SME industrial firms drawn from a larger
population of firms over time. Thus, in the text that follows, I will often refer to
the sample of firms that have been collected in this study. Furthermore, inferences
about this sample will be considered with respect to the broader population of SME
public industrial firms that exist in Canada over time.
The firms in this study are listed either on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX)
or the Toronto Venture Exchange. To be consistent with previous studies, financial
firms, real estate companies, and holding companies are excluded from the sample.
Resource extraction firms are also omitted from the sample under study because they
are considered to be systematically different from industrial firms because they are
largely dependent on global commodity prices. Resource firms are also contained in
a separate data source from the FP Survey of Industrials.
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4.2.1 Why SMEs?
The importance of access to financing for growing SMEs has emerged as an important
concern for governments within the G20 (OECD 2012). The recent financial crisis
and subsequent recessions throughout the international economy have also added to
the difficulties of SMEs. Many SMEs find their customers are less willing to buy their
products and that accessing capital for growth has become more difficult. Within
this context, governments have been searching for sustainable ways to improve access
to finance for SMEs.
Canada and the United Kingdom have both developed specialized public ex-
changes for SMEs. These SME exchanges – the Venture Exchange and the TSX in
Canada and the AIM in the UK (London Stock Exchange 2012) – offer an alterna-
tive way for SMEs to gain financing for innovative projects1. However, corporate
governance remains a major concern for investors in publicly listed companies. De-
spite this, very little research has focused on the relationship between corporate
governance and public SME performance.
The managers and directors of SMEs differ from those of large, established firms
because SMEs are often started by a few people who know one another. The founders
of small business often receive help from family members, close friends or close busi-
ness associates. Building on this intuition, in this research I hypothesize that the
relationships between these corporate insiders can be important predictors of firm
valuation. Studying the importance of relationships between individuals is in con-
trast with much of the extant literature; most of that research concentrates on the
importance of individuals such as the CEO, and his ownership in the corporation (a
prominent example is Morck et al. 1988b).
It should be noted that while SMEs are important, the results of this research
from the social capital perspective has the potential to extend beyond SMEs. In
1SMEs are also listed on so-called Alternative Trading Systems (ATS) in the USA and Mul-
tilateral Trading Facilities (MTFs) in the EU. Used by mainly institutional investors, ATS/MTF
are often called “light” exchanges. NYSE Alternext is a prominent example of an MTF for SMEs
(NYSE Euronext 2012).
86
particular, the findings of this study may be useful in the context of corporate gov-
ernance studies of larger firms. Some of the types of linkages considered in this
study between corporate insiders – family, ownership and professional relationships
– could be extended to other kinds of networks. For example, in studies of larger
firms in Canada, the inter-corporate ownership network could also be included as an
additional network to determine relationships between insiders. The social capital
approach used in this research may provide additional tools and theory to help gover-
nance researchers working in these different contexts. However, these are approaches
that are beyond the scope of the present study; they are best considered as potential
directions for future research.
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4.2.2 SME Definition and Criteria
This study is concerned with small and medium-sized enterprises. However, there
is no universal definition of what constitutes an SME. Many of the countries in the
European Union define an SME as a firm that employs fewer than 250 people. In
contrast, in the USA and Canada, a firm is considered an SME if the organization
employs fewer than 500 people (OECD 2012, p.174).
One shortcoming of the chosen data source for this study is that it does not list the
number of employees in every firm in each year. Rather than using the employment
information that does exist for firms, this study removes larger firms from the sample
based on their assets and market capitalization in the first year after their IPO. In
their first year of operations, firms with an excess of $50 million dollars in assets or
$100 million in market capitalization are removed from the sample. Most of the firms
in the sample are well below these cut-off points. However, to ensure that the results
were not driven by larger firms in the sample, a sensitivity analysis was conducted
adjusting these cut-off points upwards and downwards. No significant changes to the
model results were found.
To verify that these cut-off points are reasonable and also reflect the desired em-
ployment levels for SMEs, I examined the firms that have employment information
in their first period of operations. I found that the vast majority of firms employed
fewer than 200 people in their first year of operations (See Figure 4.5 and accompa-
nying discussion in Section 4.6). These employment levels are consistent with smaller
firms as defined by Canada, the OECD and the USA.
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4.2.3 Criteria for Selecting SMEs into the Sample
There are some practical and theoretical reasons to prefer constructing a panel of
firms by selecting SMEs based on their initial assets and market capitalization in
their first year of operations. I argue that the sampling method described above is
the best way to capture a sample of SMEs that have recently undergone an IPO.
It could be argued that a larger sample could be created by selecting all firms that
currently exist in the public market that meet the SME criteria outlined previously.
(Ignoring for the moment that such a sample would have little to say about firms that
are starting out on the public market – the entrepreneurial firms that are seeking
capital for growth.) I argue that while this alternative process would yield a larger
sample, such a sample would not truly be representative of small and medium sized
enterprises for the reasons described below.
I argue that the chosen methodology results in an unbiased firm sample, whereas
choosing firms that meet the SME selection criteria in any given period would result
in bias. The main reason for bias is that many of the public firms do not perform
well over time. Just like in the private market, the most firms do not rapidly grow
and many shrink or outright close (Baldwin & Gorecki 1991, Baldwin, Dunne &
Haltiwanger 1998). These firm dynamics – growth, shrinkage and failure – can create
inferential problems if one were to simply sample all existing SMEs over time. If one
were to just take a sample and include pre-existing firms, then the prior performance
of pre-existing firms would be unknown. Having the prior performance of some firms
censored from the analysis means that all of the firms that listed as SMEs and then
grew past the size of the SME criteria would be omitted from the sample. Similarly,
all of the large firms that decreased in size to the point that they met the criteria
for an SME would enter into the sample. The end result would be that the sample
would be biased to contain more poorly-performing firms, and fewer growth firms.
A version of this sampling argument is made by Davis, Haltiwanger & Schuh (1998)
and subsequently by Haltiwanger (2006). I argue that following a sample of SMEs
from their IPO on is a more representative sample of firms over time. Moreover, it
captures those firms that are in the initial stages of launching as public companies.
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These firms are likely of greatest interest to policy makers considering alternative
methods of financing SMEs (see BBC 2012, The Economist 2012, OECD 2012).
Following a panel of SMEs from their IPO onward also has some theoretical
advantages. Demsetz & Villalonga (2001) are critical of studies of firm performance
because they argue that they make unfounded assumptions about causality. The
authors argue that these studies assume that ownership affects performance and not
vice-versa. By following a panel of SMEs, I can mitigate concerns that the initial
ownership stakes of the corporate insiders may precede performance.
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4.3 Constructing the Sample of SMEs
On average, there were 200 IPOs each year from 2000 to 2009 (my calculation based
on IPO data from Investcom Group 2010). However, many of these IPOs are financial
investment vehicles and are not counted by sources usually consulted by the investing
public (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2010, pg.2).
Accurately constructing a firm’s history across time is a straightforward proce-
dure. In order to track changes to firms over time, information listed in the Financial
Post Survey of Industrials (Financial Post 2010b) each year is linked to the following
year using information on corporate name changes that is given in every edition of
the Survey of Industrials. Any discrepancies in the information are resolved by con-
sulting the original filings using the System for Electronic Document Analysis and
Retrieval (SEDAR), available online at sedar.com (CDS Inc. 2012). Major changes
can indicate that a firm has changed so much that it is effectively no longer the same
organization. If this occurs, it is dropped from the analysis. For example, a reverse
takeover – when a public company is taken over by another company that wants to
be publicly listed – can result in an entirely different business being listed. All data
sources are summarized in Table 4.1.
Three main sources supply most of the data for this research. Corporate infor-
mation is drawn from the FP Survey of Industrials (Financial Post 2010b). Detailed
director information is taken from the System for Electronic Disclosure by Insiders
(SEDI) (CDS Inc. 2010). This publicly available website (www.sedi.ca) contains all
of the publicly listed companies in Canada and detailed accounts of all executive
holdings in the corporation. By law, SEDI has to be updated within five days of
any purchase or sale of equity by corporate insiders. The definition of an insider, in
this case, is anyone who knows about internal planning decisions in the corporation
or owns a significant portion of the stock (10 percent of shares or more). However,
SEDI has only been active since 2003, so the observation window of this study is
between 2003 and 2010 (see Figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.1: Observation Window 2003-2010. Lines represent firm histories. The
dotted square is the observation window.
The annual listings of IPOs in Canada are drawn from an investment website,
ipo.investcom.com. This is derived from the original IPO prospectus filed at the
SEDAR website (Administration at investcom.com 2011). This is a complete list
of Canadian IPOs. However, for the purposes of this research, a number of these
listings need to be removed because they do not meet the criteria of this study.
Some research reports remove structured products, a type of investment vehicle,
from their total counts of IPOs (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2010). Similarly, in this




There are a number of cases in which the data had to be cleaned or, in some cases,
firms removed from the panel. Firms are removed from the sample in cases where
information for them could not be found in any data source – either the FP Survey
or SEDI. Overall, there are very few firms that could not be found.
Once collected, the data was cleaned to remove duplicate entries for firms. Dupli-
cate entries were recorded because the FP Survey would often republish a particular
firm’s financial statements the following year. This may have happened because the
firm delayed publishing information, or the FP Survey ’s publication schedule per-
haps conflicted with the firm’s reporting period. Other rare, problematic cases that
were removed consisted of cases where a firm split into two firms.
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4.4 Creating the Panel for Data Analysis
There are a number of supplementary data sources that need to be consulted in order
to create the final panel of firms and directors for data analysis. This section outlines
the key sources and procedures used to merge the information gathered from these
sources into panel data organized by firm-year observations.
The general approach is to follow a firm over time. This is done by constructing
a panel of firm-year observations. The process is as follows:
1. Firm names are drawn from the list of annual IPOs. Each firm is assigned a
unique identifier so that if the firm changes its name it can still be identified
in subsequent years.
2. In each year, the name of each firm is verified using the Financial Post’s Survey
of Industrials. Direct matches are recorded. Each firm is also checked to see if
the name changed that year or if the industry code changed.
3. In cases where an exact match is not found, a confirmatory search is performed
in the Survey of Industrials corporate name changes and mergers information.
If the name has changed, step 1 is repeated with the new name.
From these searches, it is possible to determine whether the firm is still in opera-
tion, if it has changed its name, or ceased to exist. A basic firm-year history can be
formed in order to collect information with greater ease from other sources.
It is important to note that firms often do not immediately appear in the panel
in the year of their IPO. In order to be included in the analysis, firms must have a
complete year’s worth of financial information. In practice, this criteria means that it
can be up to three years from the time a firms undergoes an IPO until it is published
with a full year of data in the FP Survey of Industrials. There are a number of
reasons for this time lag. The primary reason is that the FP Survey of Industrials is
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published once a year, so that if a firm IPOs after the date of publication it will not
be included in that edition. Next, the criteria that a firm must have a complete year’s
worth of financial data means that there may be a time lag before it is captured by
the FP Survey of Industrials. This publishing lag is one of the reasons that firms
that underwent an IPO from 2000 on are included in the panel.
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4.4.1 Details of Constructing the Panel
In order to construct the panel of firms over time, a number of steps were taken.
Each step was codified so that it could be reproduced, if necessary. The first step
involved extracting information from the FP Survey of Industrials. In order to do
this, the PDF files were converted to HTML and then the HTML files were parsed.
This conversion was done for convenience because HTML is a structured document
type and was easier for me to work with.
Each firm in the FP Survey of Industrials is written up in the same way. There
is a series of section headings that are further subdivided with bolded subsection
headings. These section and subsection headings were used as the basis for a simple
parser. The parser extracted the data from each of the sections and generated a file
that was then read into an SQL database table. The parser extracted information for
all Canadian public firms into this firm table. Over the period of interest, approxi-
mately 21,000 records were extracted. In subsequent steps, only the SME industrial
firms that are of interest to this study are used.
In each FP Survey of Industrials there are also separate tables at the end of the
document detailing firm name changes and their industry classification. From each
annual edition of the Survey, this information was transcribed into a separate SQL
table. This name change table was used to accurately track a firm across time, even if
it underwent a name change. In the final step of this process, a “life-history” of each
firm was constructed by joining firm observations across years. In the event of a name
change, the new name was used to ensure that each firm was accurately followed.
Firms that are acquired by other organizations are censored from the analysis. All
of these steps were performed using the SQL database language so they are easily
reproducible. See Figure 4.2 for an outline of the process.
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Some background needs to be given regarding the diverse number of industry code
systems that appear in data sources used in this study. In particular, three classi-
fication schemes are prevalent in the data sources used. The oldest system still in
use is the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). This system was found wanting
because it lacked classifications for more modern industries and there were difficulties
comparing across nations. As a result, the North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS) was developed by national governments to reconcile differences be-
tween Canadian and US industrial schemes (for listings of SIC and NAICS standards,
see Statistics Canada 2011) However, business groups and industry have found that
these systems often do not meet their criteria.
Usually firms are assigned to categories depending on what they produce. How-
ever, it is often unclear how companies are assigned to particular categories. In
answer to this problem, Standard & Poor’s and MSCI/Barra developed the Global
Industrial Classification Standard (GICS) (Standard & Poor 2006). Developed by
leading financial industry analysts, this scheme categorizes companies mainly ac-
cording to where their revenues are derived from – as opposed to what goods they
make. Each of these schemes appear in different contexts and there is often no clear
concordance between the classification schemes.
This paragraph describes how I handle missing GIC codes in this study. In the
panel of firms in this study, a corporation’s GIC code may not be listed for a given
year, or the GIC code may change over time. In cases where the GIC is not listed but
the industry category is the same in the previous and following years, I insert the same
GIC code. In cases where the GIC code changes but one or a number of observations
in between have no assigned GIC code, I automate an approach which I also manually
verify. The automated approach uses term-frequency, inverse document frequency
(TF-IDF) using the profile information for the firm that is supplied in each year of
the FP Survey of Industrials.
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Details of Industry Code Process
TF-IDF makes use of firms with known industry codes in order to classify firms with
no listed industry code. The process, although complex in the details, boils down
to a series of intuitive steps. The first step is to separate firm listings that include
industry codes from firm listings with no industry code. The collection of firms with
industry codes that we know make up the corpus of documents. The next step is
to subdivide the corpus of known documents into groups based on which industry
category each firm is classified into. The final step is to consider the description
that is associated with each firm in the FP Survey of Industrials. Each firm listing
contains a brief description, also referred to as a profile, outlining the firm’s business.
The TF-IDF approach uses information from each firm’s profile to properly categorize
firms without an industry category by comparing how similar the firm’s profile text is
to the description of firms with a known industry code. The paragraphs that follow
elaborate on this procedure.
In order to properly compare the text from firm descriptions, the unique words
that are specific to particular industries need to be determined. These industry-
specific words need to be used to help classify firms with no listed industry. Sim-
ilarly, common words such as “the”, “if”, “and”, etc. need to be ignored. The
industry-specific words are separated from the more common words by considering
their frequency within each known industry group and then to the corpus as a whole.
TF-IDF essentially applies a weight to each word based on how often it appears in
the collection of firm descriptions from a particular industry relative to the corpus of
all known firms. Industry specific words such as “auto”, “car”, “manufacturing” may
appear more in auto manufacturing firms but not at all in software related firms.
Common words like, “and”, “or” and “the” will likely appear in all of the profile
descriptions. Therefore, if we count the number of times each word appears and
then divide that by the total number of words in the firm’s description, we know the
term-frequency. The inverse document frequency considers how rare a given word is
compared to all of the descriptions in the entire corpus – this measure is the propor-
tion of documents with the word over all of the documents in the entire corpus. By
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dividing the term-frequency (TF) by the inverse-document frequency (IDF), we end
up with a number representing how unique the word is.
The mechanics of document classification involve comparing the TF-IDF score of
each unknown document and seeing how similar it is to known documents. This is
done by creating a vector of of all word scores for each firm profile. For any given
profile, it is unlikely that all of the words in the corpus will appear, so the vector will
contain zeros instead. More common words in the description will have low scores
and less common words will have higher scores assigned to the vector. Since we are
given certain industry groups, it is possible to average their word-score vectors to
create a single industry-average vector.
The result of this process is that there are now a series of word-score vectors
representing each high-level industry. The final step involves simply comparing the
vectors generated from those firms where we are not given the industry category to
the average industry vectors. This comparison can be done using cosine similarity
– this measures the cosine of the angle between two vectors. The smaller the angle
between the two vectors, the more similar the vectors are. Thus, firms can be assigned
an industry category by seeing how similar their description is to the descriptions
used by other firms in known industries.
For introductions to some of the important tools and methods involved, see Stray
(2010), Ingram (2007), Grimmer (2011), and Pal (2011).
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4.4.3 Insider Relationship Information
The information about linkages between individuals and their ownership in the firm
is determine through SEDI, the System for Electronic Disclosure of Insiders. SEDI
contains a listing of all of the shares owned by all corporate insiders for every Cana-
dian public company. Using the information from SEDI, the entire interlock network
of all firms was determined. However, this study uses information from SEDI to
focus on the relationships between corporate insiders within each firm.
In order to extract the necessary information about each corporate insider from
SEDI, a series of small scripts were written to “scrape” the SEDI web site. In each
case, the following process was used to collect data on insiders:
1. The name of the company is searched for, and the names of all of the associated
corporate insiders are recorded.
2. Each of the names of the corporate insiders are searched for, and their personal
details are extracted from the site.
3. Finally, all of the trades every insider has made with all public firms they serve
with are recorded.
The resulting insider and trading information was also inserted into SQL database
tables. The trading table consists of an entry for each trade for each company on
any given date. Not surprisingly, this table is large – with over 400,000 entries – but
it allows me to calculate the ownership stake of any given insider in a firm over any
span of time. In Canada, insiders are required by law to report their shareholdings
and trades in SEDI. However, the system may contain errors when insiders make
mistakes when reporting (McNally & Smith 2010).
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4.4.4 Bringing the Data Together
The final step was to bring all of the data together into a reasonably flexible for-
mat. In particular, I needed to integrate firm information with insider ownership
information. In order to accomplish this goal I used an object-oriented framework to
encapsulate the data. In essence, by using object-oriented programming, I was able
to simply “ask” a firm object to return its object representation of its collection of
insiders, which I could then query about their ownership stake in the firm over any
particular period. This simplified what could have otherwise become an unwieldy
processes. The relationship is shown graphically in Figure 4.3. The overview of how
the FP Survey and SEDI information is related is shown in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.3: Data encapsulation – firms in any given range of dates contain all insiders,
which in turn contain groups of related insiders, which in turn contain individual
insiders.
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Some note should also be made at this point about the presence of multiple
classes of voting shares. There were very few companies that had multiple classes
of shares. In the vast majority of cases, each share is worth one vote. However,
in cases where there are multiple votes assigned to each share, great care is taken
to appropriately allocate voting shares to individuals. For example, if an individual
owned super-voting shares that gave them 10 votes per share, then I took great
care to ensure that the individual was analyzed according to the number of votes
he had, not the number of shares he owned. This was done to help ensure that
controlling shareholders were correctly identified as such. Additionally, care was
taken in tracking the current number of shares outstanding for each firm to ensure
that additional share issues or consolidations of shares outstanding were accurately
tracked.
Figure 4.4: Data sources – The information below shows the main data sources and
how they are related.
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4.5 Analytical Approach
This is a quantitative study designed to examine the association between corporate
governance in Canadian industrial SMEs and their performance on the public market.
This research uses a series of fixed-effects and random effects regressions to attempt
to model this relationship. In the subsections that follow, three topics important
to successfully modelling the relationship between performance and governance are
discussed.
The first section gives a general overview of network models and explains how
whole-network models differ from so-called ego-centric type network models that
are utilized in this study. The next section considers a problem common to all
social science models – potential bias caused by endogeneity. This section contains a
brief review of some potential approaches and trade-offs to dealing with endogenous
variables. The regression modelling technique chosen in this study is situated within
these various approaches. The last section discusses fixed-effects regression models
and random effects models and how they are related. These methods are important
when dealing with a panel of individual subjects that change over time.
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4.5.1 Ego-Centric Network Models
There are two main approaches to studying networks. One is the whole-network
approach and the other is an ego-centric network model (sometimes known as person-
centric). Whole-network studies focus on social collectives – groups of actors that are
related due to some predefined characteristic. Ego-centric networks focus on a sample
of individuals (in this case, firms) drawn from a population. Each individual in the
sample is referred to as an “ego” and the immediate network surrounding each ego
is composed of individuals known as “alters.” Ego-centric studies are limited to the
immediate network surrounding each individual (Marsden 2005, pg. 8-9). Although
whole-network data is generally considered ideal, it is often not feasible because of the
high costs of collecting data. Ego-centric approaches are often preferred because of
their focus on the immediate population of interest. In this study, the industrial firms
that underwent an IPO between the years 2000 and 2010 are the “egos” of interest.
Rather than other firms, the linkages that are considered in this research are to the
corporate insiders that are charged with both running and overseeing the firm. One of
the main advantages of the ego-centric approach is that it is compatible with random
sampling approaches and regression analysis because the ego-centric approach does
not violate the independence assumption required for regression analysis.
Network studies that utilize ego-centric network approaches often suffer from
recall problems; the “egos” in the study may not recall who they are connected with
and the strength of those connections to alters (Marsden 2005). This study avoids
this problem through the use of the System for Electronic Disclosure by Insiders
(SEDI) database (CDS Inc. 2010). This database captures ownership information
for corporations and individuals. The database also retains historical ownership
information for defunct or acquired companies. One of the disadvantages of the SEDI
database is that it does not reveal detailed information about prior work experience,
demographic information or relationships of directors with non-public entities.
To some extent these shortcomings can be mitigated through positional mea-
sures (Burt 2000, Lin 1999). Positional measures are indicators of position within
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a network. Examples of positional measures include the highest-status person of an
individual’s contacts. Another may be the diversity of occupations that an indi-
vidual interacts with (Burt 2000, pg.11-12 Appendix). In both cases, there is not
detailed information about the network relationship, but there is an indication of
the types and diversity of social networks an individual may be exposed to. In this
study, positional measures are the official titles of the corporate insiders that indicate
whether they are directors or executives. The advantage of this information is that,
while it lacks detail, it is relatively easy to collect and gives an indication of the
different types of relationships an individual is engaged in (see Burt 2000, for discus-
sion). Quantitative studies of boards of directors and firm performance tend to use
aggregated measures of group characteristics rather than rely on detailed individual
characteristics.
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4.5.2 The Problem of Endogeneity
One important concern in the corporate governance literature is that most governance
variables within models are arguably endogenous to some degree. In other words,
explanatory variables themselves may possibly be explained by the other variables in
the model. Major concerns can arise when explanatory variables are correlated with
the error term of a regression. In the worst case, extreme endogeneity may cause a
model to be biased unless some preventative action is taken.
Three main problems may cause inconsistency in OLS estimates. Measurement
error is one possible cause of endogeneity. In this case, the measurements used in the
study may not be an accurate reflection of reality. A simple example could involve
a survey question that is phrased in such a way to elicit a certain response. If this is
the case, then the resulting measurements will be biased.
Another problem is simultaneity bias – also known as instantaneous causation.
When events take place at the same time, it becomes difficult to unravel causal
relationships. Finally, omitted variables bias – variables excluded from the regression
that are nonetheless related to other explanatory variables – make it difficult to
accurately unravel causal relationships between variables. Omitted variables can
lead to bias in the regression if they are correlated with other dependent variables
(for a full discussion of these issues, see Wooldridge 2001).
In applied social science work, some degree of endogeneity is common – this is
also true for governance research (Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach 2008). There are
different techniques to attempt to mitigate the effects of endogeneity. One basic
approach – the approach used in this dissertation – is to ensure that there is a time
lag between the dependent variable of interest and the explanatory variables. In
panel models, a lag of the dependent variables is taken to ensure that the variables
of interest do not change due to the same circumstances as the independent variable.
Theoretically, if we want to show causation, we need to ensure that the explanatory
variables appear prior to the event of interest. This approach assumes that there
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exists relationship between past explanatory variables and those that explanatory
variables that evolved simultaneously with the dependent variable. While not a
perfect solution, this approach helps to mitigate simultaneity bias (for a discussion
of trade-offs involved with different methods, see Nichols 2007).
Other approaches to the problem of quantitatively determining causality include
the use of simultaneous equations. In work utilizing this approach, multiple equa-
tions are created containing the dependent variable of interest and separate equations
estimating the potentially endogenous regressors. Simultaneously estimating these
equations is said to reveal the distinct relationships between variables. The disad-
vantage of this approach is that a single misspecified equation in any step can bias
all of the regressions (Hayashi 2000, Ch.4).
Instrumental variables (IVs) is the preferred method of choice for determining
causation by many economists. In instrumental variable regressions, endogenous
variables are modelled by adding so-called instrumental variables. These instru-
ments are (ideally) highly correlated with the endogenous variable of interest, but
not related to the errors in the main regression of the dependent variable. Instru-
mental variables are theoretically capable of helping to unravel causal relationships
by removing endogeneity. IVs refine the part of the endogenous variable of interest
into a portion that is highly correlated with the dependent variable of interest, but
no longer correlated with the error term. In practice, however, finding and utilizing
proper instruments is difficult (Adams et al. 2008). Using poor instruments can often
lead to incorrect conclusions. Additionally, what constitutes a good instrument is
often not clear. Using improper instruments can result in bias (Baum, Schaffer &
Stillman 2003, Hayashi 2000).
Given these options, this research uses the basic approach of lagging the explana-
tory variables one period from the dependent variables. While this approach may
be open to criticism, it maintains the advantage of being relatively simple and eas-
ily verifiable. Beyond a randomized experiment, there is no ideal way to determine
causation in the social sciences (Nichols 2007). As previously noted, simultaneous
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equations are susceptible to bias if one equation is misspecified. Similarly, an in-
strumental variables approach is also open to bias if improper or weak instruments
are used with suspected endogenous covariates. In summary, short of a random-
ized clinical trial, there are no perfect approaches for those interested in determining
causality in quantitative social studies.
The following section discusses more in-depth the panel data methods used in
this study.
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4.5.3 Overview of Longitudinal Regression Models
Longitudinal data presents a number of problems that need to be accounted for by
any regression technique. The main approaches for dealing with longitudinal data
make use of fixed effects or random effects. The sections that follow will review and
relate these techniques in order to make clear the approaches used in the analysis.
When examining longitudinal panel data – data collected on a series of individuals
over time – ordinary regression techniques are insufficient. One of the fundamental
assumptions of ordinary regression – or Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) – is that all
of the observations are independent. Clearly, however, this assumption is violated
when we consider data collected about individual subjects over time. It is reasonable
to expect that observations of a subject – in this study, a firm – remain similar
over time. Because it is more natural to assume that changes are gradual and not
discontinuous there is a very strong likelihood that there is serial correlation between
the observations of an individual. This correlation can be controlled for in a number
of different ways using the panel data methods described below.
Fixed Effects Regression
Perhaps the most straightforward approach to dealing with serial correlation between
the observations of a subject over time is to apply fixed effects regression analysis.
The fixed effects approach removes all of the time-invariant aspects of the observa-
tions from the analysis. Thus, the focus of the analysis is on how the variables we are
concerned with change within the subject over time. To accomplish this, the fixed
effects regression subtracts the subject mean of each variable from each observation.
After this operation, only the variables within the subject that have changed over
time remain. Static variables that do not change over time are completely removed
from the analysis.
One of the disadvantages of the fixed effects approach is that static variables that
do not change over the time are simply removed from the analysis. Fixed effects
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regressions can’t tell us anything about the potential importance of variables that
do not change over time, or change very little over time.
The key advantage of fixed effects estimates is that they are unbiased. However,
the standard errors on fixed effects models may not be the most efficient. In appro-
priate circumstances, the random effects estimator is potentially more efficient and
therefore a better choice. However, if improperly applied, estimates from a random
effects regression can be biased. Before discussing the random effects approach, it is
first necessary to consider population average models.
Random Effects Models
Fixed effects estimation is guaranteed to be consistent but not efficient. In con-
trast, random effects models can be more efficient but they may not be consistent.
Random effects models are a weighted average of the within and between regressions
previously discussed (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal 2008, pg.113). This methodology ex-
ploits differences between individuals to gain greater efficiency than the fixed-effects
method can.
In order to do this, the random effects model assumes that the error term is
uncorrelated with the regressors (Nichols 2007, p.514-5). A Hausman test of over-
identifying restrictions is used to test to ensure that a random effects model is applica-
ble by comparing the asymptotic variance of the fixed and random effects estimators
(Hayashi 2000, pg.335). If the Hausman specification test fails, then the fixed effects
estimation should be used because the random effects estimation could give biased
results.
The next section outlines some important descriptive statistics of this study.
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4.6 Descriptive Statistics
This research involves the collection of information about the population of public
SMEs that underwent an IPO between 2000 and 2010 in Canada. In the following
sections, some relevant information about these public firms is outlined. Relatively
little information exists pertaining to public SMEs in Canada. This is unsurprising
since larger firms are more often subjects of scrutiny; they have more assets under
their control, employ more people, and potentially offer more stable returns to in-
vestors. Smaller firms are a riskier investment. They have fewer resources to sustain
themselves when their strategies go awry or product development fails. Despite these
risks, the growth potential for some innovative firms can be large. The risk associ-
ated with smaller firms implies that corporate governance should be a major concern
of investors.
In this section, a number of basic descriptive statistics are discussed. The subsec-
tions that follow contain some general summary statistics of the variables of interest
in this study and information about firm industry categories. Included is an overview
of firm size by market capitalization and number of employees. The final portion of
this section discusses matters related to insider ownership and family ownership.
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4.6.1 Summary Statistics
Table 4.2 shows basic summary statistics of the variables used in this study. The
table of correlations follows; see Table 4.3. In this table, variable names have also
been shortened to fit in a single page. It should be noted that some firms change
industry classification over time (as discussed in Section 4.6.2). Thus, the industry
classification variables will persist within the fixed effects models.
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
West 0.439 (0.497) 0 1 760
East 0.224 (0.417) 0 1 760
Ind. Auto 0.157 (0.364) 0 1 760
Ind. Computer 0.391 (0.488) 0 1 760
Ind. Health 0.33 (0.471) 0 1 760
Ind. Consumer 0.054 (0.226) 0 1 760
Ind. Transition 0.067 (0.25) 0 1 760
Crisis 0.503 (0.5) 0 1 760
Ln (Assets) 8.256 (1.749) 1.053 12.266 760
Leverage 0.171 (0.626) 0 11.077 760
Patents 1.375 (7.932) 0 94 760
Ind. Dirs. 0.451 (0.31) 0 1 760
CEO 0.066 (0.122) 0 0.833 760
CEO2 0.019 (0.06) 0 0.694 760
CEO3 0.008 (0.038) 0 0.579 760
Eff. Control 0.561 (0.296) 0 1 760























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This research makes use of the Global Industrial Classification Standard (GICS)
(Standard & Poor 2006) in order to classify firms by industry. As previously noted,
in Chapter 4 (Section 4.4.2; Industry Codes), the GICS scheme was developed by
financial analysts to classify firms according to their main sources of revenue. The
GICS scheme seems well-suited for firms in this study because it relates their indus-
try category to the activities from which they raise their revenues. However, some
difficulties arise because some firms get the revenues though different industries over
time as their business model changes.
The table that follows lists the GICS categories of the three main industrial
activities of interest in this study. The four broad industry categories are (i) auto
and machinery, (ii) computer equipment and software, (iii) biotechnology and health-
related products, and (iv) consumer products.
Large companies generally tend to stay within their industry categories over time.
However, in this study, it is not unusual for firms to change industry categories as
their business changes. For the most part, these industry transitions can be credited
to the firm finding new sources of revenue for existing products or services, or devel-
oping related products. For example, one company called HealthPricer Interactive
initially was classified as a “health” company because it sold dietary supplements.
Over time, if was reclassified as a “software and services” company because its main
product became a health products-related search engine. In all, 28 firms in this
sample – approximately 14 percent – have undergone a change significant enough to
their business model to merit a change in industry classification.
All of the firms in this study are SMEs with fewer than 200 employees – see
Population Under Study (section 4.2) for discussion. For these SMEs it is possible
to rapidly transition between industries. As a result of the transitions between
industries, firms are included in the study depending on if they had ever served in
an industry of interest at some period over the course of their existence.
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Table 4.4: Broad 4-digit GICS categories of interest in this study















As noted earlier, financial firms and resource firms are omitted from this study.
Resource firms are captured in another data source separate from the FP Survey of
Industrials, and financial firms are not of interest in this study. Because the firm’s
main revenue sources can transition across industry categories, there are cases where
industries are represented that were not part of the original selection criteria to enter
the study. Table 4.5 on page 119 includes a concordance with the corresponding GICS
categories related to the broad categories used in the regression models. In the table,
frequency represents the number of firm-year observations that are included in the
sample for a given industry. For example, there were 14 observations from different
firms that changed industry and became classified as deriving a significant portion
of revenues from the resource sector.
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Table 4.5: Simplified industry categories used in this research
Industry Category GICS Categories Frequency Percent
























Resource Oil & Gas Equipment & Services
Electric Utilities




Oil & Gas Refining & Marketing
Independent Power Producers
14 1.8
Construction Construction related businesses 6 0.8
Media Media 2 0.4
Total firm-year observations: 760 100%
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4.6.3 Measuring Firm Size
The number of people a firm employs cannot be used directly as a criterion to include
firms into the sample for study. The data source used in this research does not contain
consistent employee information for all firms, for all time periods. The FP Survey of
Industrials only has information about the number of employees for approximately
30 percent of firms in their first year of operations. Therefore, rather than use these
employment numbers directly, I exclude firms from the sample based on their initial
market capitalization and their total assets in the first full year of being listed on the
stock exchange. I use the employment numbers that do exist for firms in the sample
to verify that my chosen cut-offs appear to conform to the definition of SME used
in the literature.
The chosen cut-offs are as follows. Firms with a market capitalization in their
first year of operations in excess of 100 million dollars are excluded from the sample.
Similarly, firms with over 50 million dollars in assets in their first year as a listed
public company are also excluded from the sample. In practice, these cut-offs are
not very restrictive. The vast majority of firms listed on the venture exchange are
much smaller2. The distribution of employees is shown in Figure 4.5. This figure
shows the number of employees in the first year of operations for firm listings with
employment information. The results are a skewed distribution – the vast majority
of firms employ fewer than 50 people. Figure (4.6) shows the employment by firms
listed on different exchanges. These findings are consistent with Nicholls (2006).
Nearly 80 percent of the firms on the venture exchange that meet the sampling
criteria of this study employ fewer than 50 people. Firms listed on the TSX appear to
be larger, on average. Close to half of the firms on the TSX that meet the sampling
criteria have fewer than 200 employees – with fully 25 percent of all firms employing
100 to 150 people (see Figure 4.6).
2To ensure that the results are not driven by larger firms in the sample, a sensitivity analysis
was conducted adjusting maximum assets and market capitalization in the first year both upwards
and downwards. The model results showed no significant differences.
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Figure 4.5: Histogram of employees of firms in their first full year of operations (bar
width represents 20 employees)
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Figure 4.6: Employees of firms in their first full year of operations. Separate his-
tograms by TSX and Venture Exchanges (bar width represents 20 employees)
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Figure 4.7: Histogram of market capitalization of firms in their first full year of
operations (bar width represents $10 million)
Perhaps not surprisingly, the vast majority of firms have a very small market cap-
italization – over 50 percent of the firms in this sample have a market capitalization
of less than 10 million dollars in their first year of operations (see Figure 4.7). Figure
4.8 shows that this is the case for over 60 percent of firms listed on the Venture
Exchange, but only a small minority of firms in the sample listed on the TSX.
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Figure 4.8: Market capitalization of firms in their first full year of operations, separate




As previously noted, this study takes a one period-lag of the independent variables
for the regression analysis. For this study this step was necessary in order to separate
the effects of variables changing simultaneously. Governance variables tend to change
slowly so there should be no major changes one year to the next. If there are major
changes, they may be associated with changes in other variables. This decision also
has the effect of removing all firms from the sample where there is only a single
observation. Similarly, each firm loses an observation because of this lagging. The
table below highlights the effect of lagging the independent variables.
Table 4.6: Observations from sample of firms taken from 2003–2010
Firms Observations Notes
194 760 Before lag taken
159 535 Used in regression analysis – one period lag
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4.6.4 Family Control
Entrepreneurs often rely on family in the initial stages of building their business.
Families often provide funds when lending institutions refuse to invest, or skills when
the firm cannot afford outsiders. Thus, it should come as little surprise that more
than 40 percent of the SMEs in the sample have families serving as corporate insiders.
Recall that in this research, a family relation is considered to be detected when two
or more corporate insiders share the same last name.
Table 4.7: Family as Corporate Insiders
Family Insider Type Number of Firms Percent of Sample
Firms with families as insiders 83 of 194 43%
Firms with families within insider group
with largest shareholdings, owning at least
10% of shares outstanding
33 of 194 17%
As Table 4.7 makes clear, members of the same family are represented on more
than 40 percent of public corporations under study. However, if we consider just
the insider group with the largest shareholdings within a firm, owning at least 10
percent of outstanding shares, 17 percent of firms have families as part of their largest
shareholding groups. It should be noted, however, that in some cases families may
enter or exit from the largest shareholding insider group (or the firm entirely). Some
firms also have multiple different families serving as corporate insiders.
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4.6.5 Firm Ownership by Insiders
In all corporate governance research, a key question is how much of the firm is owned
by insiders. The following figures show the total percentage of the firm owned by all
insiders of the corporation – not just a single individual or insider group.
In the sample of firms under study, it is clear that firms that are widely held
are a minority. Table 4.9 shows that approximately 20 percent of firms observed are
widely held, in that they have less than 10 percent ownership by insiders.
Figure 4.9: Total percentage ownership by all corporate insiders combined, all years.
Each bar is 10%.
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Figure 4.10 shows a breakdown of insider ownership by listed exchange. This
figure makes it clear that over 30% of firms listed on the TSX are widely held. This
compares to approximately 15% of firms listed on the Venture Exchange. However,
considering firms where insiders own in excess of 20% of outstanding shares, there
are similar levels of total ownership by insiders on both exchanges.
Figure 4.10: Total percentage ownership by all corporate insiders combined. Separate
histograms by exchange, all years. Each bar is 10%.
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4.6.6 Family-Run Firms
Figure 4.11 examines only firms where a family is part of the largest shareholding
group versus firms that are not family-run. A family is determined in those cases
where two or more corporate insiders share the same last name. This figure shows
only the total ownership of firms where families are part of the largest shareholding
group. In this case, I call the firm family-run. The largest difference appears beyond
the 60 percent ownership level, where family-run firms appear to have much higher
rates of total firm ownership.
Figure 4.11: Total percentage ownership in of non-family firms versus family-run
firms, all years. Each bar is 10%.
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4.6.7 CEO Ownership
The total distribution of CEO ownership in the firm is shown in Figure 4.12. In
the vast majority of cases – close to 70 percent of all observations – the CEO owns
between zero and five percent of the firm. On average, the CEO only owns more
than 20 percent of the firm in about 13 percent of the cases.
Figure 4.12: Percentage CEO Ownership all firms. Bar width is five percent.
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4.6.8 Recap
This section has described the sample examined in this study (Section 4.6). This
section began with summary statistics detailing the variables used in this study. The
industry categories that are used in this study are of interest not only because they
describe the area in which industrial firms generate revenues, but also because firms
in this sample change industry classifications over the course of the analysis. Another
point of interest in this research is the high rate of family presence in the public firms
that comprise this study. Given that more than 40 percent of firms appear to have
a family involved as insiders in some capacity lends credibility to the intuition that
examining the social capital of corporate insiders is an important way in which to
attempt to capture some nuances of corporate governance of SMEs. The descriptive
statistics on total ownership by all firm insiders – not just a single individual or
group – reveal that few firms in the sample are widely held by this measure.
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4.7 Dependent Variable
This study uses Tobin’s Q as a market-based measure of performance, or firm valu-
ation.
4.7.1 Tobin’s Q
Tobin’s Q is generally accepted in the corporate governance literature as a measure of
market valuation of a firm’s assets. In this study of small- and medium-sized public
firms, Tobin’s Q is particularly useful. Tobin’s Q captures the valuation of a firm’s
intangible assets that the market may value (Morck et al. 1988b). Intangibles include
goodwill, valuable patents, or perhaps promising research. The key idea is that the
market will price the firm not just according to its present financial performance,
but its potential future performance.
In the sample of firms under study, many smaller firms have a large Tobin’s Q.
These are companies that have intangibles that are highly valued by the market –
presumably for the perceived potential for the firm to be highly profitable relative
to its assets. Thus, many smaller firms on the TSX and the Venture Exchange have
values of Tobin’s Q that far exceed those of more established firms. This is expected
because more established firms likely have Tobin’s Q values closer to one – where the
market’s valuation of the firm more roughly approximates the replacement cost of
physical assets. For smaller firms – especially those that are research intensive, the
market valuation can far exceed the replacement cost of the firm’s physical assets.
This reflects the fact that the firm is developing a product or service offering that
has the potential to exceed the initial start-up and research costs. Of course, the
process of research and development is full of risk, so a high Tobin’s Q need not
indicate a successful company. Rather, Tobin’s Q indicates the potential for the firm
to succeed taking into account the risks.
In this study, Tobin’s Q is implemented as book value of liabilities plus market
value of common equity, divided by the book value of assets. Using the book value
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of assets rather than the replacement costs of assets is consistent with other studies
(Khanna & Palepu 2000, Klein et al. 2005, Martinez et al. 2007, Elkinawy & Stater
2011). Research has also shown that book value of assets is highly correlated with
replacement cost of capital (Hillman 2005). This formulation of Tobin’s Q is thought
to be particularly appropriate for the current study because the firms in this sample
raise funds through both equity and debt.
The distribution of Tobin’s Q is right-hand skewed (Figure 4.13). The most
common fix for a skewed variable is to transform it (Fox 1997, pg.59). The natural
logarithm is taken of the variable to normalize it. Figure 4.14 shows density plots of
the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q for the sample broken down by industry category.
Figure 4.13: Histogram of Tobin’s Q, first period of analysis
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Compared to other studies using Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm performance, the
sample considered in this research tends to have relatively higher values of Tobin’s Q.
Considering all periods in the sample under study, Tobin’s Q ranges from a minimum
of 0.03 to a maximum of 1360. However, such high values appear to be outliers. In
this case the high Tobin’s Q appears to be the result of the firm having decreasing
assets. Removing this outlier, for firms under study the maximum value of Tobin’s
Q is 79.
Figure 4.14: Smoothed density plot of natural log of Tobin’s Q by industry group,
first period
A series of sanity checks were performed to ensure that the results of this study
were not driven by outliers. Another concern was that firms that are going out of
business may have decreasing assets and that these decreasing assets may artificially
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inflate Tobin’s Q. In the current regressions, as noted elsewhere, the outliers were
removed from the analysis. A series of other sanity checks, in regressions not shown
here, were also performed to ensure that the results were consistent. These tests
also showed results consistent with the regressions published here. In the first test,
the data was winsorized and the regressions were repeated. In the second test, firms
that showed large year-on-year decreases in assets were removed from the analysis.
Finally, in order to remove firms that may be at risk of failure, the last observed
period of the firms were dropped from the analysis. The idea behind this test is to
remove the last observation where a firm may be winding down the business – and
thus have their assets approaching zero, but still has a positive share price. In all of
these test scenarios, the results were consistent with the results published here.
Other Dependent Variables
The SMEs in this study differ from the larger, established firms that usually make
up the firms in samples of corporate governance and performance. The SMEs in this
sample rarely have positive profits or even revenues. In addition to equity financing,
debt financing also appears to be common. Debt financing may be due to the fact
that borrowing costs have been relatively low over the time this study was conducted.
As a result of the differences between SMEs and large firms, standard accounting
measures of performance that are used to evaluate large firms often yield unintuitive
results. Common measures of accounting performance such as return on assets, or
return on sales contain large numbers of zeros.
In this research, a number of regression models using accounting performance
measures were attempted, but they failed to explain more than one or two percent of
the underlying variation overall. Models that were attempted included the natural
log of the firm’s profit rate, as well as measures based on profits such as return
on assets and return on equity. In no case did the models explain any substantial
amount of the underlying variance in the dependent variables. Similarly, models
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of the percentage change of the firm’s revenues and profits also failed to explain
a substantial portion of the variation in the dependent variable. This finding is
not unusual – most corporate governance research finds no relationship between
accounting measures of performance and corporate governance (King & Santor 2008).
These results are not surprising given that the firms in the sample are SMEs.
SMEs often have difficulty in becoming profitable and experience a high failure rate
as a result (Baldwin et al. 1998, Davis et al. 1998). There may also be other reasons
for the lack of relation to accounting measures of performance. The key issue may
be that the firms in the sample are trying to undertake new businesses that may not
be profitable for some time. Part of the reason for the lack of profitability may be
that the firm is engaged in product development or other research and development.
In these cases, Tobin’s Q may be high for a firm that appears to be on the path to
becoming profitable, but does not yet have profits. For example, a biotech firm may
need to send a drug for testing and obtain regulatory approval before it can actually
begin to become profitable. Over time, investors may choose to invest in the firm
based on its non-financial successes such as obtaining patents, receiving approval, etc.
Similarly, other technology firms may need time to develop their products before
potentially becoming generating significant revenues or profits. Therefore, in this
study of SMEs, measures of Tobin’s Q – which captures intangible assets of the firm,
unlike accounting performance measures – is thought to be more appropriate.
Accounting measures also do not capture the potential for firms to be profitably
acquired by larger organizations. Again, the advantage of Tobin’s Q is that this
measure captures these potential gains because the Tobin’s Q takes into account the
firm’s intangible assets. I argue that these intangibles are especially important in
the case of the SMEs that are part of this study.
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4.8 Control Variables
The control variables that are used in this study are listed in Table 4.8. The para-
graphs below provide a brief description of these variables. All measures in nominal
dollar values are converted to real 2006 dollars using a consumer price index deflator.
A series of dummy variables are used in the regression models. Industry dummies
are used to control for spurious relationships specific to the type of industry the firm
is in (Morck et al. 1988b, Demsetz & Lehn 1985). These are in the Global Industrial
Classification Standard (GICS) industry code format (Standard & Poor 2006). The
auto and machinery industry category is used as the reference in the model because
the Q values of the health and computer industries may be relatively inflated.
Regional dummy variables denote whether the firm’s head office is located in
western, eastern or central Canada (the default case in the model). The different
regions may have different implications for firms performance. Western Canada
has enjoyed significant economic growth driven through the province’s oil and gas
resources. The eastern provinces have Ontario is the largest province in Canada with
the largest industrial base. A time dummy variable is one in cases where the firm
observation occurs after the financial crisis.
The value of firm assets is an important variable for controlling for the size of
the firm (Hermalin & Weisbach 1991, pg.106). In this study the log of total assets
is used to control for differences that are due to the scale of the operation. This
measure is common to all corporate governance and firm performance studies (for
review, see Benson & Davidson III 2009). A control for which exchange the firm
was listed on was considered as a candidate to add to the models. However, testing
revealed that this dummy variable is highly correlated with firm assets. As a result,
it was omitted.
Book value of debt divided by market value of common equity captures firms that
are more leveraged (Klein et al. 2005). Firms that are highly leveraged may perform
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differently than those that are not. For example, growth may be more difficult for
highly leveraged firms.
There are two variables that sometimes appear in the literature but are not di-
rectly used in this study. The first variable is the amount of research and development
dollars that are spent as a fraction of total assets. Morck et al. (1988b) use this to
capture potentially new innovations from the firm. Morck et al. (1988b) also use
advertising expenses as a fraction of dollars spent to capture marketing by the firm.
In both cases, the necessary information was not present in the chosen information
source to re-create these variables. However, the number of patents a firm has re-
ceived up to a given date is used as a proxy for R&D spending. Information for
the number of patents a firm has on an annual basis is drawn from the Canadian
Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) web site at http://cipo.ic.gc.ca (Government of
Canada 2012). No comparable proxy was found for marketing expenditures by the
firm.
The sections that follow describe the variables to test the central hypotheses of
this research.
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Table 4.8: Control variables
Variable Meaning
GICS Industry dummies Represents 2-digit GICS code of the firm’s
industry (Demsetz & Lehn 1985; Morck et
al. 1988)
Region Location of head office: Western Canada,
Eastern Canada or Central Canada (the
default).
Crisis Dummy variable to indicate if the
observation occurred after the 2007
financial crisis.
Firm assets Natural log of firm’s assets to capture the
size of the organization (Morck et al 1988,
Hermalin and Weisbach 1991)
Leverage Book value of debt divided by market value
of common equity (Klein et al. 2005)
Number of patents received by firm Proxy for R&D spending used in many
studies (Morck et al 1988)
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4.9 Control by Insiders - Constraint
The relatively small firms that are the subjects of this study often have complex gov-
ernance structures. If we use agency theory, and consider widely held firms as the
baseline, then the vast majority of firms in this study have potentially problematic
governance structures because they have at least one large owner. This study argues
that the close relationships among many of the corporate insiders in the firm – both
directors and managers – make measuring individual ownership alone within the
board a potentially misleading approach. On the surface of it, it is unclear whether
positional measures of corporate insiders are a good approach to understanding own-
ership and control. In this case, for example, the position of a corporate insider may
hold – a position such as a manager or directors –may not accurately capture what
happens in the firm, which affects corporate governance.
There is an alternative to examining individuals who hold top level positions in
the firm without referencing other insiders in the firm. The alternative is to momen-
tarily set aside their nominal positions within the organization and to consider their
relationships to one another. This focus on the relationships between individuals is
based intuitively on how firms form. Entrepreneurs often need to get funding and
assistance from their friends and family to start their businesses. In the public firms
I am studying, there remains a significant representation of families. By considering
the family relationships of individuals as well as the ownership relationships, it is
possible to get a more balanced view of the different coalitions that actually govern
the firm. From this perspective, in terms of ownership and control, the unit to con-
sider is not the ownership of an individual, or a position (such as CEO, director or
manager) but of the entire group that is linked together through common ownership
structures and/or family relationships. Approached in this way, governance can be
considered in terms of the structure of different coalitions or groups of insiders who
collectively operate the firm.
In order to declare that a single group has control over the firm, it is also necessary
to determine to what degree other groups own enough of the outstanding voting
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shares to contest decisions by the largest shareholders. The degree to which different
groups are able to control the firm can become complex. The suggested measure
of constraint is useful because it captures the differences between groups in a single
summary statistic. However, while the statistic is intuitive, the construction of the
statistic is somewhat complex and requires a section of its own to explain.
Most firms in this sample issue only common stock with a single vote per share.
This measure is ultimately concerned with control over the firm, so the term own-
ership is used to mean “ownership of common voting shares”. In the few cases – 14
firms – where firms have dual-class shares with differing voting rights, the multiple
voting rights are taken into account in the calculations.
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4.9.1 Explaining Network Constraint
Network theory is concerned with how the structure of the networks that relate
individuals or groups together affects outcomes concerning those involved in the
network. Information flow is often considered an important element in the network
under study (see Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell 2011). Depending on the concerns of the
analyst, how information is conveyed through a network could result in advantages for
certain individuals based on their position within the network. The classic example is
Granovetter’s (1973) finding that people find a job not through their close relations,
but through their acquaintances. Thus, these individuals acted as bridges across to
different groups and provided information to the individual.
Burt’s (1992) measurement of constraint is an attempt to capture the degree to
which an individual has more opportunities because they are acting as a bridge across
structural holes. So, in effect, Burt is concerned with the degree to which the links
that an individual has are redundant. The more interconnected – or redundant –
one’s links are, the more one is in the centre of a close group. If one considers that
value is to be obtained through novel information, then the person who maintains
the same contacts as everyone else is not structurally in a very good position to be
the first to receive new information.
The following sections discuss various concepts that constitute Burt’s (1992) mea-
sure of constraint. Throughout the discussion that follows, it is important to be
mindful that the measures are dependent upon how they are used within theory. For
example, while the term “constraint” may have negative connotations, it should not
be assumed that the outcomes will always be negatively related to this measure. The
measures presented below should be considered agnostic – it is the particular theory
that they are used within that gives them a predicted effect. We will return to the
theory and assumptions used in this research following this brief exposition of terms.
For Burt (1992), one is constrained to the extent that one’s contacts also have
the same contacts as oneself. Implicit in the idea of constraint is the idea that one’s
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contacts are redundant in the sense that these contacts may, if considered purely
as a network, lead back to other people that one already knows. To continue with
this example, if we were to account for the redundancy in our relationships, then we
could gain an appreciation for the effective size of our social network. The effective
size of one’s network is defined by Burt as being a measure of the network size once
redundant contacts are taken into account. In the sections that follow the terms
redundancy, effective size and constraint will be defined. Finally, the constraint
measure will be illustrated in this study through two examples.
4.9.2 Measuring Redundant Relationships
Intuitively, redundancy is the degree to which one of your contacts knows the rest
of your contacts. So, if we consider person i is the person of interest – or “ego.”
Person j represents the another person – or “alter”. Finally, let q represent person
i’s other contacts. Burt (1992, pg.51) formalizes redundancy as the time and energy
spent on a relationship (piq) and the marginal strength of that relationship (mjq).
Marginal strength (mjq) is defined by Burt as the strength j’s relationship divided
by the strongest of j’s relationships with anyone. In the equations that follow, zjq
measures the strength of the relationship from person j to person q.




where i 6= j (4.1)




where j 6= k (4.2)
Burt defines redundancy as
R = piq ·mjq (4.3)
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4.9.3 A Simplification
It is worth noting that the apparently complex relation that is a measure of redun-
dancy in a relation piq ·mjq can be greatly simplified. If we assume that zjq can only












In other words, the time spent on each relationship is equal to the inverse of the
number of relationships. This assumes that we spend equal time on each relationship.
Similarly, mjq, the marginal strength of the relationship in equation (4.2) simpli-
fies to one. This is the case because all edges are of the same weight by assumption








So, in this simplified case, piq ·mjq = 1j .
4.9.4 Redundancy in Relationships
Taking equation (4.3) and summing across all relationships that our ego i has, we
can calculate the total redundancy of i ’s relationship with the alter j. In other words,
i ’s relationship with j is redundant to the extent that j maintains relations with i ’s
other contacts q. The more contacts that i and j have in common, the higher the
measure of redundancy will be. If we examine each individual that our ego knows, q,





piq ·mjq where q 6= i, j (4.6)
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4.9.5 Effective Size of a Network
The non-redundant size of one’s network is simply one minus the redundant portion
of the network. Burt (1992) takes the sum of all the non-redundant relationships a
person has and calls it the effective size of one’s network. This measure is intended
to capture how large one’s network actually is once we take into account redundant













where q 6= i, j (4.7)
Burt (1992, pg.53) points out that the square brackets in equation (4.7) are equal
to one when contact j is independent of other primary contacts – i.e., there is no
redundancy in the relationship. At the other extreme, when contacts are very closely
related, the term in the square brackets approaches pij.
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4.9.6 Calculation of Constraint
With the previously noted concepts, we can finally turn to the meaning of the mea-
surement of constraint. In his 1992 book Structural Holes, Burt approaches constraint
from the perspective of an individual negotiating with others. Because of limits to an
individual’s time and resources, each individual needs to optimize their time. Deal-
ing with each of one’s different contacts takes a certain amount of time and energy.
Time spent on any given relationship is termed as pij in equation (4.1).
Burt (1992, pg.54) gives the example of ego i considering the cost of maintaining
a relationship with j. Burt argues that i must consider the extent to which his
current group of contacts, q, is already in contact with j. In this case, piq is the time
and energy i puts into existing contacts q. The time and energy that i ’s contacts,
q, put into maintaining a relationship with j are pqj. The product of these terms,
piqpqj, is the proportion of time that i has invested in q, and the proportion of time
that q has invested in j. The higher the product of these terms, the more redundant
i ’s relationship with j is because j and q remain close. By considering all contacts,
q, Burt (1992) defines constraint across one’s contacts as follows:
Constraint across contacts = pij +
∑
q
piqpqj where q 6= i, j (4.8)
Again, the idea behind equation (4.8) is that one is constrained to the extent
that one has invested solely in contacts that are closely related. From a negotiations
standpoint, it would be hard to negotiate anything from one’s contacts if they are all
closely related. If we look at the network from the point of view of receiving novel
information, the situation is similar. The person who has a high constraint measure
is unlikely to receive new information before any of his contacts, simply because he
has few relationships that reach beyond his immediate group.
Burt (1992, pg.55) argues that the final measure of aggregate constraint should
be squared. Burt notes that the expression measures the lack of structural holes an
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individual has, as well as the product of time an individual has invested in a given










where q 6= i, j (4.9)
Thus, one is constrained to the extent that one has invested one’s limited re-
sources in people with relationships that also lead back to the group of people that
you already are close to. In other words, one has cultivated relationships within a
single close group of individuals. Again, if we consider new information entering the
network, it seems unlikely that individual i will receive any information that is novel
relative to what is known by her current contacts already.
It is again worth emphasizing that Burt’s exposition is set within very specific
situations that tend to emphasize that constraint is negative. This need not always
be the case. There can be situations where a high measure of constraint can be
considered to have a positive effect and can lead to desirable outcomes. For example,
Coleman’s (1988) concern with social capital as closure is an important contribution
that argues for the importance of community in certain outcomes. At-risk students
may do better in tightly-knit social circles where difficulties can be noticed and
remedied early on (see discussion on Social Capital in Section 2.5.1 on page 40).
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4.9.7 Constraint As Used in the Present Research
Network measures seem to be a natural fit for cases where there are multiple indi-
viduals who could be related in complex ways. In the present research, the top level
of each corporation is composed of individuals. These individuals may pool their
ownership stakes in the firm into voting blocks to affect decision making.
In the present research, Burt’s measure of constraint is used to consider groups
of corporate insiders rather than individuals. Rather than considering individuals
as nodes in the network, I consider groups of individuals. Prior to calculating the
constraint measure, I assign each corporate insider to a particular group based on
their ownership and familial relationships to other insiders. By definition, no insider
can be part of more than a single group. If in the process of the calculation, an
individual is part of more than one group, then the groups are merged into a larger
group.
This process simplifies the the constraint measurement in a number of ways.
First, by definition each insider group is independent from all other insider groups.
This means that there is no redundancy in relations – so the
∑
q piqpqj portion of
equation (4.9) drops out of the calculation. Second, by considering groups of insiders
rather than individuals, the networks are much simpler and easier to explain and
understand. Finally, these simplified networks can be weighted by the total number
















Recall from (4.1) that pij is the time and energy spent on the relationship between
i and j. In the simplified case, z was set equal to one or zero depending on if there
is a relationship or not. For this study, each z term is weighted according to the
number of voting shares outstanding held by each insider group.
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4.9.8 Examples of the Constraint Calculation
The following section provides some examples of how constraint is calculated for each
of the insider groups in the firm. The first example covers calculating constraint for
a company called Lehman Trikes. Lehman Trikes builds components to convert
motorcycles into three-wheeled trikes. The simplified graph of major shareholders
shows two major shareholding insider groups. The first group is composed of one
person – Daniel Patterson – who is listed as a director of the firm. The second group
is composed of Larry Strilchuck and Marilyn Strilchuck. Larry Strilchuck is also
listed as a director.
Figure 4.15: Network of corporate insiders for Lehman Trikes (2007-2008)
Given equation (4.10), it is straightforward to calculate the constraint measure.
Considering the Lehman Trikes firm and insider groups listed above as nodes, it is
possible to set the weight of the edges between the nodes as equal to the total shares


















= (0.7068)2 + (0.2932)2
= 0.59
For the next example, consider a company called Grand Power Logistics, which
handles freight and brokerage services in China. Tong (Ricky) Chui and Wan Kee
Chui collectively own almost 31 percent of the firm. Both are directors, and Tong
Chui also serves as CEO. Sheng Ning Wong held approximately 2.5 percent of the
shares outstanding, followed by Kim Oishi with just 1.49 percent of the shares. Both
served as directors.
Note that for the calculation of constraint, it makes no difference if we use shares
outstanding or the percentages of the firm owned by each insider group. If we use
percentages, the denominator cancels in the calculation.
Figure 4.16: Network of corporate insiders for Grand Power Logistics (2008-2009)
Pi,Chiu =
30.67%









30.67% + 2.47% + 1.49%
= 0.0430









= (0.8857)2 + (0.0713)2 + (0.0.0430)2
= 0.79
Both examples show how constraint can be calculated. In the Lehman Trikes
example, the calculated constraint is about 0.59. The constraint measure for Grand
Power Logistics is approximately 0.79. Grand Power Logistics is more constrained
than Lehman Trikes because the Chiu family controls a much larger portion of the
voting shares than the other insiders – approximately 25 percent more than all other
insiders combined. In the case of Lehman Trikes, the Strilchuk family retains owner-
ship of just over six percent of the outstanding voting shares as compared to Daniel
Patterson, who controls nearly 15 percent of the voting shares. The difference here
is not nearly as great as in the Grand Power Logistics example. The constraint
measure shows that in the case of a conflict, there is some room for the Strilchuks
to contest any attempt at unilateral control exerted by Patterson. By comparison,
there appears to be little stopping the Chiu family from exerting total control over
Grand Power Logistics.
4.9.9 A Relative Measure of Control
As the examples from the previous section makes clear, the measure of constraint
used in this research is a relative measure of control. The measure of effective control
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is relative in the sense that it compares the outstanding of shares of insiders only.
It does not consider all outstanding shares. This choice in the construction of the
index has a number of implications.
The first implication is that the measure more accurately determines the balance
between coalitions within the firm. The result of this approach is that the measure
of effective constraint considers graphs with the same relative voting weights as
equivalent. For example, there are two firms, A and B, each with three coalitions
owning a number of voting shares. In firm A, each of the three coalitions control 20%,
15% and 5% of the firm’s outstanding shares. In firm B, each of the three coalitions
controls 10%, 7.5% and 2.5% of the outstanding voting shares. In this case, firms A
and B will have the same measure of effective control. This is the case because the
coalitions within the firm have the same proportion of control of the firm compared
to other insiders. From a governance perspective, the two smallest coalitions control
roughly the same amount of outstanding voting shares as the largest group. In both
cases, it is hypothesized that there will be a high degree of internal oversight over
decisions.
Thus, there remain boundary cases that the measure of effective control alone
may be less suitable because it is a relative measure of a coalition’s control over
the organization. In empirical studies needing to examine absolute control from a
network perspective, the effective control measure could be adjusted directly to make
use of the total number of shares controlled by all insiders. In cases where there is a
dominant owner – a single coalition that absolutely controls the firm with more than
50% of the voting shares – a dummy variable could be set. Although in practice,
this would appear to be a relatively rare case. Similarly, in cases where insiders own
a relatively small proportion of the firm, the total percentage owned by all insiders
could be used as a cut-off to examine effective control only in cases where insiders
controlled some percentage of the firm. However, some caution should be exercised
with this approach because analysts risk omitting measures internal oversight in
cases where the firms are large and insiders own a small percentage. In some cases,
this may be an interesting case because although insiders own a small proportion
of the firm, their shares could be highly valued. However, for the purposes of the
152
present study, the measure of effective control is an adequate measure of the internal
governance of the firm.
153
4.10 Proportion of Independent Directors
Independent directors are thought to provide oversight over the firm’s operations.
Independent directors are defined in this study as directors who do not have sig-
nificant attachments to the firm. In this study, to be considered an independent
director, the individual must meet the following criteria:
1. Own less than one percent of the shares outstanding in the firm,
2. not have direct relations with any other insider through mutual ownership links,
3. not have direct relations with any other insider through family relations,
4. not be a director of, or be connected to, a large shareholding organization,
5. not serve on a board at another company with any other director of the firm.
In essence, in order to be considered independent, directors must not be related to
any insider within the firm or through work at a different public firm. The proportion
of independent directors is calculated as the ratio of the number of independent
directors over the total number of directors. It is hypothesized that the proportion
of independent directors will be positively associated with firm performance and
growth.
An anecdotal example of the power of independent directors can be seen in the one
recent, high-profile case. The firm, Environmental Management Solutions, obtained
a number of well known independent directors. For a number of reasons, in 2005
the independent directors eventually felt they had to remove the CEO – who also
owned 20 percent of the firm – for malfeasance (McNish & Howlett 2005, CBC
News 2005a, CBC News 2005b). While extreme, this case illustrates that directors
do have real power to use when they choose.
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4.11 Family-Run Firms
In this study, a firm is considered to be family-run if multiple family members are part
of the insider group that collectively holds the most shares in the corporation. When
there are multiple corporate insiders with the same last name, they are considered
to be related. From the standpoint of market valuation, firms that are family-run
may be discounted somewhat for fear that family interests will be put ahead of the
interests of other shareholders. In terms of real performance indicators, it could be
feared that firms will not perform as well because their management is not hired
through merit, but through family relations.
This research begins from the position that there is reason to suppose that a
family-run firm will be considered suspect by investors. Thus, a family run-firm will
be systematically undervalued relative to firms that do not have families as part of
the largest shareholding group, all other things being equal. In order to test this
hypothesis, I construct a dummy variables that indicates whether a family is part of
the largest insider group in a firm. These dummy variables will represent an intercept
shift which is applied to the company if the above conditions are met. If the firm is
family-operated, I expect a negative association with the performance measure, all
other things held constant.
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4.12 CEO Ownership
Studies concerned with corporate governance and firm performance often consider
executive or CEO ownership as a key factor affecting performance. Morck et al.
(1988b) found a non-linear association between the percentage of executive ownership
and performance as measured by Tobin’s Q.
In this research, the CEO ownership is also measured as the percentage of voting
shares in the firm that the CEO owns. The percentage of the firm that is owned by the
CEO is hypothesized to be non-linearly associated with firm performance similar to
the results found by Morck et al. (1988b). The intuition here is that the CEO is likely
to play a particularly important role in the success of an SME. This research will
attempt to fit a polynomial of the percentage of ownership in order to capture the
potential non-linear relationship between CEO ownership and performance. CEO
Ownership will also be compared to the variable capturing control by insiders to
ensure that they are not highly correlated.
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4.13 Summary
This chapter has reviewed how the full model outlined in previous chapters will be
implemented. In particular, this chapter has covered in depth the sample the study
is concerned with. The important data sources have been outlined along with the
general methodology involved with extracting data from these files. An extended
discussion followed detailing how the individual firm observations over each year of
the study will be linked in order to create a longitudinal panel. Finally, a detailed
outline of how each of the major hypotheses are implemented was included. This
was followed by an overview of the control variables important for this study.





The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the regression models used to test the
hypotheses developed in chapters three and four. The sections that follow contain
the results of the fixed-effects and random effects regression models that have Tobin’s
Q as the dependent variable. In this chapter, I describe the technical results of the
models. An in-depth discussion of how the results are related to the internal social
capital theory developed in this research is reserved for the discussion in the final
chapter of this dissertation.
5.1.1 Corporate Governance Measures
In this research, I examine the firm from a social capital perspective. By utilizing
the information about how corporate insiders are linked to each other, I re-interpret
corporate governance measures. The variables that are used to test the hypotheses
generated in the previous chapters are concerned with different aspects of corporate
governance.
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In this research, I have focused on four main areas of corporate governance. The
first area concerns what I have termed the effective control of the firm and how
the structure of relationships between insiders can be interpreted as an indicator of
internal oversight within the organization. The second area concerns the external
oversight provided by independent directors. The third examines the differences
between family-controlled firms and other firms. The fourth area focuses on the
relationship between CEO ownership and firm performance. Each of these areas of
research and their implementation in the model specifications will be reviewed below.
I argue that the structure of relationships – the internal social capital of the firm
– can be considered as contributing to the corporate governance of the firm. The
measure of effective control used in this research is based on Burt’s (1992) network
measure of constraint and varies between zero and one. A lower measure of effective
control indicates that the coalitions within the firm have similar voting rights. In
this case, no single coalition of insiders can control the firm without at least the tacit
consent of other coalitions. A value at the other end of the effective control scale,
when the measurement is close to or equal to one, indicates that there is a single
coalition that has enough voting rights in the firm to exercise complete control of
the organization. This measure is similar in intent to that used by Maury & Pajuste
(2005) (for discussion, see Literature Review, Section 2.3).
Although I argue that internal social capital is important for corporate gover-
nance, it is not the only factor that is important. The extant literature has also
stressed the importance of independent directors as sources of oversight over the
principles within a firm. Independent directors are thought to be particularly impor-
tant because they have incentives to oversee the insiders in the firm. One important
incentive is that independent directors are likely to be concerned about their pro-
fessional reputation (Jensen 2000). It is well known that directors often gain work
through personal references (Useem 1986). Directors who do not provide effective
oversight are therefore less likely to receive new positions.
In this research, I use the proportion of independent directors on a board to cap-
ture the importance of independent external oversight in a firm. I define independent
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directors as those directors that have no family or professional associations with the
firm and do not own a major stake in it. In essence, independent directors are those
directors that are unconnected to other corporate insiders through any of the types
of networks discussed in this research.
In the corporate governance literature, family-run firms are also an important and
growing area of research. In this research, I indicate family-run firms by setting a
dummy variable for those firms that have two or more family members in the largest
shareholding group of the firm.
The importance of the level of ownership by key executives was first highlighted
by Morck et al. (1988b). Since then, a number of researchers have considered the
relationship between executive compensation and firm performance (for brief review,
see Benson & Davidson III 2009). However, there has been little corporate gov-
ernance research examining the importance of executive roles in SMEs despite the
fact that this area was identified as an important area for research early on (Morck
et al. 1988b, pg.314)..
5.1.2 Model Specification
The model specification assumes that all governance variables are independent from
one another and other measurable factors operating within the firm. The model is es-
timated with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Serial correlation due to ob-
servations of the same firms over time are also controlled for. Wooldridge’s test for au-
tocorrelation also shows no support for the hypothesis that there is serial correlation
in the idiosyncratic errors at the 13 percent level (Wooldridge 2001, Drukker 2003).
The models also use lagged independent variables in order to alleviate concerns about
simultaneity bias from contemporaneously determined independent and explanatory
variables.
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5.2 Fixed Effects Regression
Table 5.1 contains the basic fixed-effects (FE) model with the governance covariates
treated independently. The table contains two different regressions. The first model
(column one) excludes all of the governance variables. This regression is used as
a baseline to compare the explanatory power of the governance variables used in
this study. The second regression (column two) contains the full fixed-effects re-
gression model including the governance variables that were discussed earlier. The
addition of the governance variables collectively accounts for almost four percent
of the variation explained by the model. While the additional explanatory power
of the governance variables is relatively modest, this result is consistent with other
corporate governance studies (for example, see Benson & Davidson III 2009). Both
regression models include standard error adjustments to control for within-firm serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity.
These regressions show that the control for firm size, the log of assets, is negative
and statistically significant within the firm. The implication is that the larger the
organization, the closer Tobin’s Q will be to one. This is consistent with my ex-
pectation that larger firms will be more established businesses with fewer unknowns
and intangible goods. Thus, the market valuation will be closer to the assets the
firm holds resulting in a Tobin’s Q closer to one. In larger firms, Tobin’s Q is more
likely to be closer to one than in smaller firms. Smaller firms are a greater risk but
potentially offer a greater reward per dollar invested if their strategy bears fruit. It
is not unusual for high-tech firms to be valued much higher than their assets because
of the firm’s potential to make profits in the future.
The financial crisis dummy variable also indicates that firm observations after
this point in time experience a significant decrease in Tobin’s Q, all other things
being equal.
Of the governance variables considered in this study, none are statistically signif-
icant except the covariate measuring effective control within the firm. In this case,
the coefficient of effective control is negative, as expected.
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Table 5.1: Tobin’s Q regressions: Fixed-effects model
(1) (2)
VARIABLES FE p-values FE p-values
Prov. Western 0.520 (0.312) 0.429 (0.459)
Prov. Quebec 0.0556 (0.916) 0.0534 (0.931)
Ind. Computer 0.0402 (0.941) -0.0967 (0.872)
Ind. Health 0.0589 (0.908) -0.118 (0.840)
Ind. Consumer Goods 0.190 (0.710) 0.0443 (0.936)
Ind. Transition -0.217 (0.319) -0.358 (0.262)
Log Assets -0.313*** (4.72e-05) -0.318*** (2.82e-05)
Leverage -0.0250* (0.0844) -0.0232 (0.113)
Fin. Crisis -0.387*** (0.000550) -0.409*** (0.000118)
Patents 0.0129 (0.881) -0.0312 (0.562)
Prop. Indep. Directors 0.321 (0.153)
Effective Control -0.395** (0.0285)




Constant 3.283*** (1.13e-05) 3.570*** (1.37e-05)
Observations 535 535
R2 Within 0.212 0.249
Number of Firms 159 159
Joint test CEO 0.0164
Robust p-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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In a sample of large firms, Morck et al. (1988b) find evidence suggesting that
the relationship between CEO ownership and firm performance is non-linear. In
order to test this hypothesis, my research makes use of a third degree polynomial
of CEO ownership. This approach allows the curve representing CEO ownership to
vary non-linearly across a range of ownership values. Table 5.1 makes it clear that
individually the CEO ownership covariates are not significant. However, they are
jointly significant at the two percent level.
Figure 5.1a on page 165 shows the curve from the estimated polynomial based on
CEO ownership along with 95 percent confidence intervals. This figure shows that the
curve of CEO ownership does not appear to rise until after CEO ownership exceeds
40 percent of the firm. Figure 5.1b is the derivative of the curve also with 95 percent
confidence intervals. This curve clearly shows that the slope of the CEO ownership
curve does not appear to be significantly different from zero until ownership exceeds
40 percent of the firm. In Figure 5.1b, the y-axis value of zero is in bold. This
indicates that the slope of the CEO ownership curve in Figure 5.1a does not increase
or decrease until the 40 percent ownership point. In excess of 40 percent, it appears
that the slope of the CEO ownership curve becomes positive.
There is not a statistically significant relationship between the remaining gover-
nance covariates and Tobin’s Q. The proportion of independent directors and the
dummy variable representing family control of the firm are not significantly different
from zero. Note that family control of the firm can change over time within firms –
hence it is not a fixed effect which would be dropped from the regression model.
The failure of the fixed effects estimation method to indicate a relationship be-
tween the dependent variable and governance explanatory variables is not surpris-
ing. The governance variables in question are more likely to change slowly over
time (Zhou 2001, Benson & Davidson III 2009). The fixed-effects method examines
the changes within individuals over time by subtracting the mean from each obser-
vation. Thus, covariates that change slowly over time will display little variation.
In contrast, the random effects models discussed in the next section are designed
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to take into account the variation between insiders as well as the variation within
observations.
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(a) CEO ownership curve based on the fixed effects model with 95% confidence intervals.
(b) Derivative (rate of change) of the CEO ownership curve based on the fixed effects model
with 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 5.1: Predicted marginal effects of CEO ownership based on fixed-effects model
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5.3 Random Effects Regression
Random effects models have an important advantage over fixed-effects models be-
cause they take into account the variation between observations in addition to
the variation within observations of individuals. Random effects regressions are a
weighted average of between and within effects. Fixed-effects models have the ad-
vantage of being consistent, but random effects models are more efficient. However,
random effects models have the disadvantage that they may be inconsistent if the
between and fixed estimates of the parameter values in a model are not the same –
i.e., if the model is misspecified. The Hausman test compares the between and fixed
estimates to ensure that the random effects model is valid.
Column one in the regression results Table 5.2 on page 167 shows the results of the
random effects model with the same basic specification used in the previous section.
Column two shows the results of the regression when the governance variables are
included. Again, comparing the overall r-squared values of the two regressions, the
governance variables appear account for approximately four percent of the model’s
power to explain the variation in the dependent variable. In both cases the Hausman
test indicates that the random effects model is not invalid.
Table 5.2 shows that firms in the health and biotechnology industry appear to
be positively associated with Tobin’s Q. The random effects regression also shows
positive coefficients for both the computer industry dummy variable at the seven
percent level. However, after the governance characteristics are accounted for, the
dummy variable for computer industry firms ceases to be significantly different from
zero even at the ten percent level, but the health industry dummy variable remains
significant at the five percent level. The sign of the coefficients are as expected – both
the computer industry and the health industry are technology-intensive industries
where a potential success could result in large gains relative to their assets.
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Table 5.2: Tobin’s Q regressions: Random effects model
(1) (2)
VARIABLES RE p-values RE p-values
Prov. Western 0.00344 (0.983) 0.0466 (0.770)
Prov. Quebec -0.0648 (0.670) -0.0514 (0.729)
Ind. Computer 0.373* (0.0628) 0.319 (0.115)
Ind. Health 0.493** (0.0113) 0.406** (0.0410)
Ind. Consumer Goods 0.404 (0.263) 0.393 (0.263)
Ind. Transition 0.126 (0.608) 0.0374 (0.888)
Log Assets -0.379*** (0) -0.390*** (0)
Leverage -0.0267** (0.0265) -0.0256** (0.0319)
Fin. Crisis -0.308*** (0.000830) -0.340*** (7.69e-05)
Patents 0.0130*** (0.00245) 0.00962*** (0.00519)
Prop. Indep. Directors 0.505*** (0.00253)




Family Firm -0.0371 (0.857)
Constant 3.743*** (0) 3.802*** (0)
Observations 535 535
Number of Firms 159 159
R2 Within 0.203 0.234
R2 Between 0.390 0.426
R2 Overall 0.339 0.377
Hausman test 0.520 0.163
Joint test CEO 0.00304
Robust p-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The natural log of assets – the proxy for firm size – is negative as expected and
is significant at the 0.01 percent level. This captures the idea that larger firms will
be more established businesses with fewer unknowns and intangible goods. Just as
with the dependent variable, this covariate is also transformed as a natural log. The
interpretation of the coefficient is that a one percent increase in firm assets will be
associated with approximately a 0.4 percent decrease in Tobin’s Q, all other things
being equal. The leverage of a firm is also negatively associated with firm valuation
of the firm at the four percent level.
The dummy variable indicating if the firm observation occurred after the financial
crisis is negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 percent level. A number of
different specifications were tried, including individual dummy variables, each year
after the crisis. In each case, the results were consistently negative and statistically
significant. The single dummy variable was kept for simplicity as different configu-
rations of variables had no discernible effect on the overall fit of the model.
The number of patents a firm has – a proxy for R&D spending – is positive and
statistically significant at the 0.01 percent level. The magnitude of the coefficient is
rather small, indicating that each additional patent will increase the firm’s valuation
by less than one percent. However, the sign and significance of the coefficient is in
the expected direction, which supports the idea that the choice of proxy for research
and development expenditures is adequate.
The proportion of independent directors, which ranges in value from zero to one,
is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level. Here the coefficient
indicates that a complete change in a firm’s board from having no independent
directors to having all independent directors will be associated with an increase in
Tobin’s Q of over 50 percent, all else being equal. In practice, it is very unlikely
that a single firm will experience such an extreme change. The average proportion
of independent directors on boards of firms in the sample is 0.45 (see Summary
Statistics in Table 4.2 on page 114). Moreover, as noted in the previous section
dealing with the fixed effects regression, governance variables such as the proportion
of independent directors in a firm tend to change relatively slowly over time.
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The measurement of effective control yields a negative coefficient that is statisti-
cally significant at the three percent level. The interpretation is that, holding all else
equal, a complete change in the effective control from a firm where no insider group
has any effective control (i.e., the covariate is zero) to one in which one insider group
has complete effective control (the covariate is one) will be associated with over a
30 percent drop in Tobin’s Q. The average level of effective control in the sample is
0.56.
The measure capturing family control of the firm is not significantly different
from zero. An alternate specification used a dummy variable indicating if there was
a family in the firm at all. This variable too was found to not be statistically different
from zero. Note that this alternate choice of variable does not change within firms
so it can not be estimated in the fixed-effects model.
Finally, a joint test of the variables representing CEO ownership indicates that
the covariates are jointly significant well below the one percent level. The covari-
ates representing CEO ownership are also individually significant but just at the
10 percent level. Figure 5.2a on page 171 shows the predicted relationship between
CEO ownership and performance based on the regression results. Here the local
maximum appears to be at the 11 percent ownership mark and the local minimum
appears around the 36 percent ownership point.
Figure 5.2a shows the marginal effects for changes in CEO ownership on Tobin’s
Q, everything else held equal. The confidence intervals on the CEO ownership curve
(Figure 5.2a) and its derivative (Figure 5.2b) indicate that the slope of the curve is
not significantly different from zero below the 40 percent ownership mark. However,
past the point where the CEO owns 40 percent of the firm, there clearly appears to
be a marginal increase in Tobin’s Q, all else being held constant.
The results are similar to those found in the fixed-effects model. The derivative
of the CEO ownership curve shows the rate of change of the CEO ownership along
with 95 percent confidence intervals. Figure 5.2b makes it clear that the slope of
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the CEO ownership curve does not significantly vary from zero until about the 40
percent ownership mark.
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(a) CEO ownership as a polynomial curve based on the random intercept model with 95%
confidence intervals.
(b) Derivative (rate of change) of CEO ownership polynomial curve based on the random
intercept model with 95% confidence intervals.




Some basic diagnostic testing was done for all the models used in this chapter. In both
the fixed-effects models and the random effects models, histograms of the residuals
took on a normal distribution. There were observations with residuals beyond three
standard deviations. For testing purposes, these observations were dropped and the
regressions were re-estimated. The resulting coefficients were very similar to those
of the original regression model in both signs and significance.
5.5 Summary
This chapter presented the results of fixed and random effects regression models that
used Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. In this research, Tobin’s Q is used as a
measure of firm valuation. The model specification treated each of the governance
variables independently.
In the next chapter, these results will be discussed with respect to the theory
of internal social capital of corporations. Particular attention will be paid to the







This thesis offers a view of the firm that focuses on the internal social capital of
the organization (Harris & Helfat 2007). From this perspective, I have argued that
the theory of internal social capital – described here as the structure of relationships
between different coalitions of corporate insiders – can be a useful way in which
to understand corporate governance. In this research, I have tested the hypotheses
listed in Chapter Three using a sample of SMEs that have recently undergone a
public offering.
The literature review touched on some of the influential themes within the corpo-
rate governance literature. These themes include ownership and control of the firm
(Morck 2005a), and the importance of family-run firms (Villalonga & Amit 2006), and
the presence or absence of outside directors to oversee management (Weisbach 1988).
The majority of the corporate governance research examines hypotheses about these
themes by considering samples of larger, established firms. This is the case even
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though one of the seminal papers in the field, which focuses on top executive owner-
ship and firm performance, explicitly calls for an analysis of smaller firms and their
ownership structure (Morck et al. 1988b). Morck et al. (1988b, pg.314) call for fur-
ther research, “to learn how members of boards of directors with different individual
ownership positions interact, and how the distribution of ownership among board
members affects performance.” This research on internal social capital of SMEs of-
fers a contribution to the corporate governance literature on precisely this point both
theoretically and empirically.
The literature review also examines theories that are concerned with how the
linkages between firms are important. Economic sociologists have mainly developed
this area of the literature. These researchers have paid particular attention to how
firms can use corporate interlocks to exchange resources (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978),
relate firms to their sources of finance (Mintz & Schwartz 1985), and also examine
top corporate managers as a distinct social class (Useem 1986). Researchers in this
area have also contributed to network theory more generally.
6.1.1 Network Theory
Network theory has a long history in the social sciences dating back to at least the
late 1940s and 1950s. Bavelas (1950) was the first thinker to connect the structure
of linkages between individuals with their collective outcomes. Since that time, an
examination of the structure of network linkages and how they influence individuals
and organizations has become a growing area for academic research.
Other researchers have built on Bavelas’s (1950) insight of network centrality to
examine the importance of other network characteristics. One of the most important
research areas concerns how weak ties can be important (Granovetter 1973). Burt
(1992) also focuses on ties between groups, which he calls bridging ties. These are
similar to Granovetter’s weak ties but Burt places more emphasis on structure and
less on tie strength (Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell 2011).
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The structuralist approach – the approach that is adopted in this research –
explains success as a function of network position. Structuralism differs from other
network theories that are more concerned with who one is connected to and the
resources to be gained from those others (Lin 1999). In general, network theory has
proven to be very flexible – research has extended from whole-network analysis to
ego-centric networks.
The dominant approach within network theory has been to consider a so-called
flow model. In this type of model, resources of some type – often information –
are hypothesized to flow through a network. The position one has in a network
may be advantageous if one is able to access unique information or broker that
information to others. The alternatives to flow models are called bonding models or
architectural models. These models emphasize how individuals in the network can
coordinate action (Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell 2011, p.7). This research makes use of
an architectural model perspective to understand relationships between coalitions of
corporate insiders.
Economic sociologists generally try to take the social context of economic issues
into account in their analyses. The same cannot be said of most of the corporate
governance research; this research tends to focus on individuals within a firm without
a broader examination of their relationships to others in the same firm or different
firms. Granovetter (1985) has been particularly critical of economic studies that
ignore the social context in which economic transactions are embedded.
6.1.2 Corporate Governance Research
Corporate governance studies have tended to treat the importance of linkages be-
tween insiders as a secondary concern, if at all. For example, when dealing with
complex ownership pyramids, most studies of corporate ownership make simplify-
ing assumptions about which group controls the firm, based on who is the largest
shareholder (Porta et al. 1999, Connelly et al. 2010). Similarly, studies that include
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measures of outside directors often begin from the same intuition – that directors
who are not associated with the firm are important for governance. However, gover-
nance researchers often vary widely in how they determine who is an outside director
and who is an inside director (for discussion, see section 2.3.1 on page 33). It should
be noted that there are studies that do attempt to take into account diverse owner-
ship structures (such as Maury & Pajuste 2005) and account for relationships among
directors within the firm (Hwang & Kim 2009). These studies, however, are in the
minority.
My research brings network theory to the corporate governance literature. Using
social capital theory, I examine how the structure of linkages between corporate
insiders is associated with firm performance. I use the main networks noted in the
literature review – family networks, ownership networks and professional networks
– in order to determine which insiders are linked to each other. These relations are
theoretically expressed as the internal social capital of the firm.
The theory of the internal social capital of an organization is concerned with the
implications of the network structure that links corporate insiders within a firm. In
this dissertation, the literature has been broken down into broad headings that em-
phasize the networks that are used in this study to identify how corporate insiders
are related. The key idea behind this research is that the directors, managers and
large owners of a corporation are often socially related, and these relationships are
important for understanding corporate governance in SMEs that have recently gone
public. I argue the social network that results from considering these overlapping
networks should be considered architecturally, in terms of how the people within the
network coordinate their actions. Understanding how different corporate insiders
are related makes it possible to determine whether different coalitions – representing
corporate insiders that share some common network ties – exist in the firm. These
groups of variously related corporate insiders are assumed to share common interests.
These common interests may or may not coincide with the interests of other coali-
tions within the corporation. I argue that the structure of the relationships between
these coalitions can tell us something about how the corporation governs itself. The
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The sections that follow discuss the findings that are the result of the major hy-
potheses of this research. For each hypothesis, the theory, implementation, findings
and implications will be discussed.
6.2.1 Effective Control by Insider Groups
Hypothesis 1: The measure of effective control (constraint) in the firm is negatively
associated with firm performance.
The theory of internal social capital of the firm captures the idea that firms are
often composed of multiple different coalitions. This hypothesis considers the direct
implications that the structure of the different coalitions within a firm have on a
firm’s corporate governance. I argue that the relative voting rights controlled by
different coalitions within a firm have implications for how a firm is governed and
how the firm ultimately performs on the market.
The implications that having multiple coalitions within the firm can have on cor-
porate governance is perhaps best illustrated by considering two different scenarios.
In the first scenario, consider the implications if there are multiple coalitions in the
firm controlling roughly similar numbers of voting rights. In this case, I argue that
the different coalitions will act to provide oversight over one another in order to
ensure that their different interests are protected. In the second scenario, consider
a firm with only a single coalition of related insiders. In this case, the coalition has
effective control over the firm because there are no other coalitions of insiders with
significant interests in the firm. Thus, there is no group of insiders with enough
votes to contest the main coalition and so there is no oversight internally. In this
study, effective control is essentially the amount of control that any single coalition
can exert over the firm.
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Effective control is important to corporate governance because, at one extreme,
multiple different stakeholders have incentive to provide some oversight over one
another in order to protect their investment in the firm. This internal oversight
should benefit all shareholders by ensuring that resources are not misallocated in
order to benefit a single group in the firm. At the other extreme, if there is only
a single insider group within the corporation that has effective control of the firm,
this indicates that there is no oversight internally – i.e., no other group in the firm
has any incentive to challenge those that effectively control the firm. The key idea
here is that the structure of the relationships that exist between different coalitions
within a firm contribute to how the firm is governed.
I argue that considering the degree to which a firm is effectively controlled by a
single group is an important part of understanding a firm’s corporate governance. It
should be stressed, however, that the idea of effective control of a firm is intended as
a complement to other theories that attempt to capture corporate governance. The
idea in and of itself is not meant as a replacement to existing corporate governance
ideas.
In this research, I have implemented a measure of inside social capital using a
variant of Burt’s (1992) network measure of constraint. Family relationships and
linkages through common ownership in other companies or funds are used to deter-
mine which corporate insiders have links to others. Once these linkages have been
established, the ownership of voting shares controlled by each group of corporate
insiders is considered. Using the groups of corporate insiders, I construct a simple
network relating each insider group to the firm. The proportion of voting shares
that each coalition controls is used as a weight in the calculation of each network
edge. Burt’s (1992) measure of constraint is used to summarize the degree to which
one coalition has effective control over the organization while also accounting for the
relative importance of other insider groups with interests in the corporation.
The results in both the fixed effects and random intercept model are consistent.
In both models, the measure of effective control of the organization is negatively
associated with firm performance. In both the fixed and the random effects models,
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the coefficient on the effective control covariate is negative and statistically significant
at the five percent level. This lends support to the interpretation put forward here
that firms that are controlled by a single insider group have less internal oversight
which has a negative effect on firm performance. These findings support the idea that
there are insider groups within the firm and that these coalitions can act to oversee
one another. This is not to say that all coalitions in every case will always work
to oversee one another in a way that benefits small shareholders. As Flew (1995)
succinctly points out, relationships do not cause anything – individuals cause things
to happen, though the social structure in which they exist may influence individuals’
decisions. The point here is that the structure of the network of linkages between
different coalitions makes it more likely that there will be some oversight exercised
and that firm valuation will be affected.
This finding lends support to the idea that the internal social capital of a firm
has an influence on firm market performance. I argue that this observed relationship
can be understood with reference to firm corporate governance. If there is only one
insider group in the firm with effective control of the organization, then there are
no alternative coalitions of insiders with enough voting shares to provide a credible
threat to block the dominant group’s plans. However, if there are multiple coalitions
within the firm with similar levels of voting control, these groups are likely to provide
oversight over one another. If members of one group attempt to organize the firm
in a way to narrowly benefit themselves, the other coalitions of corporate insiders
in the firm will coordinate to stop this action. This finding also implies that many
commonly used measures of corporate governance may be better understood with
reference to the internal social capital of organizations.
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6.2.2 Oversight by Independent Directors
Hypothesis 2: The proportion of independent directors in the firm is positively asso-
ciated with firm performance.
The prime duty of directors of public companies is to oversee the work of man-
agers to ensure that the shareholders’ investments in the firm are protected. In
practice, however, the firm’s top managers often also serve as directors. This has
led researchers to try to distinguish between so-called inside directors (i.e., the firm’s
managers) and outside directors. Outside directors are assumed to be more inde-
pendent because they share no relationships with the firm. Thus, outside directors
are more able to effectively challenge the executive mangers than inside directors
whose future employment may be at risk if they openly criticize other top managers
(Weisbach 1988). Independent directors also have incentive to properly oversee the
firm. Fama & Jensen (1983) argue that independent directors are cognizant that
their reputations will be at risk if they do a poor job. Other studies have found that
there are consequences to the future employment prospects of directors who perform
poorly (Srinivasan 2005).
In practice, however, the seemingly simple delineation between inside and outside
directors has spawned a great many difficulties. These difficulties stem from the fact
that different authors often begin from the same intuitive starting point – that outside
directors are not related to the firm. Inconsistencies arise because the criteria used
by different authors to determine what constitutes an independent director can vary
widely across studies (see Literature Review, Section 2.3.1, page 33). There appear
to be only a few studies in which a consistent methodology to determine inside and
outside directors is based on the relationships between corporate insiders – a good
example of this approach is provided by Hwang & Kim (2009).
The advantage of a network-based theory used in this research is that the theory
often implies a clear methodological approach (Borgatti & Lopez-Kidwell 2011, Bor-
gatti & Halgin 2011). From a network perspective, independent directors can be
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thought of as insiders who do not share a relationship with any of the other insiders,
and who also do not own a significant portion of the firm. In this research, I use
the proportion of independent directors on the board – the number of independent
directors is divided by the total number of directors – to capture whether indepen-
dent directors have a significant say in the organization. Thus, as the proportion of
independent directors to all directors gets closer to one, the more independent the
board is considered to be.
In the fixed-effects regression model, the coefficient on the covariate representing
the proportion of independent directors was not significantly different from zero.
However, in the case of the random effects model, the coefficient is positive and
significant at the 0.01 percent level. This results support the notion that independent
directors are important for firm valuation.
The implications of this finding are twofold. First, these findings support the idea
that independent directors are important for corporate oversight. Second, the theory
of internal social capital of firms upon which this thesis is based and the method-
ological implementation speak to how useful a theoretical basis for determination
of inside and outside directors can be. In the majority of the corporate governance
literature, directors are determined to be insiders or outsiders based on intuitive but
ultimately somewhat arbitrary criteria. The social capital perspective offers a con-
sistent theoretical and methodological determination of independent directors in a
firm.
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6.2.3 Family Control of the Firm
Hypothesis 3: An indicator of a family-run firm is negatively associated with firm
performance.
Empirical measures of the importance of family ownership and control of firms
have yielded mixed results. Established family control has repeatedly been found to
be detrimental to firm performance if the founding entrepreneur passes the firm on
to other family members (Villalonga & Amit 2006). Research has shown that in the
Canadian context, large firms that are family-controlled have similar performance as
measured by Tobin’s Q, as widely-held firms in cases where there are no additional
mechanisms of control. Family-controlled firms with dual-class shares, on the other
hand, are found to have comparatively lower valuations (King & Santor 2008). How-
ever, all of this research has focused on larger, established firms. Little is known
about family-controlled SMEs on the public market.
In this research, I hypothesized that family-run firms are penalized by potential
investors due to concerns that the family will put their own interests ahead of other
shareholders. I speculated that if a firm is family-run, investors will see it as carrying
additional risk and that the firm will be valued accordingly. In order to test this
hypothesis, I created a dummy variable if family members are part of the insider
group with the greatest amount of voting shares in the firm.
The findings across all regressions were consistent in that they did not support the
hypothesis that family-run firms would be negatively associated with firm valuation.
Instead, consistent with King & Santor’s (2008) findings for larger Canadian firms,
there does not appear to be any relationship between family operation of the firm
and its valuation as measured by Tobin’s Q. Investors appear to be ambivalent about
the family ownership characteristics of the firm. This supports the idea that relatives
serving as top managers or directors has no effect on firm valuation once the structure
of relationships within the firm has been accounted for.
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6.2.4 CEO Ownership
Hypothesis 4a: CEO ownership is non-linearly associated with firm performance.
Ownership by the CEO is often considered to be an important element of firm
valuation. There are two theories that offer guidance regarding the relationship be-
tween CEO ownership and firm valuation (Morck et al. 1988b). The first theory is
called the convergence of interests hypothesis. It posits that increasing ownership is
incentive for the CEO’s interests to converge with those of other shareholders. This
theory predicts a roughly linear relationship between executive ownership and firm
performance. The second theory has been called the entrenchment hypothesis and
it predicts that there is a non-linear relationship between CEO ownership and firm
performance. Morck et al. (1988b) found in a sample of larger firms that there was
a local maximum at around the five percent ownership mark in the marginal rela-
tionship between ownership and performance. After this point, there was a decline
to a local minimum at around the 25 percent ownership point, after which there was
an increase in marginal relationship between ownership and performance (see Figure
2.4 and accompanying discussion on page 29).
In this research, I have implemented CEO ownership as a third degree polynomial
in the regression models. This approach has the advantage of allowing the resulting
curve to form according to the underlying data and not through a series of chosen
dummy variables as used in Morck et al. (1988b). In utilizing this approach, I pay
particular attention to the marginal changes in CEO ownership and the confidence
intervals around the estimated point values. The confidence intervals are particularly
important because they show whether the slope of the CEO ownership curve is
significantly different from zero at any given point.
In the primary fixed and random intercept models, the findings have been con-
sistent. There appears to be no significant relationship between CEO ownership and
firm valuation at low levels of ownership. It is only when CEO ownership exceeds 40
percent that there appears to be a significant positive association between ownership
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and performance (see Figure 5.2b on page 171). This implies that only at very high
levels of ownership does there appear to be any positive relationship between the
CEO’s ownership in the firm and the firm’s performance.
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6.3 Conclusions About the Research Problem
The findings from the empirical portion of this research support the idea that the
theory of internal social capital of firms is a useful perspective to examine corporate
governance within a sample of SMEs that have recently gone public in Canada.
In this research, I present hypotheses to examine questions that are pertinent to
corporate governance research. Each of these hypotheses are derived from the theory
of the inner social capital of the firm. The core idea of this theory is that the structure
of the relationships between corporate insiders matters. The network of relationships
that exists between corporate insiders can be used to infer coalitions with similar
interests that have incentive to coordinate their actions in order to protect their own
interests.
The first two hypotheses about effective control and independent directors deal
directly with the structure of relationships between corporate insiders. The last
two hypotheses – dealing with family control of the firm and CEO ownership – are
concerned with how particular characteristics of the group or individual potentially
affect firm performance. Other corporate governance studies dealing with questions
of family control and CEO ownership do exist. The difference is that my research
considers these factors through the theoretical lens of internal social capital of the
firm. I submit that understanding the larger social context adds more insight than
considering either the presence of families or CEO ownership in isolation. The in-
ternal social capital of the firm is a useful perspective to take in examining the
firm because the network of relationships between insiders can have both direct and
indirect effects on firm outcomes.
Effective Control
The first hypothesis is concerned with the implications that effective control of the
firm by an insider group has for firm performance. The concern is to determine
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if there is a coalition in the firm that has enough voting rights to effectively con-
trol the organization or if other coalitions can contest any decisions made by the
controlling group. In the sample of SMEs used in this research, I find support for
the hypothesis that having a single controlling group is negatively associated with
firm performance. This finding indicates that the internal social capital view of the
firm can provide insight into how the structure of relationships between insiders can
influence outcomes.
The effective control hypothesis extends and builds on Maury & Pajuste’s (2005)
work. However, rather than just being restricted to multiple corporate owners, this
research considers the voting shareholdings of every individual insider associated with
a firm and their links with other insiders. Thus, the internal social capital of the
firm includes all owners as well as their representatives on the board. Internal social
capital encompasses all the voting ownership among all the coalitions of insiders in
a firm. The extension of the networks in this research to encompass family networks
and ownership networks is relevant, especially considering the high rate of family
involvement in public SMEs (for discussion, see 2.2 on page 18).
Independent Directors
The second hypothesis is concerned with the proportion of independent directors
who provide external oversight on behalf of shareholders. The previous hypothesis
dealt with those insiders who are somehow connected to one another. In contrast,
this hypothesis focuses on individual insiders who are not connected to anyone else
in the firm. In particular, the network measure examines which directors are not
related to other insiders. The findings of the empirical model support the notion
that independent directors are important for corporate oversight. The internal social
capital perspective of the firm also allows for independent directors to be identified
using a methodology that is consistent with theory.
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Family Control of the Firm
In this research, a firm is considered to be family-controlled if multiple family mem-
bers are part of the largest shareholding group. I found no support for the idea that
the performance of family-controlled firms is significantly different than that of other
firms.
This result appears, at first, to differ from the results found in the extant lit-
erature. However, the extant corporate governance literature has mainly focused
on large, established firms where there may be multiple generations involved in the
firm. Researchers have found that there appears to be a negative association with
performance when there is nepotism involved in executive appointments (King &
Santor 2008). The key idea is that subsequent generations may not have the same
business acumen that the originator of the firm possessed. In the current sample of
SMEs that have recently undergone an IPO, it is very likely that the family members
are founders of the firm. The results from the model indicate that family-controlled
firms perform no differently, all other things being equal, than other firms. These
results support the idea that executives from the same family are no better or worse
than other managers.
CEO Ownership
The percentage of a firm that executives of that firm own has emerged as an impor-
tant, if controversial, theme in the corporate governance literature. In this study,
I consider CEO ownership in the firm because of the important role the position is
thought to play in SMEs (Morck et al. 1988b, pg.314).
The basic regression models in this study indicate CEO ownership has no asso-
ciation with firm performance for relatively low levels of ownership. At high levels
of ownership – past 40 percent – there appears to be a positive association between
CEO ownership and firm performance. This implies that at high levels of corporate
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ownership, the interests of the CEO appear to converge with those of regular share-
holders. However, this result is based on relatively few observations from just seven
firms. It is clear that for lower levels of ownership no association between ownership
and performance was found. For higher levels of CEO ownership, there may be some
relationship although the potential relationship based on these influential observa-
tions is likely best explored outside of a quantitative framework using a case-study
approach.
6.3.1 Contributions
This research has explored the importance of internal social capital theory to corpo-
rate governance and firm performance. Using a sample of SMEs that have recently
gone public in Canada, I find evidence supporting the idea that internal social capital
is a useful way to understand corporate governance. The hypotheses of this research
have made use of the theory of internal social capital to better understand SME
corporate governance and its association with firm performance.
There are a number of benefits to examining the internal social capital of corpora-
tions. The first is that internal social capital theory offers guidance and consistency
in cases that are often handled in an ad hoc fashion by governance researchers. Ex-
amples include cases of effective control and independence of directors, discussed
above. The second advantage of the internal social capital perspective is that the
network measures used offer accurate summaries of the complex relationships that
are commonplace in even the smallest firms. The social capital approach can also
be easily extended to other cases where additional networks need to be taken into
account. In short, the internal social capital view of firms has the advantage of being
a consistent theoretical approach to corporate governance within the firm, as well as
offering consistent methodological tools to measure complex relationships.
This research has made a number of contributions to the corporate governance
literature. The primary contribution of this research has been to develop the theory
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of internal social capital of the firm. In contrast to earlier work in this area (Harris &
Helfat 2007), I develop a network-based theory of firm governance that is concerned
with the coordination between corporate insiders. This is an architectural network
model as opposed to a flow-type model that is often adopted in network studies.
Using the theoretical lens of internal social capital, I have developed four general
hypotheses of the firm. The hypotheses concerned with effective control of the firm
and the proportion of independent directors in the organization are both concerned
with factors affecting corporate governance in the firm. Both of these measures are
derived directly from the network of relationships between corporate insiders in the
firm. This is a methodological contribution of this study – the variables used in the
models are tightly coupled with the network theory from which they are derived.
This study’s remaining two hypotheses – dealing with family-run firms and CEO
ownership – are concerned with themes that have become increasingly the focus of
interest for many researchers. Both of these hypotheses make use of the structure
of relationships between corporate insiders in order to better understand corporate
governance of SMEs. The hypothesis regarding family-controlled firms is concerned
with possible differences between firms that are family-run and those that are not.
In this research, I find no significant difference between family-controlled firms and
other firms in the sample of SMEs that have recently gone public. CEO ownership,
a measure of individual incentive, does not appear to be an important explanatory
variable in firms that are not effectively controlled by a single large insider. Thus,
the findings of these hypotheses illustrate the usefulness of the theory of internal
social capital in exploring corporate governance issues in greater detail.
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6.4 Implications for Theory
The findings of this research have implications for existing corporate governance
theory. Considering the internal social capital of a firm draws together disparate
sources of the corporate governance literature in a theoretically consistent manner
(Connelly et al. 2010). For example, in the present study, family, ownership and
professional linkages are all considered. The social capital perspective allows for
the implications of these different network types to be considered holistically. By
combining all of these very different networks, the theory of internal social capital
allows us to see how related insiders in the firm can collectively influence outcomes.
Although this research has focused on Canadian SMEs that have recently gone
public and the networks associated with family, ownership and professional connec-
tions, there is nothing restricting the approach used here from making use of other
theoretically valid networks. This flexibility means that the theory and measures
developed here can be easily taken to other contexts, using other theoretically justi-
fiable networks.
This emphasis on relationships and interconnections is important given that the
dominant paradigm in the corporate governance literature continues to be agency
theory (Connelly et al. 2010). Agency theory provides a powerful explanatory frame-
work, but even authors working with agency theory feel the need to extend it to
explain the outcomes they see empirically (see section 3.4 on page 61 for discussion).
Viewing the firm from the perspective of its internal social capital can provide
valuable insights even if used from within an agency perspective. For example, in
the current research, all SME owners are taken into account in determining whether
a firm is effectively controlled. I argue that this approach is superior to existing
attempts that focus exclusively on external corporate owners (Maury & Pajuste
2005), or ignoring all but the largest owners altogether (Morck 2005b). The social
capital approach captures details about the linkages between insiders with significant
ownership stakes in the firm that may have otherwise been lost.
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Coupled with internal social capital theory and its emphasis on the linkages be-
tween corporate insiders are related methodological tools. The measures in this study
can be used in other corporate governance studies regardless of the networks chosen.
Similarly, the process to determine who is an independent director leads directly
from the internal social capital theory developed in this research.
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6.5 Implications for Policy and Practice
This study builds on research drawn from the corporate governance and sociological
literature. The extant literature in these fields tends to focus on large, established
firms. Very little work examines the importance of corporate governance to the
performance of relatively small and medium-sized firms. This research assesses the
importance of corporate governance to the performance of SMEs. The outcomes of
this research will be of interest to policy makers and practitioners – entrepreneurs,
managers and directors.
Policy makers will find this work useful because it offers practical, quantitative
methods for measuring the relationships between corporate insiders. Policy makers
are hesitant to burden SMEs with excessive reporting requirements. The methods
used in this research can shed light on corporate governance of SMEs without bur-
dening companies with surveys or new reporting requirements. Using these measures,
which are grounded in the network analysis literature, firms with different governance
structures can easily be compared. Moreover, the methodology used in this research
can be used for any public Canadian firm that is required to report using the System
for Electronic Disclosure of Insiders (SEDI) (CDS Inc. 2010).
Entrepreneurs, investors, directors and managers will find this research useful
because it examines how different forms of governance are generally associated with
firm valuation. This knowledge – gained from an analysis of actual SMEs that have
recently undergone an IPO on a Canadian exchange – can be used as the boards of
SMEs are assembled or new members are added to existing boards. This information
is useful because SMEs are likely different from the majority of larger, established
companies that make up the majority of corporate governance studies.
In SMEs, many of the corporate insiders maintain relationships with the found-
ing entrepreneur. Family members, friends or early investors may all be corporate
insiders because of their personal relationships with the founder rather than merit.
Directors working with these firms need to be aware of the possible dynamics of
193
groups of insiders within the firm. The relationships highlighted in this study –
family, ownership and professional relationships – may affect how directors can do
their job. Rather than ignore these complex issues, this research attempts to take
them into account. For example, family firms make up a significant percentage of
the publicly listed SMEs in Canada. In many firms, families retain enough shares
to effectively control the firm. This research considers how corporate governance in
family-run firms is related to performance.
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6.6 Limitations
There are also limitations that should be considered in this study. This research
only considers industrial SMEs that have recently undergone an IPO and that are
publicly listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange and the Toronto Venture Exchange.
The results here may not be directly applicable to private firms or to larger public
firms.
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6.7 Implications for Future Research
The empirical findings of this research cannot be generalized beyond the SMEs that
have recently gone public in Canada. However, the theory and methodology devel-
oped in this research point to new directions for future research. The theory and
methodology developed in this research should be applicable using any theoretically
justifiable networks.
One direction for future research would be to extend it to the study of large
corporations and business groups. In many countries, including Canada, business
groups are common (Morck 2005a). These business groups are characterized by
companies owning voting shares in other corporations. Collectively, these firms are
often organized into a corporate pyramid. Within a corporate pyramid there is an
ultimate controlling owner. When multiple large corporations own shares in another
firm the consequences for firm performance are difficult to determine. Many studies
of corporate pyramids have made simplifying assumptions to make their analysis
more tractable (for discussion, see Section 2.3 on page 27).
Some researchers have chosen to examine the largest owners in a firm while ex-
cluding other large shareholders in the firm from their analyses. I argue that these
simplifying assumptions are not necessary. Using network-theoretic approaches, com-
plex relationships based on inter-corporate ownership only need to be considered as
another network in order to be evaluated. Using the social capital theory in general,
and the measure of effective control developed in this research in particular, I argue
that it would be possible to conduct more nuanced research into the implications of
ownership by business groups. For example, do firms that are effectively controlled
by a number of firms perform differently than those that are effectively controlled by
a single parent company? What are the implications for public firms that are central
in a corporate pyramid? Moreover, what is the role the directors from within the
corporate pyramid play on the board of a firm (Attiga & Morck 2006)?
The findings of this research regarding CEO ownership offer another avenue for
future research. In this research, CEO ownership was found to have a non-linear
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relationship with firm performance in firms that are highly controlled. The results
of this study differed from those of Morck et al. (1988b). Rather than displaying an
increasing and then decreasing association of ownership with firm performance, the
results of this study show only a result in those cases where the CEO owns in excess
of 40 percent of the firm. These results indicate that in some cases, strong leadership
may positively influence performance. However, in the majority of cases this does
not appear to be the case. A case-study approach may be necessary here to better
understand these results.
This research examines how SME corporate governance is related to firm perfor-
mance as measured by Tobin’s Q. Another important related question concerns those
firms that have exited the panel in this analysis. SMEs may have left the panel used
in this study for a variety of reasons. Some firms leave because they go out of busi-
ness, but others become acquired and generate profits for their owners. More study
needs to be done to understand if and how the corporate governance of the firm is
related to the event of the firm becoming acquired. A further question concerns how
the corporate interlocks that the firm maintains are related to this outcome.
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